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Abstract
Algeria’s achievement of independence in 1962, after a bloody war served as an 
inspiration to the rest of Africa still under colonial rule. As a result, many studies 
have been done on French colonial rule in Algeria, and the latter’s resistance to it. 
But, these studies have not fully attempted to link the implications of French 
decolonisation of Algeria to British decolonisation of her African territories, hence 
this study attempts to fill this gap. The thesis is about Britain and the Algerian war, 
with particular reference to Britain in Africa. It deals with decolonisation and the 
“wind of change” and presents the history of North Africa in the context of Africa as a 
whole. From its beginning in 1954, the Algerian war has occupied a unique place in 
the history of decolonisation. Its repercussions for French colonial policy were 
followed with keen interest by the British, who like the French had a huge empire in 
Africa, and also had potential trouble spots of the magnitude of the Algerian 
quagmire.
The thesis begins with a description of the post-war international situation, in which 
America and the Soviet Union emerged as the two super-powers, while the resources 
of the old imperial powers of Britain and France did not match the growing needs of 
government in their colonial possessions. They were put on the defensive by 
nationalism in Asia and Africa, supported by American anti-colonialism. The 
outbreak of the Cold War and the fear of communism seemed to provide them with 
some justification for resisting demands for independence, but made America all the 
more anxious for the “end of empire,” to win the battle of third world “hearts and 
minds.” The thesis investigates the extent to which British and French colonial 
policies had an influence on each other during the period of decolonisation. Against 
this background, the thesis traces the history of the war in Algeria, 1954-62, and the 
post-war settlement down to 1965, together with the histories of French and British 
decolonisation in Africa over the same period, in order to follow the history of British 
concern with the problem. It shows how this concern was at its height under the 
Macmillan government, but came down to the promotion of British business interests 
after the end of the war, when Algeria’s internal problems and continued dependence 
on France reduced the fear that it would seek to cause difficulties for the colonial 
powers in Africa.
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CHAPTER 1
SOURCES
In writing this thesis I relied on four broad sources of information namely, official British 
records at the Public Record Office, the British press, Parliamentary papers and the 
published secondary literature on the Algerian war. My main research base was London 
and travels were centred around the Public Record Office at Kew, Newspaper archives at 
Colindale, School of Oriental African Studies Library, Senate House Library, Institute of 
Historical Research, British Library and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Library. 
The purpose of this section of the thesis is to detail the kind of information that was 
discovered and how it was utilised in preparation of this study.
First, British government reaction to the Algerian war can be categorised into two parts, 
namely what transpired within Whitehall and how Algeria was presented and debated in 
the British legislature. In the Public Record Office this research benefited substantially 
from files that fall under the F0371 and PREM11 series. The former are Foreign Office 
political correspondence such as letters from British diplomatic missions in France, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and United States (Washington and New York respectively). 
The NATO Delegation was also a valuable source of information. In other words, Britain 
received first hand information about Algeria from a variety of diplomatic and military 
sources. The PREM11 series files are Prime Ministers’s Office correspondence and 
papers. I classified the information from the above sources into three categories and 
treated it in the following manner. Firstly, was the original information from official 
sources such as consulates, or foreign official sources, for example, French government. 
Secondly, was what comments were made on the information in government circles or in 
the press; and thirdly, the action that was taken on the information, for instance, reports, 
statements of positions and effect or utilisation on policy decisions.
During the better part of the Algerian conflict, 1954 to 1960, Britain had in Paris as her 
Ambassador, a highly capable, efficient and competent man in Sir Gladwyn Jebb. Jebb 
does appear to have had close contacts within the French political establishment. His 
reports to London showed or indicated that he was on many occasions privy or briefed on 
highly top secret issues pertaining to French policy in Algeria. Even his support staff 
seemed to have been well-informed and connected in the Elysee Palace and the Hotel 
Matignon and Quai d’Orsay. When General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in May 
1958, Jebb developed a highly professional and sophisticated relationship with him and 
de Gaulle respected and held the Ambassador in high regard because he always stood his 
ground in an argument or discussion. Through this association the British diplomat was 
able to extract quite a lot on the French leader’s thinking of Algeria. The Paris Embassy 
reported to the Western and African departments or desks in the Foreign Office, while 
some information regarded as too sensitive was short-circuited to reach the Foreign 
Secretary instantly.
In Algiers, the Britsh Consul-General Office was manned by R.F.G. (Rod) Sarell who
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was also an outstanding diplomat. He reported to both the British Embassy in Paris and 
Foreign Office in London. His main sources of informants included the Algiers 
Residency and British people such as those in the Foreign Legion, while his American 
counterparts always passed crucial information to him on the Algerian situation. Sarell 
through these information rich sources was able to move from providing quarterly reports 
to monthly ones as there was a lot to write about. After Tunisian independence in March 
1956 and the subsequent intensification of the struggle, the Tunis embassy under Angus 
Malcolm provided the Foreign Office with information on the war across the border. 
With the establishment in Tunis of the Algerian Provisional Government in exile in 1958, 
Malcolm’s office followed every move within the FLN. Just as the Algiers Consulate, 
the Tunis office collaborated with their American counterparts in exchanging vital 
information such as Tunisian moves at mediation between the belligerents. In 
Washington, the State Department frequently passed essential information to the British 
mission there. The British delegation to NATO also listened to the reaction of the 
Alliance defence community and French official and military comments on Algeria. In 
addition, British military attache(s) in Paris frequently visited Algeria and reported on 
military aspects of the conflict and how the situation was likely to develop.
So, the information from all these diplomatic and military sources was distilled into 
coherent reports and summaries of the Algerian situation. These conclusions informed 
British official thinking of the trends of international opinion towards the Algerian issue, 
and how much opposition France was likely to face at the United Nations. Through this, 
London was able to frame the kind or nature of positions to adopt at these international 
fora. Also, more importantly the Algiers diplomatic mission always prepared for London 
annual review reports on the situation in Algeria. These were summaries which in a 
chronological fashion followed or reported on the major highlights or developments of a 
particular year on the Algerian issue. In most instances these annual reports covered the 
political and economic situation in Algeria. On the economic aspect, present and future 
British interests were at times discussed. All the information from this variety of sources 
was digested into reports which were circulated in Whitehall up to Prime Ministerial 
level. The nature of the reports or correspondence were always in response to or analyses 
of episodes in the course of the war. Beginning with the battle of Algiers in January 
1957, through to the Sakiet Sidi Youssef incident in February 1958 onwards there are 
indications that there was growth in official British interest on events in Algeria. This 
was shown by the flow of information from the various diplomatic missions in North 
Africa, Western Europe and across the Atlantic.
Still under the official British sources were the Parliamentary papers which dealt with or 
covered the presentation of Algeria in the House of Commons. Opposition to colonial 
rule gained momentum in the 1950s and in most of the metropolitan countries it was 
political parties to the left of politics that often advocated the ending of colonial rule thus 
lending their support to the colonised peoples in their struggles. This was the case in 
Britain and France. In Britain the Algerian question was in most cases raised in the 
House of Commons by the Labour Party. This was in many instances in the form of 
questions, whereby the Opposition wanted the government to clarify its position on 
certain aspects or incidents of the conflict. Ministers were frequently taken to task to
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slate what Her Majesty’s Government was doing towards the resolution of the conflict 
and which side they were supporting. From the British Parliamentary papers it is quite 
clear that the opposition Labour Party was fully in support of the Algerian nationalists’ 
cause and viewed the issue as an international problem that could have serious 
ramifications for British colonial policy in some of her African colonies in British East 
and Central Africa, while it also had implications for NATO.
During the course of the war, at times demonstrations under the Labour Party’s banner 
were organised in support of Algerian freedom fighters. Protests were made against 
certain brutalities or injustices committed by the French during the war. An example of 
increased Labour Party support for the Algerians was shown in November 1960 when 
one of the party’s vociferous Members of Parliament Anthony Wedgwood Benn tabled a 
motion for debate in the House. Answers to these parliamentary questions or debate(s) 
throw insights into British policy which was supporting France albeit couched in 
diplomatic language which often raised more questions than answers.
The third source of information used in this research was the press. Newspapers are 
important in the sense that they inform the public on various issues. Through the press, 
government policies on contentious issues can be known and through its reportage, the 
press can be able to gauge the public mood or even shape public opinion on a particular 
subject. During the Algerian war Britain had and (still has) numerous newspapers. 
These were either daily or weekly publications. Newspapers inasmuch as they inform, 
can also display political leanings or orientation depending on their editorial policy, and 
their writings may be tendentious. In other words, newspapers can be to the left, right or 
liberal side of politics depending on the way they report news on particular issues.
Since this study is not about the Algerian war and the British press per se, the latter is 
used to see the extent to which it informed the British public on the war and what 
significance it attached to this conflict through its reportage. In terms of the usage of 
newspapers, the papers were not picked in any order of preference but the sampling was 
randomly done depending on how much they reported on the subject treated in the thesis. 
For the dailies, those found to be invaluable to this study were the Daily Telegraph, 
Manchester Guardian or Guardian, Daily Express, Daily Herald, Daily Mirror and The 
Times. In case of weekly periodicals, The Listener, New Statesman and the Spectator 
were found crucial to this study. Weeklies were important in the sense that they gave the 
gist of a particular event or story in that particular week and in most cases these were 
leading articles. Again in most instances the newspapers had special correspondents 
either in Paris or Algiers, or were sent on special assignments to report on particular 
subjects. Some of the notable correspondents who reported on the subject were Thomas 
Cadett (BBC Paris correspondent), Edward Behr {Reuters and Time Magazine), New 
Statesman’s Francis Williams and Bickham Sweet-Escott of The Listener, to mention but 
a few.
What was persistent in all these papers was that they did not report on the war 
consistently. Episodes in the war that might be perceived as critical or important did not 
appear as such from one newspaper to another. Whereas incidents linked directly or
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indirectly to the war such as the Philippeville massacre, Suez, battle of Algiers, Saldet 
Sidi Youssef, collapse of the Fourth Republic, September 1959 De Gaulle’s speech on 
self-determination of Algeria, week of the barricades, Evian accords, OAS counter­
terrorism and the Boumedienne Coup of 1965 dominated front pages and were lead 
stories of some papers, in others they were relegated to the obscure middle pages of the 
papers or at times passed unnoticed or unreported. On balance there was an increase in 
the coverage of the war in the press. Generally, the Daily Telegraph and Guardian have 
tended to follow the Algerian story in every inch as it unfolded and often gave their 
editorial position on particular events or episodes. The sample of newspapers used in this 
study is generally representative of the whole British press.
The final sources of information used in this research was the published secondary 
literature in the period under study, which also extended to the general literature of 
British decolonisation in Africa, especially the “wind of change” period and its 
repercussions. The published secondary literature included books, journal articles or 
periodicals, memoirs and biographies. As for memoirs and biographies those that 
benefited this work were of people who through their actions were either directly or 
indirectly involved with events or the course of the conflict. In this regard the memoirs 
and biographies of Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, Selwyn Lloyd, Iain Macleod, 
Charles de Gaulle, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and John Foster Dulles were 
consulted. In terms of books, those covering the period 1945 to 1954 featured Algeria in 
the general discussion of the French North African problem. Most of these covered 
issues relating to the direct belligerents or protagonists namely France and Algeria.
“Anglo-Saxon” literature began to appear in the late 1950s and culminated for this 
purpose with Alistair Horne’s, A Savage War o f Peace in 1977. These were in most 
instances books, political commentaries and newspaper articles in the form of talking 
points written by journalists who were able to penetrate the rebel front lines and had 
established some rapport with them. These were written by British and American 
journalists and academics. The significance of these sources was that they brought the 
war into the public domain in both Britain and America. These books covered a variety 
of themes relating to the war, such as Algeria’s “nationhood,” torture and human rights, 
terrorism and counter-terrorism, independence as opposed to different kinds of 
relationship to France or the West in general and on the whole concept of the revolution.
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CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION : BRITAIN AND FRANCE AFTER WORLD WAR II 
a. INTRODUCTION
The context of this thesis is the end of British and French empires especially in Africa. 
The purpose is to see how in this context Britain saw and reacted to Algeria in relation to 
her broader policy of African decolonisation. Both Britain and France had huge direct 
and indirect spheres of influence in different parts of the world. After the Second World 
War in 1945, a process began, gained momentum in the 1950s and accelerated in the 
1960s. By 1965 vast areas that used to be colonies and protectorates under European 
powers had become politically independent entities determining their own destinies. This 
process alluded to above came to be known as decolonisation. Decolonisation as a 
concept has now become a controversial subject, mainly in relation to its meaning and 
what forces were at play that brought about this phenomenon, especially the speed with 
which decolonisation occurred. As a consequence of this, various schools of thought 
have advanced diverse reasons as to why decolonisation took place at the time it did. 
Arguments advanced hinge on what was happening in the metropoles and in the colonies, 
on public opinion in the mother countries, and on the changing economic and 
international balance of power in the world after 1945.
In order to address this controversy, an argument is made here that there is no satisfactory 
single explanation of decolonisation, but that a multiplicity of factors in the economic, 
political and military circumstances in Europe and the wider world, coupled with the 
growth of African nationalism, made this process inevitable. It is true that other factors 
weighed more heavily than others. The way the colonial powers reacted or responded to 
decolonisation varied from region to region, from colony to colony. Decolonisation in 
general, however, can be explained as the collapse since 1945 of the global system which 
sustained British and other European imperialisms. In this sense therefore, 
decolonisation is to be seen as the breakdown not just of colonial rule but of a much 
larger complex which might be called the “global colonial order.”1
b. The World Situation After 1945 to 1953
The United States joined the Second World War on the side of Britain in December 1941, 
as a direct consequence of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. Though Britain and 
America were allies in this global conflict, they had different colonial aims. Because of 
her history, there was a long tradition of anti-colonialism in American foreign policy, 
whereas Britain regarded colonies as part of her strength, and were to be maintained for 
the survival of her global power and influence. The post-war international situation was 
such that the United States and Soviet Union emerged as the two super-powers, while the 
resources of the old imperial powers of Britain and France did not match the growing 
needs of government in their colonial possessions. The post-war, bi-polar era in which 
the world divided into two opposing camps came to be known as the Cold War. Attack at
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Pearl Harbor and the conclusion of the war ended American “isolationism.” The United 
States now became active in world affairs especially in Europe and the strategy was to 
prevent any rival power from controlling its vast industrial resources.
America was the only power to gain economically from the Second World War. As a 
result of massive increase in wartime spending, the American Gross National Product 
(GNP) rose from $88.6 billion in 1939 to $135 billion in 1945. America’s industrial 
output between 1940 and 1944 rose by 15 per cent a year.2 United States economic 
superiority was reflected in her military might. According to Nicholas White, at the end 
of the war, America boasted of 12.5 million military personnel, 7.5 million of whom were 
stationed overseas.'1 America’s navy far outstripped that of Britain. The American 
airforce commanded the air with over two thousand heavy bombers and, above all, a 
monopoly of atomic weapons. This American military power was exemplified overseas 
by the establishment of a mass of military bases and the signing of security pacts in 
different parts of the globe.
But the United States power came up against an equally formidable opponent in the form 
of the Soviet Union. Having defeated the Germans, the Soviet Union had extended its 
own boundaries and the immediate post-war years witnessed the development of an 
informal Soviet empire of satellite states in Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that the 
Soviet Union’s economy had been partly ruined by the war, her imposing military might 
could not be ignored. Though the Red Army was reduced by almost two-thirds after the 
war, it still had about 175 divisions, which were supported by tens of thousands of front­
line tanks and aircraft. Added to this was the vast Soviet navy.4 All this made the Red 
Army the largest defence complex in the world, which after the war underwent a 
thorough modernisation programme.
In contrast to the United States and Soviet Union, Britain emerged from the war in dire 
economic and military circumstances. The war had exhausted most of British resources 
in its execution. During the war Britain liquidated over £lbillion of overseas investments 
to finance the war effort and at the same time the general foreign debt reached more than 
£3 billion.5 Post-war Britain faced a colossal balance of payments deficit, and the 
country was the world’s largest debtor. In blunt terms, Britain emerged from the war, 
virtually bankrupt, and was dependent on American financial aid. After the war the 
United States gave Britain a loan of $3.75 billion and Canada augmented this by $1.25 
billion/’ Britain’s industrial base had drastically shrunk in spite of the manufacturing 
output being greater than those of Germany and France combined.
This British weakness was marked both economically and militarily. By 1950 Britain’s 
total GNP was less than one-fifth of the United States and just over one-half of the Soviet 
Union. Militarily, by 1950 the United States had 1.38million men in uniform and the 
defence budget stood at $14.5 billion.7 The Soviet Union had 4.3 military personnel with 
a budget of $15.5 billion. Britain’s military personnel and budget paled into 
insignificance when juxtaposed with the super-powers. For instance, the British defence 
budget stood at $2.3 billion although there were still 680,000 persons under arms. 
Coupled with this was the fact that Britain still maintained enormous overseas
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commitments in the empire and beyond.
This was even more true in the case of the other imperial European powers. Italy, 
Germany’s ally, had been defeated by the US and Britain, and as a result lost her colonial 
possessions in Africa - Eritrea, Somalia and Libya although she was granted trusteeship 
of the former Italian Somalia from 1949-60. France, Belgium and the Netherlands, on 
the other hand, had been defeated by Germany. Although they had been liberated by the 
US and Britain, their economies were in ruins and their military capacity tiny even in the 
case of France. The task they faced of resuming the burden of empire in Africa and Asia 
was immense, and was certainly not helped by the formation of the United Nations.
In April 1945, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) was formed as a major 
international institution of the “new world order.” This had a wider remit and 
membership than its predecessor, the League of Nations. Part of the UN’s mandate was 
to assist in the rise of new states. Article I of the UN Charter stipulated that the general 
purpose of the organisation was “to develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples...”8 In 1948 
this principle was expressed with greater force in the Declaration of Human Rights 
endorsed unanimously by the UN General Assembly. But the UN had its origins in the 
Atlantic Charter of August 1941, when the American President Franklin Roosevelt and 
the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met on a battleship off the Canadian coast 
and issued a statement of their hopes for the future of mankind. The Charter especially 
Article III as a declaration of common Anglo-American principles, declared that the 
United Kingdom and the United States “respect the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and 
self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”9 
Interpretation of the above declaration soon proved to be an issue of contention. Whereas 
President Roosevelt, declared that the right of self-determination should apply to all 
peoples (and this view was supported by many people in the colonies), on the other hand, 
Churchill and Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, insisted that Article III should 
apply only to the European countries liberated from the Axis powers, thus excluding the 
colonies. The United Nations Charter did become a kind of documentary expression of 
natural law and a global Bill of Rights. It served as a reference point in the development 
of the Third World bloc or Non-Aligned Movement. By 1955, most of Asia had 
achieved its independence and Africa was becoming militant in the quest for its own, the 
nationalists of Asia and Africa were still basing their demands firmly on the Charter. At 
the end of the first conference of the Third World States at Bandung in Indonesia in 1955, 
at the final communique stated that:
The Asian-African Conference declared its full support o f the fundamental 
principles o f Human Rights as set forth in the Charter o f the United 
Nations and took note o f the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights and 
all nations. The Conference declared its full support fo r the principles o f 
self-determination o f peoples and all nations as set forth in the Charter o f 
the United Nations and took note o f the United Nations resolutions on the
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rights o f peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a pre- 
recjiusite o f the fu ll enjoyment o f all fundamental Human Rights.10
This movement for independence on the part of the colonial subjects of the European 
empires was favoured by the United States. This attitude, however, was to some extent 
reversal in favour of the imperial powers by the growing rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. From 1947 onwards the Cold War emerged as the dominant 
reality of international politics. In February 1947, the British government informed the 
Americans that they were terminating their financial aid to Greece and Turkey at the end 
of March because of Britain’s domestic economic difficulties. These were trouble spots 
in the deepening Cold War. In fear of communist penetration, the United States moved 
in swiftly to fill the vacuum created by this contraction of British power. The United 
States then approved aid in the region of $400 million for Greece and Turkey.11 With the 
help of American aid and military advisers the Greek army eventually managed to defeat 
the Greek communist insurgents. On 12 Marchl947 in a message to Congress, President 
Harry Truman outlined the Truman Doctrine, which was “to support free people who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”12 He went 
further and stated that the world was dividing into two ways of life, democracy and 
totalitarianism. This effectively committed the United States to intervene against 
communist or communist-backed movements in Europe and elsewhere.
The next American move was to turn her energies to war-ravaged Europe. Returning 
from the March-April 1947 Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, the United States 
Foreign Secretary, George C. Marshall passed through Western Europe and was appalled 
by the economic and social distress that he witnessed. Most of the economies in Western 
Europe were suffering acute balance of payments difficulties, especially foreign currency 
such as the dollar to purchase food and raw materials from the United States. Their 
industrial and agricultural bases were shaky because of shortage of investment funds to 
generate more wealth and job opportunities. The severe winter of 1947 had compounded 
the problems by causing severe fuel crisis and a breakdown in communications. For 
instance, in Britain almost the whole industrial sector was paralysed.
Marshall and his associates feared that unless magnanimous American aid was made 
readily available to Western Europe, the economic repercussions would be of 
monumental proportions with reverberations even in the United States. Moreover, such 
economic difficulties, the Americans feared, might drive the inhabitants of Western 
Europe to turn to communism and the Soviet Union as their saviour. Marshall was 
quoted as saying that, “Stalin looked over Europe, and saw the best way to advance 
Soviet interests was to let matters drift,” on the assumption that poverty and disease
13created “the kind of crisis that Communism thrived on.” Marshall came to the 
conclusion that immediate action for European recovery was needed with the United 
States taking the leading role of providing the financial resources for this purpose. On 5 
June 1947, Marshall called for a determined American effort to promote the economic 
revival of Europe and thus ensure the continued prosperity of the United States economy. 
He called on the European governments to confer amongst themselves and come up with
a joint recovery programme. If this programme was agreed to by most if not all the 
European states the United States would be in a position to offer financial support. 
Marshall’s proposals were very much appealing to the British and French, who 
immediately seized on this opportunity. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his 
French counterpart, Georges Bidault, convened a conference in Paris at the end of June. 
Invitations to this conference was extended to the East European countries, Soviet Union 
included.
The Soviet Union sent a high-powered delegation of economic experts led by the Foreign 
Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov. The Soviets soon rejected this idea of a joint European 
recovery programme which was to be run by financial institutions under the auspices of 
the United States. The Russians walked out of the meeting on 3 July 1947. Before they 
left, Molotov ominously predicted that the plan would split Europe into two groups of 
states. Despite this the Western European states drew up their Marshall Plan 
requirements, which after tedious and laborious negotiations were accepted by the United 
States. So, the Marshall Plan which would soon be launched covered only one part of 
Europe, namely the Western one. The Marshall Plan took months to be finally approved 
by the United States Congress. In March 1948, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance 
Act, the Marshall Plan. Initial Marshall aid allocated to recovery was $5,3 billion. Over 
the next four years $13 billion in American aid flowed into Western Europe especially in 
Britain, France and West Germany.14
As Western Europe gravitated towards recovery and prosperity because of American aid, 
the Soviet Union tightened its grip on eastern Europe and exploited the resources of the 
region, with the exception of Tito’s Yugoslavia. As a result of the Marshall Plan, the 
division in Europe was not only political but economic as well. In March 1948, the 
governments of Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the 
Brussels Pact (Brussel Treaty Organisation) which provided for mutual military 
assistance in the event of aggression against any of the signatories. The Brussels Pact 
Powers promised to coordinate and plan their military defences in advance. Despite this 
treaty Western Europe was still militarily weak to deter any attack from the Soviet Union, 
so American material and psychological support was needed. So, the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation was a precursor to a more worldwide inclusive security pact.
The vanquished Germany was divided in 1945 into four zones each occupied by the 
victorious powers, America, Britain, France and the Soviet Union; even the city of Berlin 
was divided into four military zones. The three Western sectors of the city were isolated 
deep within the Soviet zone of Germany, with long road and rail communications of the 
Western zones. In March 1948, France agreed that her zone of Germany must be united 
with the Anglo-American zones to form a unified West Germany, albeit on federal lines 
but with limited powers. The Western powers also decided to introduce a new separate 
currency in their zones as part of the rejuvenation of the West German economy. The 
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was angered by these Western unilateral actions, so he 
decided to hit back to force them to reverse their decisions. Between March and June 
1948 Russia imposed a complete blockade of the Western zones of Germany.
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Britain and America did not budge and showed their determination not to succumb to 
Soviet pressure. On 25 June 1948, both London and Washington began to airlift food 
and fuel requirements into West Berlin. The Western planes flew over the Soviet 
controlled airspace in Berlin and could have been easily shot at, but Stalin was wise 
enough not to provoke another war in Europe. Meanwhile, plans were on course in the 
West to form a transatlantic alliance. On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) was formed. Signatories to this treaty were members of the 
Brussels Pact, United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Norway and Italy but 
not Germany. The heart of the treaty was the pledge for mutual military assistance and 
that an attack on one of them was an attack on all. This was meant to be a deterrent to the 
Soviet Union and also to Germany. The North Atlantic treaty was formulated in accord 
with the United Nations Charter, specifically Article 51 which recognised the right of 
individual or collective self-defence.
On 12 May 1949, as a sign of Soviet admission of defeat, the Berlin blockade was lifted. 
Throughout all the twists and turns of the Cold War, the Russians were busy and secretly 
working on their own atomic bomb. The Soviets were helped in this adventure with 
uranium from mines in Czechoslovakia and the East German part they had occupied. 
American espionage failed dismally in following the Soviet progress on the bomb. 
America and the rest of the Western world were taken by surprise and horrified when it 
was revealed that the Soviet Union had in fact successfully tested an atomic bomb on 29 
August 1949 in the steppes of Kazakhstan.15 This meant the end of America’s monopoly 
of the atomic bomb. Happening almost at the same time was the Communist take over of 
power in the huge Asian State of China. These two events were indications to the 
Americans that communism was rampantly on the move and the heat in the Cold War 
was increasing. The United States could no longer insulate herself militarily and 
ideologically from the rest of the world.
In September 1949 the new state called the Federal Republic of Germany (West 
Germany) came into existence on the Western powers zone of Germany. It was followed 
the next month by the establishment of German Democratic Republic ( East Germany) in 
the Soviet zone. The loss of America’s monopoly of the atomic bomb prompted 
President Truman at the end of January 1950 to give the green light to the development of 
a more lethal hydrogen or super bomb, using an atomic explosion to generate a runaway 
thermonuclear reaction.16 By 1949 Europe was polarised into two camps, the capitalist 
Western world led by the United States and the communist Europe under the Soviet 
Union. Still by 1949 both super-powers had the atomic bomb and within five years they 
had tested hydrogen bombs. All these developments unleashed the nuclear arms race 
and showed how fragile the balance of power in the world was. For each super-power 
security was defined as superiority and each prepared itself for a moment of pre-emptive 
strike.
The Cold War battleground shifted from Europe to the Far East where the Chinese 
Communist Party took Beijing in October 1949. Korea had been recaptured from the 
Japanese in 1945. It was then divided at the thirty-eighth parallel as north and south 
Korea. The Soviets supported Kim II Sung who ruled the north and the Americans
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supported Syngman Rhee in the south. Both leaders of the two Koreas believed that the 
division was temporary, and each one of them wanted a united Korea under him. In June 
1950 the communist North Koreans launched a surprise invasion of South Korea. The 
United States immediately ordered their naval and air forces in the vicinity to intervene 
and help the South Koreans. The Soviets reluctantly offered North Korea support or aid 
in the form of arms, ammunition and advisers. The United States also managed to secure 
United Nations backing for troops under its aegis to be used to defend South Korea. This 
United Nations mission was led by the American, General Douglas MacArthur. The 
United Nations force managed to score initial victories such as the recapture of Seoul, the 
capital of the south. Buoyed by this success the United States administration instructed 
MacArthur and his men to move deep into the north crossing the thirty-eighth parallel 
and to occupy the north. But he was warned that if there was the likelihood of Soviet or 
Chinese intervention he must withdraw. The United Nations and the United States had 
conflicting aims in this military expedition. Whereas the former’s aim was to unite both 
Koreas, the latter saw its mission in the context of the Cold War, that is, to drive the 
communists out of the Far East.
The United Nations force managed to penetrate further into the north and went as far as 
close to the Yalu river which was near North Korea’s border with Mao Tse Tung’s 
communist China. This United Nations invasion of the north intensified the Cold War 
and President Truman ordered a major United States rearmament programme. Britain 
and France immediately followed suit. Fearing for their own security and what the 
American move might be after the conflict, Mao send his troops in the guise of 
“volunteers” to help North Korea.17 The Russians now began to have cold feet once they 
realised how deep American involvement was in the war. The Chinese involvement now 
tipped the scales in favour of the North Koreans. The United Nations force was pushed 
further back to the south until they occupied their positions at the start of the conflict. 
MacArthur demanded that the United States use atomic bombs on China. Britain 
dissuaded America from such action, arguing that if carried out it would bring in the 
Soviet Union and the conflict would be global.
The Korean War ended with over a million in each of the north and south having been 
killed. Nothing was achieved by this internecine war as both north and south Korea 
remained divided, the former “Stalinized” and the latter under a corrupt regime propped 
up by Washington. The formal armistice ending the conflict was signed at Panmunjom in 
July 1953. As in Europe, the Cold War escalated in the Far East and moved to another 
heated level. It is within the context of the above discussion of the world situation after 
1945 to 1953, that we can locate the British and French empires, their resilience if any, 
resistance to demands for independence by their colonised people in Asia and Africa. 
The post-World War II super-power rivalry created by the Cold War made America more 
anxious to end both the British and French empires in order to win the battle for the third 
world “hearts and minds.” But at the same time, these empires were seen to provide a 
first line of defence against the expansion of the Communist bloc. Korea was only third 
in line as a “hot Cold War,” after Indo-China and Malaya, where the French and British 
were involved in the defence of their empire against colonial rebellions led by 
Communists and backed by the Soviet Union and China.
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c. The British Empire to March 1957
By the end of the Second World War in 1945, Britain still presided over the largest 
empire that was spread all over the world. In the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, 
Britain ruled over India, Ceylon, Aden, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Gilbraltar, Malta and 
Cyprus. The African territories included Nigeria, Gold Coast, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, British Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, 
Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.18 In 
East and South-East Asia, British possessions encompassed Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, 
Singapore, and parts of Borneo. In the Pacific, Britain administered Fiji, the Gilbert and 
Ellice Islands, and the Solomons. In the Carribean, Britain ruled over Jamaica, Trinidad, 
British Guyana, British Honduras, the Leewards and Windwards, and the Bahamas, and 
in the Atlantic, Bermuda.19
The Second World War had devastated the British economy and Britain was in financial 
ruin. There was the thinking in London that in order for Britain to revive her economy 
she had to develop the colonies in order to achieve this feat. The gloomy economic 
picture of post-war Britain was summed up by the renowned economist John Maynard 
Keynes when he said the country was headed for a “financial Dunkirk” during 
peacetime.20 Britain was highly dependent on American aid after the war. Despite these 
post-1945 economic woes, British policy makers did not lack the will to maintain both 
the empire and Britain’s role as a global power. In other words, the post-war British 
leaders were committed and determinedly so, to creating a “third force” in world politics, 
that is, to expanding Britain’s power to equal the United States and Soviet Union. One 
way of achieving this, argued the advocates, was by combining the resources of Western 
Europe, the Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Free 
State) and the A fro-Asian colonies under British leadership.
In Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s words, Britain had the material resources in the 
colonial empire, and if she developed them, would achieve the British objective, to make 
sure that London was not subservient to Washington and Moscow.21 So, the general view 
within Whitehall on British decline was that the trend could be reversed and that the 
“empire” could play a central role in terms of economic and political reforms to be 
embarked upon. It was hoped that the colonies would save the British economy through 
a protectionist system, and specifically through the exploitation of tropical territories. 
For instance, Africa which was rich in foodstuffs, minerals,and essential raw materials 
was to be heavily utilised to help the mother country. It was also hoped that as the 
colonies resources were harnessed there would be a “trickle down effect,” hence the 
living standards of the indigenous or colonised people would be improved. Since the 
colonies were to be developed not only to help Britain and the local people, but to sustain 
British global power, it was decided that more money had to be spend in this endeavour. 
London enacted the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. The Act 
provided £120 million for the development of tropical agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
education, water supplies, irrigation and transport in the African colonies.22 Also after 
1945 there were state-led development projects aimed at harnessing the economic
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potential of the colonial empire. The most infamous one was the East African 
Groundnuts Scheme in Tanganyika. Initial proposals of the scheme was the cultivation 
of one million acres of land in Tanganyika. Proponents of the scheme argued that it 
would result in a worldwide solution of shortage of edible oil, margarine, cooking fats 
and soaps.2'1
The scheme was finally approved by the British Cabinet in January 1947 and was taken 
over in April by the newly established agency called Overseas Food Corporation. 
Despite warning from experts about the ecological environment, the likely costs of 
production and transport, the availability of labour at the appropriate season, and the 
limited benefits that would accrue to the Tanganyikans, the scheme went ahead with 
disastrous results. Another failing project was the Overseas Food Corporations attempt 
to establish a large poultry farm in the Gambia to produce eggs. The Gambia project 
failed to produce either eggs for the British housewife or any notable benefits for 
Gambians. These two schemes are archetypical failures of post-war colonial 
development.
British colonial development attempts in 1947 coincided with the Cold War emerging as 
the dominant reality of international politics. The Cold War generally worked to the 
advantage of the British Empire. Despite America’s tradition of anti-colonialism, she 
buoyed up the British Empire for cold war purposes. According to W.R. Louis and R. 
Robinson, the British Empire was temporarily “preserved” as part of an “Anglo- 
American coalition.”24 By the end of 1947 both the State Department and Foreign Office 
were agreed that the greatest danger was the Soviet Union and Communism. So, under 
President Truman, American foreign policy objectives shifted from imperial 
dismantlement to the containment of Soviet communist expansion. The United States 
eased the pressure for decolonisation in return for assurances that the British would 
modernise as well as democratise the Empire. The Cold War thus gave the British 
empire an extended lease of life. For example, in Malaya, Washington appreciated the 
British role in 1950, contending that London was fighting a war against communist 
insurgents aided and abetted by Russia and China. At the same time the colonial regime 
in Malaya was earning hard currency (dollars) from rubber and tin exports. This money 
was used to cushion the British domestic economic position, hence Britain’s ability to 
assist in the resistance to communism in Europe. The Americans, therefore while still 
anti-colonialist and committed to decolonisation, did not want to alienate their NATO 
allies such as Britain by hurrying the pace.
British policy-makers after the war did also recognise that in order to preserve the 
benefits and potentials of empire intact, political relationships between coloniser and 
colonised would have to change. Implementation of political change in Africa after 1945 
was presided over in London by a partnership between a politician and a senior civil 
servant : Arthur Creech Jones, Labour’s Colonial Secretary from 1946 to 1950, and 
Andrew Cohen, the socialist head of the African division in the Colonial Office. By 
September 1946, colonial office officials such as Cohen were conscious of the need for a 
clear policy based on the political advancement of colonial peoples. It was argued that 
elements of self-government would meet African and Asian aspirations which had been
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given some impetus by the war. Political development in the colonies would make 
imperialism to look more progressive and insulate it from international criticism from the 
United Nations or United States. At the same time it was believed that giving certain 
political rights to the colonised people would equip them for social and economic 
development.
The Colonial Office thinking was that the central plank of prewar colonial administration, 
indirect rule, was to be modified. In each colonial territory, a controlled and orderly 
transfer of power was envisaged. This would entail a staged progression through elected 
local government, to elected majorities in central legislative assemblies and finally to 
cabinet government on the Westminster model. In Africa, this political advancement was 
conceived by London as a gradual process to be presided over by the colonial authorities. 
The colonial policy was aimed at guiding the colonial territories to responsible self- 
government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensured that the people 
concerned enjoyed a fairly good standard of living and freedom from oppression from 
any source. The ultimate goal was self-government which was still considered to be 
decades away from accomplishment.
Colonial Office argued that any premature withdrawal would culminate in anarchy, 
Soviet communist penetration, totalitarianism and more importantly loss of British 
influence. Through all this, the key element in colonial political change was in the long 
term, the creation of a multiracial Commonwealth to preserve British world economic 
and political influence. The Commonwealth then was a free association of self- 
governing states linked together by common cultural, economic and strategic interests. 
What also featured in the immediate post-1945 colonial policy was the need to federate 
groups of colonial territories into larger and stronger political units to facilitate economic 
development, create strategic power blocs, prepare the political and administrative 
ground for eventual transfer of power and reduce the vulnerability of small states to 
communist takeover.
The above scenario gives a general picture of how the post-war (1945-1951) Labour 
government perceived empire, and even subsequent Conservative governments which 
would carry out most of the decolonisation process operated within the parameters or 
framework laid down by their Labour predecessors. Although the above scenario tends 
to present the subsequent British decolonisation as a pre-planned and orderly process 
from London, it is only part of the whole story. Pressures in the colonies and at the 
international level have to be taken into account; Britain was by no means in control of 
events during the decolonisation era.
India and Africa
One of the most important achievements of Clement Attlee’s Labour government of 
1945-1951, and of His Majesty’s last Viceroy for India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was the 
granting of India its independence. India was Britain’s most important dependency in 
Asia. During the course of the twentieth century India had received measured amounts of 
internal self-government. The 1935 Government of India Act proposed eventual self­
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government for India as a Dominion. Moreover, under the new constitution introduced in 
1937 the main nationalist party the Indian National Congress, controlled the governments 
in a majority of the Indian provinces. The outbreak of the Second World War disrupted 
and complicated any smooth transfer of power. In 1939, Congress ministers resigned 
from government in protest at India’s inclusion in the war against Germany without 
India’s consent. In 1942 Congress launched the “Quit India” campaign,25 aimed at the 
British. The “Quit India” campaign was immediately suppressed and Congress leaders 
were incarcerated for the entire period of the war. But, Britain had still in 1942 promised 
India post-war independence. When the Labour government came to power in July 1945 
it pledged to carry out this wartime promise to India, that is, independence. So, by the 
end of the war in 1945, Indian independence was on the horizon. Things became tough 
for the British government in December 1946 to February 1947 when critical decisions 
had to be made because of the severe winter that resulted in coal shortages, cuts in fuel 
and electricity and limited supplies of food and milk. As stated earlier Britain decided to 
stop aid to Greece and Turkey, and took steps to submit the Palestine question to the 
United Nations. Most important of all, was the British government decision on 13 
February 1947 to transfer power in India by June 1948.
In March 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten arrived in India as the British Viceroy of India. 
His brief was explicitly enunciated. The Indians were to agree on a new constitution by 
the end of June 1948, failure in this regard would mean that Britain would have to 
arrange whatever hand over might seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the 
Indian people.26 Though Mountbatten was able to convince Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of 
the Hindu-dominated Indian Congress of his good faith, matters were complicated by 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League. Jinnah professed to speak for the 
close to one hundred million Muslims. He oriented the League around the slogan 
Pakistan, “land of the pure.”27 It is still debatable whether Jinnah really wanted the 
establishment of a separate state. Communal violence in the course of 1947 meant that 
Mountbatten speeded up the pace of British withdrawal by bringing the date forward to 
August 1947. In mid-August 1947 two independent countries namely India and Pakistan 
were created. The Commonwealth was reformed so that it could accommodate countries 
such as India, no longer the exclusive club of only white dominions. The following year 
Britain decided to withdraw from Palestine. India’s independence was not meant to be a 
sign of imperial decline but to enhance the empire’s efficiency. It was not intended to be 
repeated elsewhere, but in reality India’s independence did not go unnoticed in Africa.
The economic conditions in Africa remained appalling even after the Second World War. 
So, after 1945 demands for colonial economic development were intensified. Colonial 
agricultural officers were appointed so that they could intervene by improving the local 
population’s peasant production methods. These colonial interventions were undertaken 
in East and Central Africa. For example, farmers were to construct terraces to counter 
soil erosion, reduce cattle stocks, enforce veterinary controls and grow new famine relief 
crops. Many of these required intensive labour and Africans resented these reforms. In 
Kenya, for example, the Kikuyu peasant families were required to devote two mornings 
per week to the construction of terraces as part of communal labour scheme. This led to 
disaffection which culminated in rural disturbances in 1947. Unemployment, shortage of
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housing, destitution and expulsions of “ squatters” around Nairobi served to compound 
matters. Local politics became increasingly radicalised as moderates were bypassed by 
militants in the violent underground movement known as Mau Mau. Secret oathing 
ceremonies bound peasants in the movement and led to open armed rebellion at the end 
of 1952.28 Thus in place of planned evolution towards self-government and ultimate 
independence, a full-scale colonial war broke out, a major, and most important exception 
to the general picture of decolonisation in the British Empire. A large British force was 
despatched to Kenya to put down the rebellion.
In Central Africa, mainly in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland the same 
agricultural reform policies were introduced on a far larger scale. Evictions of 
“squatters” and their livestock was earned out and the region witnessed the “second wave 
of colonial invasion” by immigrant settlers after the war, especially Southern Rhodesia 
which already had a sizeable number of vocal white settlers. The regional political map 
was further shaped by events further to the south where the white supremacist Nationalist 
Party led by Daniel Malan won the elections in South Africa and espoused the policy of 
racial discrimination called apartheid. There was growing fear in London that South 
Africa was likely to export her policies to the north and particularly to Southern 
Rhodesia.
Debate began in 1948 in London among those in charge of colonial policy that a closer 
union of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland must be attempted. It was assumed that this 
union would be more efficient economically and administratively and create some form 
of racial partnership. As one white colonial politician Godfrey Huggins, indiscreetly 
revealed the partnership would be that of horse and rider. The Conservative government 
that came to power in 1951 inherited Labour government’s blueprint federal scheme for 
Central Africa. Despite African protestations, the colonial government went ahead with 
the scheme. In September 1953 the three territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) were amalgamated into a union 
called the Central African Federation of which Huggins was the first Prime Minister. 
The aim was to create a multiracial society, in contrast with the apartheid of South Africa 
and to establish an economically viable entity that would benefit both Europeans and 
Africans, but the latter viewed it with suspicion as an attempt to reinforce white 
domination. Malawi was to provide the Federation with cheap labour, Zambia with 
revenue from the huge copper resources, and these were to be used to build up the 
industrial and agricultural economy of Southern Rhodesia’s white settlers.29 In other 
words, it was believed that the three territories’ economies complemented each other. 
Administration of this grouping of states differed from the metropole. Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland were the responsibility of the Colonial Office, whereas the 
Commonwealth Relations Office had corresponding and overlapping responsibilities for 
the Federation and the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia. The obvious result 
was that there was friction between the two offices in executing colonial policy in 
relation to these territories. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of February 1953 
on self-determination in the Sudan prepared the way for the evacuation of British troops 
in Egypt. Britain withdrew her troops in the Canal Zone in 1954 and the transfer of 
power in the Sudan finally took place in January 1956.30
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Ghanaian Independence
The two leading West African colonies under the British were Ghana and Nigeria. 
Ghana was considered a model African colony. In 1946, Britain introduced a new 
constitution for the Gold Coast. The aim was to bind together the coastal and inland 
regions, so that this could provide larger representation for the local people. This was 
also to be one of the early steps to achieving self-rule which was still thought to be many 
years away. As late as 1947 Ghana and Nigeria were still believed to be decades away 
from attaining independence. In a paper presented at the African governors conference in 
1947 by Andrew Cohen he stated th a t:
hi West Africa internal self-government cannot be achieved until 
territorial unity has become a reality, sufficient numbers o f Africans have 
emerged, qualified by their training and character to manage their own 
affairs on a territorial scale and the political leaders have become11 31representative o f and responsible to the people.
The Cohen paper went further and stated th a t:
...in the Gold. Coast, the territory where Africans are most advanced 
politically, internal self-government is unlikely to be achieved in much less 
than a generation?2
In August 1947, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was formed with Kwame 
Nkrumah who had just returned from studies in America and a sojourn in Britain as its 
general secretary. The UGCC was mainly formed to campaign against the new 
constitution. It also demanded self-government in the shortest possible time/1'1
Accra, the capital of the Gold Coast was bedevilled by the post-war economic and social 
problems. Housing conditions were very bad. Demobilised soldiers exarcebated the 
already dire unemployment situation. Moreover, retail prices of imported consumer 
goods were exorbitant. In January 1948, the Africans decided to boycott the entire 
European import stores. The shopowners were not moved and prices remained 
unaffordable. The critical moment took place on 28 February 1948 when a protest march 
of ex-servicemen was fired upon by the colonial police. Two people were killed as a 
result. Then the riots spread from Accra to Kumasi in the interior and elsewhere. 
Eventually the death toll reached twenty-nine. The riots appear to have been 
spontaneous. The Governor Sir Gerald Creasy declared a state of emergency.
The Colonial Office responded by appointing the Watson Commission of Inquiry.34 The 
terms of reference of the commission were “to inquire into and report on recent 
disturbances in the Gold Coast and their underlying causes; and to make 
recommendations on any matter arising from their inquiry.” Every aspect of colonial 
government’s policy came under severe criticism in the Commission’s report. The 
Commissioners concluded that in the conditions existing today in the Gold Coast a 
substantial measure of reform was necessary to meet the legitimate aspirations of the 
indigenous population. In 1949 Nkrumah and his followers formed their breakaway 
Convention Peoples Party (CPP) and in January 1950, the party embarked on a campaign 
of “positive action” for self-government now.36 Strikes, violence and looting ensued.
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A state of emergency was declared and arrests followed ( Nkrumah included). But 
elections were held in 1951 and the CPP won convincingly. The new governor, Charles 
Arden Clarke who had served in Sarawak in Southeast Asia and witnessed the communist 
insurgency there, released Nkrumah from prison to become without delay Ghana’s 
Leader of Government Business, There now followed a period of power-sharing 
“dyarchy” between African ministers and colonial officials in which the British hoped to 
moderate and contain nationalism.37 The colonial authorities subjected Nkrumah and 
CPP to two further elections, one in 1954 and the other in 1956. The CPP passed both 
these tests. The Gold Coast was granted independence on 6 March 1957 and renamed 
Ghana with Nkrumah as first Prime Minister.
The advance of Ghana to independence was not meant to be a model to be followed by 
the immediate independence of other colonies. But, Nkrumah prophetically insisted that 
Ghanaian independence was not a mere merit award for a “model colony,” but a turning-
38point in the history of the continent. Africans elsewhere soon signalled agreement 
when they started to demand what Ghana had got. Nigeria with the largest population in 
Africa was granted independence in 1960 after constitutional arrangements were made to 
overcome the great diverse social and ethnic factors in the country. Sierra Leone followed 
closely behind, moving into independence in 1961.
d. The French Empire to November 1954
At the end of the war France controlled the second largest empire in the world, second 
only to that of Britain. In North Africa, France’s possessions were Algeria, Tunisia and 
Morocco. In French West Africa (AOF), she had control over Senegal, Guinea, 
Mauritania, Soudan, Niger, Dahomey, and in French Equatorial Africa (AEF) her 
colonies were Gabon, Congo, Oubangui-Chari (now the Central African Republic). Paris 
boasted of one outpost in eastern Africa, Djibouti or French Somali Coast. In the Indian 
Ocean, France ruled over the enormous island of Madagascar and the small archipelago 
of the Comoros. She had also gained control over part of the former German colony of 
Togo and the German protectorate, Cameroon. These were consigned to her after the 
First World War under mandates from the League of Nations. Britain also had control of 
part of these two countries. In the Pacific, France was in charge of Tahiti, most fabled of 
Polynesian islands. Further West of the Pacific in the Melanesia, she ruled over New 
Caledonia and the loyalty islands. In Indo-China, France ruled over Vietnam which was 
composed of three regions Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina. Still in Southeast Asia, 
France’s control extended to the harbours of Haiphong and Saigon. To the west of 
Vietnam, France’s possessions were Cambodia and Laos.
The French Union
The French empire was renamed the French Union in 1946 as a new start for France itself 
after the war. Beginning with the Brazzaville conference of colonial administrators in 
January 1944, post-war France was shaped. A final declaration at this conference stated 
that the goals of the work of colonisation accomplished by France precluded any idea of
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autonomy or any possibility of evolution outside the French bloc of the empire and that 
self-government though still in the distant future had to be avoided. In other terms, post­
war leaders of France were clear about their stand towards the empire, that is, they had to 
tighten their grip and hold on the empire. Early in 1946 representatives of France and 
those from her dependencies met in Paris to draw up the constitution. Prominent African 
deputies at this gathering were Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Ferhat Abbas of 
Algeria, Felix Houphoet-Boigny of Cote-d-Ivoire and Lamine Gueye of Senegal. Several 
measures were adopted in 1946, mostly at the instigation of the colonial deputies and 
these changed the status of the indigenous people in the empire. For example, legislation 
introduced by Houphouet-Boigny on 11 April 1946 outlawed all forms of forced or 
obligatory labour. The Lamine Gueye law of 7 May 1946 made all French “subjects” in 
the empire French “citizens” though without giving them equal rights to metropolitan 
citizens or French settlers overseas, or depriving them of their traditional civil status.39 
An increasing number of colonial subjects were granted the vote and allowed to exercise 
it repeatedly. There was also legislation that established the Economic and Social 
Investment and Development Fund (FIDES) which was to provide the colonies with 
financial aid to help their post-war economic recovery.
The constitution of the Fourth Republic was adopted on 28 October 1946 and it 
established the French Union. The preamble of this new constitution stated that France 
intended to lead the colonial peoples to the freedom to administer themselves and direct 
their own affairs democratically, avoiding any system of colonisation founded on 
arbitrariness.40 France was to form with the overseas people a Union founded on equality 
of rights and duties without distinction of race and religion. The Union was composed 
on the one hand, of the French Republic which was made up of metropolitan France and 
the overseas departments and territories. On the other hand, it was made up of 
associated territories and states. The Black African colonies of French West Africa 
(AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) thereby became overseas territories while the 
right to elect deputies to the National Assembly in Paris was extended from the citizens 
of the Four Communes of Dakar, Goree, Rufisque and Saint Louis to a limited number of 
electors elsewhere in the territories. But these were very few when compared to the 
number of deputies from the metropole. This was intended to be so, so that their 
influence could be minimal and not influence or dictate the laws affecting French citizens 
proper. Cameroon and Togo became associated territories and Indo-China, an associated 
state. Morocco and Tunisia were to achieve internal autonomy whereas Algeria was 
excluded since it was classed as part of France.
Paris domination of the Union remained. France was the principal member, the French 
president was the president of the Union. The Union assembly was separate from the 
French parliament and had consultative rights only; its advice could be ignored. 
Assemblies were set up in each of the former overseas colonies. There was also the 
establishment of dual electoral colleges, one elected by European residents, the other by 
indigenous voters. Under the Union, the AOF with Togo had to send ten representatives 
to the French Constituent Assembly, AEF four, Madagascar four, and Cameroon two. 
Foreign affairs, defence and other economic matters were still to remain under the control 
of France. All these reforms introduced tinder the French Union, albeit the result of
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demands for change, were intended to stifle any budding nationalist sentiments, so that 
France could maintain and preserve her sphere of influence in a rapidly changing world, 
in which climate of international opinion, exemplified by the United Nations Charter, 
dominance of two super-powers, United States and Soviet Union and later the People’s 
Republic of China, was opposed to old-style, unreformed colonialism.
Indo-China / Vietnam
In 1941 the Vietnamese nationalist, Ho Chi Minh founded the guerrilla movement called 
Viet Minh. France had in 1946 entered into agreement with Ho Chi Minh for some form 
of Vietnamese independence within the French Union. France failed to honour this 
pledge, and set up instead a separate autonomous government in Cochinchina and 
southern Annam under their collaborator Emperor Bao Dai. This move angered Ho Chi 
Minh since his struggle had always been for the independence and unification of 
Vietnam. The French still hoped to reconquer the northern regions of Tonkin and Annam 
or continue to prop up a friendly regime in the south. Ho Chi Minh began negotiations 
with the French in Paris in July 1946, but failed to bring about a satisfactory accord on 
the question of unification. The talks went into recess and it was agreed that they should 
begin at the start of 1947. In the meantime, the French decided to try to reconquer the 
north by force. On 23 November 1946, the French issued an ultimatum to the Viet Minh 
to evacuate Haiphong. On 29 November 1946, the French navy vessels intercepted a 
Chinese boat carrying contraband petrol into the harbour of Haiphong. Vietnamese 
nationalists under Ho Chi Minh’s command fired on the French ships.41
Haiphong now became a military battleground with the French and Vietnamese forces 
attacking each other and resulting in thousands of deaths on both sides. This was the start 
of the Vietnamese war of independence. In December 1946, fighting spread to the capital 
of Tonkin. Warfare continued for the next four years. By 1950 French colonial forces 
are said to have counted 56 000 Frenchmen, 35 000 Vietnamese soldiers, 25 000 North 
Africans, 18 000 Legionnaires and 15 000 black Africans.42 At the beginning the French 
had the upperhand because of firepower and their sophisticated weapons. The 
Vietnamese advantage was their knowledge of the terrain. They began to win broad 
support from their countrymen and this motivated them to mount sustained guerrilla 
warfare. The Viet Minh used unsophisticated methods in deploying their men, and 
superior French technology of aerial reconnaissance failed to detect them. They created 
networks of intelligence-gathering, including many double agents who ostensibly worked 
for the French.43 Ambushes were earned out on French convoys and military bases.
The victory of Mao in China in 1949 provided the Viet Minh with a new source of 
support. The Chinese provided the Vietnamese with armaments and this enabled them to 
carry out both conventional and guerrilla warfare attacks. The French now began to run 
out of luck as they found it difficult to find new Indo-Chinese recruits, and could not deal 
with the guerrilla tactics so successfully employed by the Viet Minh. There were 
desertions among soldiers and sailors. As the bad news began to reach home French 
public opinion turned hostile and even within the different political parties more and 
more loud voices could be heard calling for French withdrawal. The French were now
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immersed in a war which they seemed to have no exit strategy.
As the Cold War intensified with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, this added a 
new phase to the Indo-Chinese war. As the Chinese came to the aid of the Viet Minh, the 
Americans came to the assistance of the French, but with the stated aim of a free, 
independent but pro-Westem Vietnam. The United States heeded French requests and 
provided them with millions of dollars of aid and equipment in the execution of the war. 
The war now moved from being one of control of a colony to being a defence of the free 
world represented by France and the South Vietnamese government, against 
revolutionary Viet Minh and communist China. In other words, the war was now 
ideological, and the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese were at stake. As the Korean 
war moved to some form of resolution in 1953 because of a stalemate, the French drifted 
further into misery in Vietnam. The Viet Minh had made some territorial gains on the 
battlefield as they now controlled almost all of the northern region of Tonkin.
At the close of 1953, the French forces made a final attempt to turn the tables by 
occupying Dien Bien Phu, which they intended to turn into a base behind enemy lines. 
Dien Bien Phu turned out to be the French last stand and graveyard. Ho Chi Mihn’s 
fighters surrounded the French positions which were isolated from the outside world, 
only parachute landings provided the link with the outside world. On 7 May 1954, the 
Viet Minh captured Dien Bien Phu and the French surrendered. The future of Vietnam 
was soon settled at a conference in Geneva. The Geneva conference divided Vietnam at 
the seventeenth parallel. Ho Chi Mihn ruled the north and Bao Dai had a shortlived reign 
in the south. Other recommendations of the Geneva conference such as the calling of 
elections under international supervision to decide the future of both Vietnams were not 
implemented. Cambodia and Laos were now recognised as separate independent states 
by the Geneva gathering.
The last French soldiers withdrew from Indo-China in 1955. The Indo-Chinese war 
meant that France lost her empire in Southeast Asia. The vacuum created by the 
departure of the French was filled by the United States which now protected South 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos against communist penetration as Ho Chi Minh was 
entrenched in the north. The death toll in this conflict was estimated at between 
400 000 and 500 000.44 The morale of the French Army was drained away by this war 
and this contributed to the political instability that characterised the Fourth Republic in 
the 1950s. Also, the war was a clear failure of the French Union since it failed to keep 
one of its associated states within its fold.
e. Conclusion
The post-war international situation as discussed above shows that Germany was no 
longer the threat to world peace and stability. The new threat to world peace and stability 
was declared to be communism. The dominance of the world by two super-powers 
would only serve to polarise the world still further. In this bi-polar world, Britain as well 
as France found that their power had drastically declined and needed to be resuscitated. 
In this endeavour their empires were to play a central role. The super-powers rivalry
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resulted in the cold war, which was the struggle for ideological and military dominance 
of the world either by the United States or Soviet Union. Despite their history of anti­
colonialism, the cold war meant that the United States had to come to the rescue of her 
European imperial allies (Britain and France). For Britain and France their empires now 
came to serve as sources of international political and military strength in this post-war 
era.
In both the British and French empires, social and economic development was carried out 
in order to stabilise colonial rule, through the improvement of the indigenous peoples’ 
living standards. Britain and France also discovered that for their empires to be 
resurrected, an element of political reform based on a new “partnership” of the ruler and 
the ruled had to be undertaken. They now embarked on colonial government reforms 
which were carried out at local and regional level. For the French, this was exemplified 
by the creation of the French Union. For the British was the creation of enlarged 
Commonwealth. The objectives of these reforms were to strengthen and not weaken the 
empires. Colonial reforms varied from territory to territory and from region to region. 
On the one hand Britain and France had different policies for their respective empires, 
but on the other, both had come unstuck by 1955: the French had lost Vietnam, while the 
British, despite success in Malaya had become involved in a controversial war against the 
Mau Mau in Kenya. As the Cold War crept into Asia after 1950, the United States came 
to bolster the threatened European empires. The French in Indo-China, like the British in 
Malaya, were believed to be fighting international communism. By the time the French 
were defeated at Dien Bien Phu, the Americans were shouldering three-quarters of the 
costs of France’s war effort. Though the Indo-Chinese conflict was temporarily resolved 
by the Geneva conference in 1954, neither America nor France had influence on the 
outcome. The Americans were reluctantly pushed by Britain to enter into negotiations 
with the Russians and Chinese.
As a contrast of the two European colonial powers, the British were generally regarded as 
more liberal in their approach to colonial reform as compared to the French. The French 
conception of empire was markedly different from the British. The British always 
devolved power in their colonies and their motto was when the colonial societies grow 
up, they would be free. In case of the French they were centralist rather than 
devolutionists and the empire was referred to as “France overseas.” The ultimate goal of 
assimilation policies was to turn colonial people into good French men and women when 
they grow up. With France now having been driven out of Southeast Asia in the 1950s, 
her attention now shifted to her North African dependencies, and it is to this that the next 
chapter focuses and British reaction to France’s dealings with her North African 
possessions, especially Algeria.
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CHAPTER 3
FRANCE AND ALGERIA 1945 TO NOVEMBER 1954
a. Introduction
As stated in the previous chapter, France’s possessions in North Africa were Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Morocco. These were acquired at different periods in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Algeria (1830), Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912) respectively. 
The degree or intensity of colonisation varied from one country to the other. Tunisia and 
Morocco were in the exceptional position of Protectorates, in principle independent 
states, whereas Algeria, at the other extreme was classed as part of France, and therefore 
not part of the empire or union at all. The traditional rulers, the bey of Tunisia and sultan 
of Morocco, had by treaty with France surrendered external but not internal sovereignty 
which was exercised on behalf of the two monarchs by a French Resident. In the case of 
Algeria the country was divided, like metropolitan France, into communes and 
departements, but had its own central administration under a governor-general, and its 
own elected assembly with responsibility for the budget.
The common feature with the three territories was that they had large sections of 
European settler populations which one way or the other would influence the course of 
colonial administration throughout the colonial era. For instance, European residents in 
Tunisia were estimated in 1946 to number 239,000, Morocco had 325,271 in 19511 and 
Algeria had just over one million European settlers by 1954. In Tunisia and Morocco, 
these settlers were represented by elected bodies in an advisory role. In Algeria, on the 
other hand, they were French citizens represented by elected deputies in Paris, but also 
heavily over-represented, in proportion to their numbers, in the Algerian assembly, with 
legislative powers. The majority Muslim population was heavily underrepresented in this 
assembly, and until 1946, not represented at all in Paris. Hence, this chapter discusses 
France’s relationship with her North African possessions after 1945 and further assesses 
the progress or state of the nationalist movements in the region from the post-war period 
up to the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion in November 1954. France was defeated and 
humiliated by the Axis forces in North Africa during the Second World War, only to be 
rescued by the Anglo-American forces in May 1943. The United States then promised 
France that her sovereignty would be re-established as soon as possible over all 
territories, Metropolitan as well as colonial, over which the French flag waved in 1939.
b. France and North Africa, 1945 to 1 November 1954
Tunisia
Tunisia which was the most homogeneous of the three Maghrib states was 
constitutionally the most developed. A constitution, or destour, had been granted by the 
Bey in 1860, and although it had been suspended in 1864, was still nominally in force. 
Under the treaties of 1881 and 1883 which established the French Protectorate, the Bey
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remained sovereign, but the government was in the hands of a Resident Minister. A 
Consultative Conference representing French settlers in the country was created in 1891, 
and enlarged during the First World War to include a Tunisian delegation. In 1922 it was 
converted into a Grand Council to give expression to the idea of Franco-Tunisian co­
sovereignty, an idea contrary to the views of Tunisian nationalists. By 1950, France 
relationship with Tunisia was governed by the so-called co-sovereignty, which simply 
put, was the sharing of power between the two countries whereas crucial decisions such 
as those affecting finance and foreign affairs were still the exclusive prerogative of the 
French Resident General and his officials.
Since before the First World War, Tunisia had had a strong nationalist movement 
spearheaded by the Neo-Destour Party (formedl934) by Habib Bourguiba, and was ahead 
of the other two North African states, Morocco and Algeria. In 1938 Bourguiba was 
imprisoned in France for his part in the rioting of April of that year. During the Second 
World War, the Neo-Destour nationalists rallied around the Bey Moncef, until he was 
deposed in May 1943 and exiled to southern Algeria by the Free French authorities who 
accused him of collaborating with the Axis powers. In actual fact the deposition had to 
do with the bey’s attempts to be independent of the authority of the Free French leaders. 
Meanwhile Bourguiba was sent to Rome by the Germans in 1943 who tried to win over 
his loyalty to the Axis, but he refused. Bourguiba from his prison cell urged the 
Tunisians to support the Allied cause in the hope that Tunisia would be rewarded with 
independence at the end of the war. In an appeal to the Tunisians to support France and 
the Allies he said:
The entire French Nation, once liberated from the Nazi yoke, would not
forget. ...her true friends, those who stood by her side in the days o f trial.
Between 1943 and 1944 the French colonial administrators tightened their grip on 
controlling Tunisian affairs. The powers of the Resident General were increased at the 
expense of the Tunisians who were pushed further into the periphery of government. 
This dashed any hopes that the Tunisians had towards the French in advancing their 
nationalist cause. So, Neo-Destour had to adopt new tactics after the war in dealing with 
the French. Once released from internment, Bourguiba set about to internationalise the 
Tunisian issue. In March 1945 he secretly left the country and his first stop was Cairo ( 
Egypt) where he sought the support of the newly established Arab League. From Cairo, 
he lambasted French practices in the Maghrib, comparing them unfavourably with that of 
the British.3 Bourguiba’s globetrotting lasted for two years and by then he had visited the 
United States, Europe and Asia. In 1946, he pleaded Tunisia’s case before the United 
Nations delegations.
While Bourguiba was still away from home, a major transformation took place on the 
labour front with the formation of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) in 
1946 with Ferhat Hached as the Secretary-General. The UGTT brought its members 
behind the Neo-Destour nationalist party. Cooperation between the two would be 
indispensable from then onwards in the struggle against French colonialism. Also during 
this period France made some conciliatory gestures, such as allowing four Tunisians to 
serve as ministers and giving them half the seats on the Grand Council (established in
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1922), In 1947, the new Resident General in Tunisia, Jean Mons, granted the Tunisians 
six ministries. Although these were cosmetic reforms and still did not satisfy the 
nationalist demands, to the colons the steps were too much and going too far, hence 
unacceptable. Neo-Destour mobilised every section of Tunisian society and had the Bey 
as one of its major supporters. The party argued that it wanted independence under a 
constitutional monarchy. By 1949 the Neo-Destour claimed to have half a million 
Tunisians among its ranks.
In April 1950, Bourguiba visited Paris carrying a seven-point manifesto of a moderate set 
of demands. These were; the restitution of Tunisian sovereignty, instead of having 
ultimate authority vested in the French Resident General; a request for a Tunisian prime 
minister; suppression of French control of the state administration; removal of local 
government from the hands of French “civil controllers.”4 Elected municipal officials, in 
which French interests would be recognised, would manage government at local level. 
He also asked for the French police force to yield power to a constituted Tunisian 
equivalent. Lastly, the election of a National Assembly under universal suffrage 
representing Tunisians and Europeans in ratio of their true members, would draft a 
constitution to accommodate Tunisian sovereignty with France’s special interests.
Tunisian nationalist hopes were prematurely raised in June 1950 when French Foreign 
Minister Robert Schuman said that the mission of the new Resident General in Tunisia, 
Louis Perillier, would be to “conduct Tunisia toward full expansion of its riches and to 
lead it toward independence, which is the final objective for all the territories at the heart 
of the French Union.”5 Bourguiba was said to have been so encouraged by this news that 
he predicted that France would reap a conquest of hearts more effective than the 
possession of Tunisian territory. When France revealed its new policy for Tunisia, it was 
evident that it was way short of Schuman’s goal of eventual independence, in actual fact 
it was to be independence within the French Union.
In August 1950 French reforms went further with the formation of a new government 
headed by prime minister Mohamed Chenik and other Tunisian nationalists such as Salah 
ben Youssef (secretary-general of Neo-Destour) as minister of Justice. Subsequent to 
this, the reform programme was moved some steps further again when in February 1951 
a new decree declared that it was no longer a requirement for the Tunisian prime 
minister’s orders to be countersigned by the French secretary-general of the government. 
This task could now be earned out by the Resident General, so this was a minor change 
which still maintained French control. The number of Tunisian ministers also became 
equal to those of their French counterparts in the Grand Council. Tunisians were 
permitted to work in the administration but holding less significant posts. The French 
still retained veto powers in the Grand Council and they used this power to delay or even 
frustrate legislation which the Tunisian ministers considered important.
In April 1951 the Tunisians demanded from the French the establishment of a fully- 
fledged representative government. This resulted in prime minister Mohammed Chenik, 
Salah ben Youssef and two other Tunisians ministers going to Paris in October 1951. 
There, they demanded Tunisian independence and the recognition of total Tunisian
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sovereignty, while retaining close cultural, economic, and military relations with France. 
The French reply came in December with Foreign Minister Robert Schuman insisting on 
the idea of co-sovereignty, that is, upholding the right of the French to have power in 
Tunisian politics. This infuriated the Tunisians who embarked on internationalising their 
plight. Before this could happen they watched with envy when their less-developed 
eastern neighbour Libya ( Italian possession) was granted independence in December 
1951 by the United Nations. France was told early in 1952 that an appeal would be made 
in the United Nations and, a few days later, the Security Council was asked to place the 
Tunisian question on the agenda. France fought hard to keep the North African problems 
out of the General Assembly. She vowed to walk out of any debate on these subjects. 
More importantly, France threatened to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the United Nations (UN).6 These threats registered with the 
United States and the Western European nations (including Britain) who considered the 
threat of communism of paramount importance than the request of two small Arab states 
(Tunisia and Morocco) for self-determination or national independence. To further 
underscore their displeasure with French policy, Neo-Destour organised a major strike in 
January 1952 and there were violent confrontations between the French and Tunisians. 
The Tunisian nationalist guerrillas (fellaghas) now began to be active in attacking the 
French. The French authorities responded to all this with more repression and terror 
which replaced any kind of dialogue between the two communities.
The new Resident General, Jean de Hautecloque decided to throw into disarray and 
ultimately destroy Tunisian nationalism. On 15 January 1952, Hautecloque demanded 
that the bey dismiss the Chenik government, an order he refused to carry out. Bourguiba 
was then arrested with other Neo-Destour leaders. Others such as Salah ben Youssef 
managed to escape to Cairo. On 25 March 1952, Chenik and three of his ministers were 
arrested, once again the bey had refused to dismiss the prime minister. So, the situation in 
Tunisia after 1952 was one of uncompromising stance by the French and the full force of 
the state machinery was used against the Neo-Destour party. The latter countered this 
repression by strikes and demonstrations.
French policy in Tunisia continued to vacillate, but once again, in a dramatic turn of 
events there was a change of government in France. Pierre Mendes-France became prime 
minister in February 1954 and was willing to listen to and accommodate some of the 
grievances raised by the Tunisian nationalists. At the same time international 
circumstances such as the Indo-China conflict prompted the French politicians to move 
swiftly in resolving the Tunisian question. On 31 July 1954, Mendes-France visited 
Tunisia. In a speech in Carthage, which became known as the “ Declaration of Carthage” 
he stated that :
The self-government o f the Tunisian State is recognised and proclaimed
without reservation by the French Government, whose intention it is both
to confirm this principle and to enable Tunisia to carry it successfully into
iaction.
He further called for continued French influence in Tunisia and a common foreign policy. 
Mendes-France also requested the bey to choose a new government to negotiate the form 
of Tunisian independence. Bourguiba, who was still in cusdody, was allowed to
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communicate with the outside world especially his Neo-Destour colleagues and French 
leaders. Meanwhile, a new government was formed in August 1954 headed by the 
independent Tahar ben Ammar. Other ministers were Mongi Slim, Mohammed 
Masmoudi, Hedi Nouira and Sadok Mokkaddem, all members of the Neo-Destour. 
Despite the Carthage speech France still retained control of substantial areas of 
administration in Tunisia.
The outbreak of the rebellion in Algeria on 1 November 1954 complicated the French 
North African situation. The immediate effect of this uprising, which the French had 
initially underestimated, was that it accelerated French efforts to solve the problem of 
Tunisia. The negotiations for Tunisian autonomy which soon began between the French 
and Tunisians were not smooth sailing, they experienced delays, slow progress and some 
setbacks such as the interruption that resulted from the fall of the Mendes-France regime 
in February 1955, The administration fell because its North African policy was rejected 
by a parliamentary vote of 319 to 273.8 Edgar Faure was given the task of forming a new 
government and was thought to have a liberal attitude toward Tunisia. The strongest 
support for Tunisia and her North African neighbours came out from the Bandung 
conference in Indonesia in April 1955 when the following statement was issued :
In view o f the unsettled situation in North Africa, and o f the persisting 
denial to the peoples o f North Africa o f their right to self-determination, 
the Asian-African Conference declares its support o f the rights o f the 
people o f Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and 
independence, and urges the French government to bring about a peaceful 
settlement o f the issue without delay.9 
On 22 April 1955 the Faure government and the Tunisian one led by Tahar ben Ammar 
signed an agreement granting autonomy to Tunisia, transference of judicial powers and 
Tunisia’s customs union with France was confirmed. The conventions embodying this 
agreement were published on 3 June 1955. The protocol agreement that granted Tunisia 
independence was signed on 20 March 1956 with Bourguiba leading the Tunisian 
delegation.
Morocco
The treaty of Fez of 1912 established a protectorate over Morocco which was a 
traditional Muslim monarchy. In theory the protectorate arrangement preserved the 
sultan as the ruler of Morocco. Furthermore to the sultan was reserved the right to annul 
decrees or delay their publication and even withhold his approval of them. As 
subsequent events would show he could not exercise this power unfettered. In practice 
the sultan was forced to share his legislative and executive powers with the French 
Resident General. The latter had the last word in most issues affecting the administration 
of the protectorate. For instance, the Resident General initiated all royal decrees and 
nominated all high officials of the protectorate’s administration. One such office was that 
of secretary-general who was directly under the Resident General and was responsible for 
the economic development of the country.10 Important departments in this endeavour 
were finance, agriculture, and public works, all under the secretary-general. From the 
1920s onwards, French settlement was encouraged by the Protectorate government, and
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led to the occupation of much of the best land in the country by European farmers.
When the Second World War broke out in August 1939, the sultan of Morocco, Sidi 
Mohammed ben Youssef rallied to the Allied cause and delegated thousands of Moroccan 
servicemen to fight in the war. This support remained consistent throughout the war 
despite various attempts to sway the sultan otherwise. Moroccan hopes for liberation 
were raised on 22 January 1943, when at a meeting in Casablanca between President 
Roosevelt and Sultan Mohammed V, the former expressed some sympathy for Moroccan 
independence. This the Moroccans viewed as in line with the aspirations of the Atlantic 
Charter. The major transformation in Moroccan nationalism took place in December 
1943, when the Moroccan National Party was transmuted into the Istiqlal (Independence) 
Party by the Moroccan nationalist Ahmed Belafrej. The religio-nationalist Allal el-Fassi 
became president of the party and Belafrej settled for the secretary-general position. 
From its inception the Istiqlal Party established a cordial relationship with the sultan. In 
January 1944 the Istiqlal Party issued a manifesto demanding independence and 
territorial unification of Morocco. The party claimed that the people’s right of self- 
determination was denied by the French contrary to allied statements and the Atlantic 
Charter.
In April 1947, sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef visited Tangier and delivered a 
speech which turned out to be a turning point in the nationalist cause. The sultan spoke 
of the “legitimate rights of the Moroccan people,” and called for the strengthening of 
Moroccan ties with the Arab League,11 and its world to the eastern Mediterranean. As a 
way of defiance the sultan deliberately omitted or deleted from his prepared speech by 
the Resident General a complimentary passage about the French protectorate in Morocco. 
He also called for a greater participation of Morocco in government by proposing that the 
budget should be scrutinised by a special Moroccan commission before he would approve 
it. The Tangier speech galvanised the Istiqlal membership and it embarked upon a 
massive recruitment drive. This close relationship between the Istiqlal (Independence) 
Party and the sultan greatly worried the French, and they decided that the relationship had 
to be nipped in the bud, moreso that the sultan was becoming more and more popular 
with the vast majority of his people.
The French decided to appoint a new Resident General who could deal with the 
Moroccan situation firmly. This task was assigned to the decorated army officer, General 
(later Marshal) Aphonse Juin, His appointment began in May 1947. Juin’s approach to 
the Moroccan situation was a double-edged one, that is, being firm and at the same time 
making some concessions to the Moroccans such as increasing their participation in 
government. By trying to kill two birds with one stone, he dismally failed on both 
accounts. In the Council of Government which he created to discuss matters of 
government policy and to debate the budget, the settler lobby in Morocco which was the 
backbone of his support proved his own undoing as they refused to pass the economic 
programme that he proposed. On the other hand, the sultan resisted Juin’s orders which 
he perceived as infringements upon his authority. For example, the sultan refused to sign 
a number of decrees of the Residency and also declined to sanction a change in local 
government procedure which if implemented, would have granted the French inhabitants
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as many representatives as the Muslims, despite the fact that the former were highly 
outnumbered in terms of population ratio.
12Juin’s failures precipitated what came to be known as the “crisis of 1951” The crisis 
began in December 1950 when Moroccan members of the Council of Government 
criticized the budget for the coming year by arguing that it only catered for the colons
1 Tinterests. ' The representative leading the attack was Mohammed Laghzaoui, President 
of the Federation of Moroccan Chambers of Commerce. Juin intervened by ordering 
Laghzaoui to leave the Chamber. Other members of the Istiqlal expressing solidarity 
walked out. They immediately went to see the sultan who received them warmly. This 
cohabitation between the Istiqlal and the Sultan further increased the French worries 
about the two. They decided on steps that would undermine the sultan in the eyes of his 
people, the ultimate objective being to wean him from the nationalist cause. This they 
did through the “divide and rule” tactics. General Juin turned to the sultan’s opponents to 
destabilise his rule. The most prominent of these was Thami al-Ghawi, the Pasha of 
Marrakesh, under whom most Berbers lived, and Sherif Abdelhay Kettani, leader of the 
Kittaniya brotherhood. A sustained attack was launched mainly directed at the Sultan, al- 
Glawi accused Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef of being, not sultan of Morocco, but the 
sultan of the Istiqlal. With the Resident General’s encouragement al-Glawi began to tour 
Berber villages and asked other Muslim leaders to support him against the sultan. Soon 
afterwards, petitions against the Sultan and Istiqlal were circulated by Berber tribal 
leaders. This disobedience, the colonial authorities encouraged and claimed that it 
showed the peoples’ discontentment with the sultan’s rule and partisan politics.
The Resident General and the Berber tribal leaders began to sponsor the candidacy of 
Sidi Mohammed’s uncle, the sexagenarian Moulay Mohammed ben Arafa to be 
enthroned as the sultan of Morocco. All these French manoeuvres reached a peak in 
August 1953. In the meantime, Juin had been replaced by General Guillaume as Resident 
General and he pursued his predecessor’s policy. Guillaume ordered the sultan to sign all 
pending decrees; when he refused, on 20 August 1953 he deposed the sultan claiming 
that he had lost the confidence, trust and was even unpopular among his own people. The 
sultan was first exiled to Corsica, then to Madagascar. In his place was installed Moulay 
Mohammed ben Arafa.
The deposition of Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef soon turned him into a martyr. The 
Moroccans engaged in different forms of resistance and defiance and called for the return 
of the sultan. Ben Arafa’s authority was disregarded, terrorist attacks increased, and these 
were directed at Moroccans who were thought to be police agents or informers. The 
imams who said the Friday prayer in the name of ben Arafa were also attacked as this 
was viewed as betrayal of the legitimate sultan.14 The period beginning with the 
deposition of the sultan and the subsequent two years witnessed a number of clashes 
between the nationalists and the French. A boycott of French goods began in early 1954. 
French property in the form of harvested grain stores,and automobiles mysteriously 
caught fire and there were instances of trains derailment.15 Terrorist activities continued 
until mid-1955 when a new Resident General Gilbert Grandval was appointed and one of 
his instructions was to return Morocco into the concept of the protectorate and to prevent
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direct administration by the local French authorities in Morocco which bypassed Paris.
In August 1955, Franco-Moroccan talks opened in Aix-les-Bains. These talks were 
significant because every voice of Moroccan public opinion was represented, from the 
Istiqlal, Berbers to the Pashas. One of the issues discussed at these talks was the 
abdication of ben Arafa and the return of the dethroned sultan. In spite of these talks, 
France was still not contemplating full independence for Morocco outside the French 
Union. This was illustrated by Mendes-France statement in the same month when he said 
that he did not see a Tunisian type solution for Morocco. On 20 August 1955, the 
occasion of the second anniversary of the deposition of sultan Sidi Mohammed ben 
Youssef there were widespread revolts in Morocco which were highlighted by the 
massacre at Oued Zem. Here the Berbers who descended from the Middle Atlas 
Mountains attacked everyone they encountered. The result was the murder of fifty 
Frenchmen16 and this incident was also a signal to the French that they could no longer 
rely on the Pasha of Marrakesh al-Glawi, in controlling the Berber tribesmen.
After intense debate, the Moroccan denouement was brought to a close when Sidi 
Mohammed ben Youssef returned home via France on 16 November 1955 and assumed 
the throne as King Mohammed V. Mohammed V signed the accords with France which 
resulted in complete independence for Morocco on 2 March 1956. He promised 
protection to expatriate French citizens and agreed to offers of economic cooperation and 
aid from Paris.
Algeria
On the eve of the uprising the situation in Algeria was that of two societies that were 
unequal in economic, political and social terms. The majority of the Algerian population 
numbered eight million Muslims of Arab and Berber stock. The minority were 
Europeans, of French, Italian and Spanish origin, who were estimated to number one 
million; apart from South Africa, this was the highest area of white settlement in Africa. 
The Europeans settled in the country from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
henceforth had come to regard Algeria as their home. Since the colonisation of Algeria 
in the nineteenth century, several attempts at reform had been made by the French in 
order to integrate Algeria into France’s daily political and economic life. 
Constitutionally since 1881, Algeria was part of France, and in principle was governed in 
the same way at national and local level. In 1947 all inhabitants of Algeria were classed 
as French citizens, but in practice the Muslim community continued to be 
underrepresented in both local and national government. Muslim political leaders had 
campaigned since before the First World War for the equal rights denied them by the 
European community. Since before the Second World War, however, this demand had 
been steadily overtaken by a demand for independence, but since Algeria was 
constitutionally part of France this demand had been consistently rejected while further 
progress toward equal rights had been blocked since the passing of the citizenship law in 
1947.
33
On the economic front, despite notable contributions by the French to the development of 
public works, public health, industry and agriculture the majority (Muslims) still fared 
badly. For example, the French settlers had the rich, well kept and productive farms and 
the Muslims had small, crudely tilled fields and the art of husbandry fell far behind that 
of the European farmers. In the towns, most of the rich were French and most of the poor 
were not. As French citizens, since the war, Algerians had the right to go and work in 
France, and about 300,000 of them were doing so by 1954.17 Through the remittance 
these Algerian migrants sent back home, most villages were able to live. These Algerian 
workers in France provided a valuable source of cheap though usually unskilled labour 
for French industry. However, gradually these workers began to be a real problem as
1 9many lived in slums or shared cheap hotel rooms or even slept in shifts. So discontent 
and poverty drove all too many to crime. The ramifications of all this were widespread 
resentment, disaffection and a feeling of being treated as second-rate French citizens. 
Thus, by 1954 the way was open for militant extremism.
During the Second World War, Algeria was under the rule of the Vichy government from 
1940 to the end of 1942, when it was liberated by the Anglo-American landings in 
Morocco in November 1942. Nationalism which had hibernated during the war began to 
rear its head after the liberation. This was illustrated by the issuing of the Manifesto of 
the Algerian People in February 1943 by Ferhat Abbas. The Manifesto called for the full 
participation of Algerians in government, as well as the establishment of a fully 
democratic constitution for the country. So, in other terms, it could be argued that just 
before and during the Second World War, Algerian nationalism as personified by the 
assimilationists under Ferhat Abbas, the refomist ulama of Abdelhamid Ben Badis and 
radical anticolonial nationalists under Messali Hadj was still at a nascent stage.
The most radical transformation in the Algerian resistance to the French took place in 
May 1945. May 8, 1945 was the V-E Day for Europe as Germany had capitulated in the 
war. For the European Algerians it was a day of celebration and demonstrations were 
organised throughout the country. Setif which was in the Constantine region was mainly 
inhabited by Muslims and the town had in the past been a hotbed of revolutionary 
activity. The Setif Muslims had been granted permission by the French Algerian 
authorities to demonstrate as part of the victory celebrations and they were ordered to 
carry placards which were unprovocative. The demonstration began peacefully although 
most of the participants appear to have been supporters of Messali Hadj. Within a short 
time that the march had begun, a section of the demonstrators turned it into a nationalist 
one. Alongside Allied flags people raised banners and placards which read as follows, 
“down with colonialism and long live a free Algeria.”19 For the first time the Green-and- 
Blue banners of the legendary Abdelkader’s shortlived nineteenth century state was 
displayed by the marchers.20 Scuffles broke out when the police tried to seize the 
banners.
On that day and the following three days Muslims attacked Europeans and killed about a 
hundred of them. European women were cruelly raped and some brutally killed as their 
breasts were even slashed off. The violence spread from the town into the country, as
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happened in Kenya at the height of the Mau Mau rebellion, European farmers found 
themselves being attacked by some of their long-serving and loyal servants. French 
reprisals were ruthless, as thousands of Muslims were wantonly massacred. The exact 
figure of the Muslims killed has since become a debatable and controversial issue. 
Figures varied wildly depending on who told the story. The subsequent Tubert 
Commission Report put the figure at between 1,020 and 1,300, Arab nationalists from 
Mashriq to Maghreb put the death toll at forty-five thousand.21 Ali Mazrui and Michael 
Tidy estimated the figure of Muslim casualties to be around twenty thousand.22 Other 
sources put the death toll at six thousand. Whatever the exact figure, the number of 
Muslims murdered by the French far outstripped that of the Europeans killed. Even the 
precise cause(s) of why the Setif march turned violent could not be ascertained, but there 
appears to have been both social and political grievances at play. The fallout from this 
was that, before the end of the year 5, 560 Muslims had been arrested, ninety-nine of 
whom were condemned to death and several hundred to life imprisonment.23 Among the 
prominent Algerian nationalists arrested were Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj. Setif was 
the first insurrection in which the rank and file of the countryside joined together with the 
nationalist movement which had been created by the urban Algerians and had been 
spreading rapidly to different parts of the country.
The legacy of the Setif uprising was that the relationship between the coloniser and 
colonised was no longer the same again. The incident was to gradually swing the 
political pendulum to those within the Muslim society who wanted open military 
confrontation with the French. Time was running out for the dovish sections of the 
Muslim community who still believed in non-violent methods to achieve equality with 
the French. Writing later during the course of the Algerian war and commenting on Setif, 
Edward Behr states that it was :
an event which, in one form or another, has marked every single Algerian 
Moslem alive at the time ... and the after-effects o f the Setif uprising 
cannot be underestimated. Every one o f the “new wave ” o f Algerian 
nationalists prominent in the National Liberation Front today traces his 
revolutionary determination back to May 1945. The moderate, French- 
educated Algerians who had hoped fo r progressive evolution towards self- 
government had their hopes dashed by French violence. Among the 
current leaders o f the FLN ....there is general agreement : each o f them 
felt after May 1945 that some form o f armed uprising would sooner or 
later become necessary,24 
After the Setif uprising there was to be nominal peace for close to a decade before the 
Algerian war of independence officially broke out. Alistair Home correctly states that 
“in effect, the shots fired at Setif represented the first volley of the Algerian War.”25
After May 1945, the French authorities introduced some reforms which were geared at 
bringing the Algerians within the political system. For this purpose three successive 
assemblies were created. The August 1945 decree granted the Muslim electorate, the so- 
called “second college.” In the first assembly Muslims were offered to elect the same 
number of representatives as the colons for the first Constituent Assembly. In the 
elections held in October 1945, thirteen Muslim members, mostly government
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collaborators and assimilationists were elected. These were also elected by a low turn­
out as Ferhat Abbas and Messali Hadj who were still under arrest had urged their 
supporters not to participate in this electoral process. Once freed, in March 1946 Ferhat 
Abbas created a new party the Democratic Union of Algeria Manifesto (UDMA). The 
party envisaged or proposed the Republic of Algeria which was to be an autonomous 
entity but within the framework of the French Union or French “Commonwealth” created 
in 1946 as a replacement of the old French Empire.26 This Algerian Republic was to be 
fully independent internally while leaving the French Union to take care of foreign affairs 
and defence. The French of Algeria were to be recognised as Algerian citizens, in 
reciprocation, every Algerian citizen would enjoy citizenship in France. The Republic 
was to have its own parliament, directly elected by universal suffrage, and would have 
control over the budget and also enjoy legislative power.
Taking into consideration the political milieu of the time UDMA blueprint was a non­
starter since Paris policy was rebuilding and consolidating the empire in the post- war era 
and colonies were not to be freed, moreso for Algeria it was not considered a colony but 
part of France. The second Constituent Assembly was elected in June 1946. Its major 
decision was the passing of the decision which increased the number of Muslims entitled 
to vote with the Europeans in the first electoral college by the law of 5 October 1946. It 
dissolved before it could discuss the organic law of Algeria, it was left to the new 
parliament which came into being as a result of the October 1946 referendum. 
Meanwhile, Messali Hadj formed a new pro-nationalist party called Movement for the 
Triumph of Democratic Freedoms (MTLD).
Debate began in early 1947 for the organic law of Algeria. During the discussions that 
spanned from March to September 1947, the majority of Algerian deputies argued for an 
autonomous Algerian Republic federated with Tunisia and Morocco within the 
framework of the French Union. Finally, on 20 September 1947, the French National 
Assembly passed the so-called Organic Statute of Algeria of 1947. Under this organic 
law, Algeria was defined as a group of overseas departments. It was to be headed by a 
Governor General appointed by the French government and wielded executive power 
with the advice of a council of six. The Statute declared all inhabitants of Algeria77citizens of France without discrimination as to origin, race, language, or religion. The 
1947 Statute of Algeria perpetuated the principle of separate electoral colleges. The first 
college was elected by some 464,000 Europeans, men and women plus 58,000 elite 
Muslims who held French civil status, while the second college was elected by 1,300,000 
ordinary Muslims.28 The Algerian Assembly was to have 120 members, from each 
electoral college. This clearly shows that the system was an unfair one as it favoured the 
Europeans who were few in number. Though Muslim women were still denied many 
rights, the Statute did extend suffrage rights to them, but only used it in 1958.
The powers of the Algerian Assembly were limited as they excluded defence, elections, 
local government, administrative and judicial organisation, civil and criminal codes, 
determination of felonies and misdemeanours, land policy and customs. All these were 
the responsibility of the National Assembly in Paris. Budgets needed the approval of the 
Governor General and had to be co-signed by ministers of Interior and Finance in Paris.
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Each of Algeria’s two colleges sent fifteen representatives to the French National 
Assembly. These thirty men, plus fourteen Senators in the Council of the Republic and 
eighteen Counsellors in the Assembly of the French Union, completed Algeria’s 
representation to Paris. Election of Senators and Counsellors was indirect, while the 
thirty representatives were elected through direct universal manhood suffrage.'10 The 
Statute of Algeria of 1947 failed in practice because it met stiff opposition from the 
colons lobby and colonial administrators in Algeria, both who considered it a disgrace 
and the Muslims considered it an insult.
The Muslims expressed their displeasure towards the Statute in the municipal elections of 
October 1947 when they voted in huge numbers for the nationalist MTLD of Messali 
Hadj. Astounded by MLTD’s electoral victories, Paris decided to replace the then 
Governor General Yves Chataigneau who was considered too weak to deal with the 
Algerian situation. His replacement was the socialist hard-liner Marcel-Edmond 
Naegelen who was determined to curb Muslim nationalism. This he did through 
tampering with the electoral process. In the run-up to the April 1948 elections of the 
Algerian Assembly, Naegelen’s administration employed methods or tactics which could 
ensure that the MTLD was disadvantaged or fared badly. On the eve of the elections a 
substantial number of MTLD candidates had been arrested, voter intimidation was carried 
out through the deployment of the armed forces everywhere. Ballot boxes were either 
stuffed or disappeared mysteriously.
When the day of voting came, it proved to be a huge electoral fraud. Out of the sixty 
seats allocated to the Muslims in the second electoral college, two-thirds of these were 
won by the administration’s sponsored candidates, the MTLD got nine and UDMA got 
eight.31 In case of the MLTD four of the victorious candidates were prevented from 
taking their seats as criminal charges were laid against them. Subsequent elections were 
subjected to massive rigging and this further sent a signal to the nationalists that change 
could not be brought about by participating in the constitutional process.32 The MTLD 
and UDMA now began to be moribund.
As alluded to earlier, after 1945 some Algerian activists still favoured assimilation or a 
peaceful negotiated solution to the question of Algeria’s relationship with France, but 
others thought this was the wrong way to proceed and advocated a more militant and 
aggressive approach. This latter group had in 1947 coalesced into what was called Secret 
Organisation (OS). They comprised of a group of young nationalists mostly in their 
twenties, namely, Ahmed Ben Bella (later President), Ait Ahmed Hocine, Mohamed 
Boudiaf, M’Hammed Yazid, Mohamed Khider, Belkacem Krim, Ben M ’hidi and Lakdar 
Ben Tobbal. ' They began to work underground toward armed rebellion. A wave of 
arrests by the French security service in 1950 scattered them as some were imprisoned, 
some sought refuge in the Kabylia or Aures mountains in Algeria, the rest fled to either 
France itself or Egypt. Once some of them had escaped from prison in 1952, namely, 
Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed Hocine, the OS started to regroup and met undetected 
frequently in Switzerland where most of the discussions and planning was done. In 
March 1954 the OS reconstituted themselves in what was called the Revolutionary 
Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA).
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These young revolutionaries were from different parts of Algeria, and had different 
social, political and military backgrounds. Generally, they were representative of the 
entire Muslim Algerian society. They had in September 1954 divided the country into 
six wilayas (military zones or districts). Each wilaya had a leader given the military rank 
of colonel. The colonel in each wilaya was assisted by three officers, one each for 
political affairs, logistics and liaison and information.34 The wilaya system was later to 
be developed into a number of subdivisions. The subsidiary units were called mantaqas 
(zones), which in turn contained nahayas (regions), qasmas (sectors), and duwwar 
(circles) in descending order.35 This military system was intended for effective execution 
of any future course of action. In their clandestine activities, Cairo proved a safe haven 
for most of these Algerian political activists. Early in October 1954, Mohamed Boudiaf 
secretly met wilaya leaders in Algeria and informed them that the rebellion would start 
on 1 November 1954. In the night of 31 October 1954, a series of attacks took place in 
the Aures mountains and Kabylie region. The Algerian war of independence had almost 
begun.
c. Britain and Algeria, 1945 to November 1954
Les Anglo-saxons was the term used after 1945 for the British and Americans and it 
expressed French fears that the two were colluding at the destruction of the French 
empire and the status of France as a great power.36 This suspicion or mistrust was to 
form the basis for French attitudes towards Britain up to the outbreak of the Algerian 
conflict in November 1954, despite repeated British diplomatic gesture and assurances at 
international forums such the United Nations. The French resented what they perceived 
as condescending superiority on the part of the British. Responding to the Setif uprising, 
Martin Thomas has stated that the then British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden after 
being presented with and reading conflicting estimates of the Setif death toll, simply 
appended, “What is this all about?” And that was the end of the matter.37 What Eden’s 
retort indicates is that Algeria was not of great significance or importance to Whitehall at 
the time. In other words, it was a peripheral issue.
On 14 July 1946, in commemoration of Bastille Day, the then British Ambassador in 
Paris, after commending France on the second Constituent Assembly of that year, and the 
proposal to enfranchise the Muslim majority as part of France’s “new deal” for the 
Empire/Union sent a message to the French Government stating that:
We are on your side in Algeria. We ardently desire the success o f your
efforts in Algeria:'8
In February 1947, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin issued a circular to all 
consuls in North Africa regarding Anglo-French relations in that sphere of the world. The 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a circular along the same lines in June 1947. 
The principal theme of both communications in 1947 was the importance of close 
cooperation in all fields between the two countries, as a cardinal element in their foreign
Qpolicy.'1 British Consuls in North Africa were instructed that it was directly contrary to 
His Majesty’s government policy for British officials to do anything to weaken the 
French position in North Africa. It was further stated that while it was naturally the duty
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of these officers to keep the Foreign Office informed of developments in their districts, 
they had no intention whatever of concerning themselves with, and still less encouraging 
the local nationalist movements.40 The British further emphasised that any suggestion 
that they were working against the interests of France was therefore patently absurd. 
Despite these British assurances the French still had suspicions and misgivings about 
British policy towards them in North Africa and other parts of the world.
In 1949 the French Secretary of State Paul Devinat wrote a long article that was 
published by the Manchester Guardian in which he complained of the severe judgement 
by the British press and government of France’s political weaknesses, her social 
disturbances and financial difficulties.41 The French also complained that Britain, backed 
by the United States of America, was acting as though she and not France should play the 
leading part in Western European Affairs. Instances that were quoted by the French were 
the general tendency of United States representatives to gang up with the British over 
German questions, and the decision to grant additional aid to Great Britain contrary to the 
known views of France.42 France threatened that if the United States continued to pursue 
the policy of thinking that it was Britain which was to play the leading part in Western 
European affairs, not France, then France would have to reconsider her whole position 
and go her own way 43 Implicit in this French diplomatic threat was the possibility of 
striking a deal with the Soviet Union.
French rumblings of discontent with British policy towards them extended to colonial 
affairs, and were to be continued throughout the 1950s up to the outbreak of the Algerian 
war of independence. For instance in late 1951 the French expressed their disquiet at 
British policy in North Africa and Levant and argued that British policy was inimical to 
their interests. One example stated for this was British support for the Arab League and 
all that went with it. Other examples cited were British support for the United Nations’ 
creation of a Libyan state without taking account of its effects on French policy in North 
Africa; the supposed British support for El Fassi’s nationalist cause in Morocco; and the 
visit of Bourguiba to London in 1951, especially his broadcast on BBC 44 In fact, Libyan 
independence was championed by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, as this not 
only corresponded to the perceived wishes of the inhabitants but met British political and
45strategic requirements.
The British response to these charges were that while some, such as the Bourguiba affair 
were genuine complaints, the truth of the matter was that London and Paris had directly 
contrary theories of colonial development, hence there was bound to be friction between 
them in West and North Africa. In a letter dated 31 October 1951 from London to Dakar, 
the Foreign Office claimed that the French were frustrated by the fact that they (the 
British) were rightly or wrongly attempting to come to terms with nationalism in Africa 
which the French did not believe to be possible or desirable 46 However, the letter added 
that the French concerns were admissible to a certain extent especially in so far as there 
was the need to preserve a united front towards anti-colonial elements.
Early in 1954, after being appointed British Ambassador to France, Gladwyn Jebb 
summarised the uneasiness in Anglo-French relations at the time as follows :
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Ever since Robert Schuman’s startling and unheralded initiation in 1950 
there had been a vague feeling in Whitehall that the French were not 
“playing the game”; that they were inclined to take an individual and at 
the same time rather unpredictable line ; and that in any case, owing to 
constant changes o f government the Fourth Republic was a weak sister 
who must be kept on the straight and narrow path o f Western solidarity by 
a firm, purposeful and self-confident Britain.41 
The above statement was made against the background of the May 1950 French Foreign 
Minister, Robert Schuman proposal for the creation of a supranational authority to 
control Europe’s coal and steel industries. This proposal came to be known as the 
“Schuman Plan”48 and it finally led to the creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) on 1 January 1958. But the above quotation serves to explain the 
state of affairs prevailing with regards to Anglo-French relations by the outbreak of the 
Algerian war in Africa as elsewhere. British-French colonial relations did not go hand in 
hand on a number of issues, and that it was the French who complained. But it is also 
quite clear from the above that British dealings or discussion of Algeria was always 
subsumed in the wider question of French colonial policy in North Africa and Africa 
generally. In other words, Algeria was not treated distinctively by Britain before the 
outbreak of the war.
d. Conclusion
The preceding discussion has shown that the three French possessions in North Africa 
were treated differently depending on their constitutional position. Since Tunisia and 
Morocco were regarded as protectorates, their political symbols or institutions were not 
destroyed by colonisation. So, after the Second World War, the Constitution of 1860 in 
Tunisia and the Sultan in Morocco came to symbolise autonomy and national unity. The 
budding nationalist movements in the two protectorates were built around these two 
principles of national self-government. International circumstances such as the fallout 
from the Indo-China war speeded France’s withdrawal from them, though the final push 
was given by the outbreak of the war in Algeria.
Algeria was in the unique position of being a colony and moreover classified as a part of 
France. This meant that its value to France was immense. So, after the Second World 
War constitutional reforms that were undertaken by the French were intended to 
ameliorate the grievances of some sections of the Muslim society such as the French 
educated and assimilationists. Even if these political reforms were done in good faith, 
they had to be always balanced with the needs of the large settler population which not 
only blocked these reforms but was willing to fight any attempts which tended to create 
some parity between them and the Muslims. By 1954 some of the Algerian Muslims had 
lost any faith or confidence on political reform, and were convinced that other means 
outside the political framework could liberate them from the colonial ordeal.
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CHAPTER 4
ALGERIAN WAR, NOVEMBER 1954 TO SUEZ, 1956
a. Outbreak and Escalation of War, 1 November 1954 to September 1956
The history of the war in these years is given for British government purposes in the 
Consular Reports for 1955 to 1956.1 The Algerian war of independence broke out on 1 
November 1954, All Saint’s Day, in the Aures mountains east of Algeria. It was a series 
of terrorist attacks on specifically chosen targets. What amazed many observers and 
commentators of the Algerian scene at the time was the meticulous way in which these 
attacks were orchestrated and earned out. The "terrorists” struck simultaneously at night 
in many widely separated places. No doubt this left the impression that the whole 
operation had been carefully planned. The attacks took many forms, from the 
commando-type raids on police and military posts and outlying farms to the murder of 
isolated French soldiers and civilians and even some Algerians. In many cases the raids 
followed the same pattern. The terrorists began by setting fire to buildings, and then 
opened up with light automatic weapons and rifles against their chosen target. In all there 
were over sixty terrorist attacks carried out throughout the country that night.2 In Cairo 
the leaders of the CRUA announced the founding of the (FLN)-National Liberation 
Front, with a military wing called the National Liberation Army (ALN). The FLN then 
issued a proclamation calling on all Algerians "to rise and fight for their freedom.”3
At the beginning, the French government was dismissive of the uprising as the work of a 
liny minority and hotheads bent on violence and sponsored from outside. Militarily, 
French response was swift and prompt with several parachute troops, mobile guards and 
armed security police dispatched to Algeria within a matter of hours. Politically, the then 
French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France assured France, Algeria and the world at 
large that normality, peace and tranquillity would soon be restored in Algeria. The 
Premier’s Interior Minister, Francois Mitterrand, went so far as to tell the world and the 
"rebels” that France’s only negotiation would be war. He further stated that the Republic, 
guarantee of France’s future, would be defended by all possible means 4 But the tide of 
events soon proved how wrong they were.
Once the war had broken out in this way, Muslims were arrested and often tortured by the 
police, brought before the courts which were both biased and permeated with a spirit of 
racialism, and finally after being sentenced, passed into the hands of a prison service 
which itself was subordinate to the police. The whole process took place within a closed 
circuit of which torture formed an integral part. Using out-of-date lists of suspects the 
police systematically arrested members of the Algerian nationalist organisation, the 
MLTD. This movement was itself in a state of turmoil at the time and so had nothing to 
do with the rebellion. Yet a good number of those arrested were subjected to the vilest 
and most despicable tortures.
Surprisingly the facts were very soon known in France. According to Pierre Vidal-
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Naquet, as early as 15 January 1955 L ’Express, a weekly review generally known to have 
close connexions with Pierre Mendes-France, then Prime Minister, published an article 
by Francois Mauriac entitled (prophetically) “La Question” (“Torture”).5 More 
revelations were soon leaked out of men being subjected to the most inhumane forms of 
treatment, with prisoners being dragged from police quarters to the law courts while still 
bleeding from their wounds, others with open and barely healed wounds.6 Such excesses 
were brought to the notice of the National Assembly during a debate on the Algerian 
problem between 2-5 February 1955. The official French reaction to these charges were 
summed up by the Interior Minister, Francois Mitterrand and the Prime Minister, 
Mendes-France as follows. The former was evasive in his response. While he admitted 
that certain excesses had taken place, he insisted on paying tribute to the Algerian police 
work. Mendes-France was, far more definite: He began by paying tribute to Francois 
Mauriac’s sterling work and went on to speak of horrible excesses which had at times 
been committed. Though they might have been exaggerated in certain instances, he 
admitted their occurrence and insisted that they must be stopped everywhere and at once.7 
But on 5 February the Mendes-France government fell over its Algerian policy of entente 
and reforms. The way was open to repression.
1955, had opened with the Algerian question being first raised in the United Nations 
Security Council in January. The issue was raised by the Saudi Arabian delegation who 
drew the Council’s attention to the situation in Algeria, which it felt might endanger the 
maintenance of internal peace and security.8 Saudi Arabia did not request a meeting of 
the Council on the question but did reserve its right to call for one. By a vote of eight to 
five, the Assembly’s General Committee agreed to include Algeria on the agenda of the 
tenth General Assembly session coming in September. In April 1955 the FLN achieved 
their first international diplomatic coup as they were invited to attend the inaugural 
meeting of the third world non-aligned movement, that is, the Bandung Conference in 
Indonesia. The conference condemned colonialism in all its shapes and unanimously 
adopted an Egyptian sponsored motion proclaiming Algeria’s right to independence and 
called on France to implement this immediately.9
The development and growth of nationalist agitation and violence in Algeria was always 
linked to events in her French protectorate neighbours of Morocco and Tunisia. The 
demands of the nationalist movement in Morocco as stated earlier, had on 20 August 
1953 led to the deposition of the Sultan, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef. The 
dethronement of the Sultan now became a rallying point for Moroccan nationalists. On 
the second anniversary of the Moroccan King’s deposition riots broke out in many 
Moroccan cities. These coincided with riots in Algeria, which appear to have been 
carefully pre-planned. The violence that ensued culminated in what came to be known as 
the Philippeville Massacres. The attacks were the result of a plan of indiscriminate 
killing of Europeans hatched by Youssef Zighout, commander of wilciya two and his 
deputy, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal.10 With this plan they hoped to provoke a massive popular 
uprising carrying the war to the urban areas where most Europeans lived. The principal 
targets were the harbour city of Philippeville, its surrounding neighbourhood El-Milia, 
and the area around Constantine proper. On that day of 20 August 1955 government 
officials, Muslim collaborators and Europeans of all kinds were attacked with grenades,
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knives, guns, sticks and sickles. Their cars were damaged, telegraph lines were 
vandalised and the emergency radio transmitter rendered unworkable. One of the victims 
killed in these random rebel attacks was the nephew of Ferhat Abbas, one of the Algerian 
nationalist leaders.11
French reprisals were severe and received widespread press coverage abroad. There were 
reports of atrocities committed by the French army in Algeria. Whole settlements were 
destroyed and men, women, and children were massacred. According to Martin Thomas 
the West German press was particularly critical of French actions, condemning “scorched 
earth” methods and a “bloodbath” in which some 1,000 Algerians were allegedly killed 
during the destruction of nine Arab villages around Oued-Zenati in Constantine.12 
Whereas the French authorities were quick to blame “foreign influence” mainly Islamic 
countries for helping the rebels, accusations were also levelled at the Americans though 
no concrete evidence was provided against them. The unsubstantiated charge against the 
Americans was that they wanted France to be driven out of Algeria so that they (US) 
could have a free hand in Algeria and exploit Algerian oil.13 For the Algerian nationalists 
Philippeville did achieve its intended purpose. The two societies were driven further 
apart, and all-out repression moved a step nearer.
It came in 1956, which opened with the intensification of the fighting between the FLN 
and the French Army. Whereas at the beginning of the rebellion France seemed inclined 
to a political solution of the Algerian problem, as was shown by the appointment of the 
liberal Jacques Soustelle as Governor of Algeria, all was to be abandoned in 1956. In 
1956 France now became more and more determined to deal with the problem in a 
military sense. In February 1956 the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet warned the 
United States that if France was driven out of North Africa, the whole of French Black 
Africa would fall under the Soviet Union’s influence, thus playing the Cold War card to 
cling to France’s North African possession. Mollet, having been met on his visit to 
Algiers in March by an angry European population opposed to his choice of Georges 
Catroux as Governor of Algeria, went still further when he made a U-turn on Algerian 
policy by appointing the hard line Robert Lacoste to the more senior position of Resident 
Minister of Algeria (this replaced the post of Governor). Since the new office had 
discretionary powers, Lacoste gave priority to the military solution instead of the political 
one. This was carried out through the policy of quadrillage, in which the army divided 
Algeria into military districts or zones which it occupied especially along the Tunisia 
border where it had barriers built. It is also important to note that the French Army had 
immensely increased in Algeria from 80,000 in 1954 to 400,000 in 1956.14 So under 
Lacoste the Army effectively took over the government of Algeria.
Since the war waged by the FLN was, by its very nature revolutionary, the main object of 
the insurrection was to bring about a state of affairs in which every Algerian in every 
town or village, should be convinced that the cause of the FLN was his own. Brutal and 
coercive methods were, if necessary, used to achieve this. Those who collaborated with 
the French Army were executed and those who were disobedient were severely punished. 
By the second half of 1956 this object had almost been achieved. The old parties and the 
rival movement of Messali Hadj had been, to all intents and purposes, eliminated. The
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ALN, with its military units scouring the countryside and its terrorist networks, was only 
one, although best-known, of the means employed in this revolutionary war. Contact 
with the population and in particular with the peasant population was maintained through 
the Political and Administrative Organisation (OPA) which knit together the 
revolutionary leaders in each village, each settlement, and each town.15
In the meantime, the FLN had grown in terms of membership, with different classes of 
people with varying interests and opinions joining its ranks. It was now becoming 
unwieldy and cumbersome to manage an organisation of such magnitude without proper 
political structures. Though a significant number of the movement’s leadership who 
started the war were either killed in action or had gone into exile, others who remained, 
such Ramdane Abane who had made his mark in the movement as an outstanding 
political intellect, realised the urgent need to come together to iron out differences within 
the movement, by providing structures for political direction and leadership. The 
outcome was the Soummam Valley Congress in Kabylia that opened on 20 August 1956, 
a date which made it impossible for the external leadership to attend. After many days of 
debate, the gathering produced a forty-page document, which clarified the objectives of 
the revolution and formalised the military structures. It reaffirmed the goal of complete 
independence, nor was there to be a cease-fire before recognition of independence for 
Algerian territory in totality. The National Liberation Army (ALN) was provided with a 
single general staff under Belkacem Krim. For political matters, a National Council of 
the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) was elected with a membership of thirty-four and 
within the CNRA there was also a five member Committee for Coordination and 
Execution (C C E).16
In order to prevent the emergence of “personality cults” it was agreed that collective 
leadership should be the motto. The aim of the struggle was stated as a single democratic 
and socialist Algerian Republic. The congress also affirmed the authority of the political 
leadership over the military. Furthermore it affirmed the primacy of the internal 
leadership over the external. These were major decisions taken at Soummam, but as with 
all revolutionary movements a split was created between those who were in exile and 
those who carried on the difficult struggle at home. Parallels, though these have not been 
much noticed, could be seen with the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, 
that is, the exiles versus the internals. The former suffered a major blow when on 22 
October 1956 the French hijacked a Moroccan plane bound for Tunis and carrying four of 
the external leadership of the FLN namely Ahmed Ben Bella, Bou Diaf, Ait Ahmed, and 
Mohamed Khider.17 The fifth person arrested was the Algerian academic Mostefa 
Lacheraf who worked for the FLN. These were then incarcerated in France up to the end 
of the war. This was a major coup for the French, although it alienated the newly- 
independent states of Morocco and Tunisia. But the incident was rapidly overtaken by 
the Suez crisis.
b. Britain and Algeria , November 1954 to September 1956
After the years following Bevin’s circular of 1947, when Britain had indeed been largely 
content to leave Algeria to the French, the outbreak of the war not only brought Algeria
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to the critical attention of the British public, but obliged Her Majesty’s Government to 
consider the implications of the position adopted in 1947 in this new situation. In 
practice, British policy makers never formulated a coherent systematic and detailed 
policy on the Algerian war or the whole North African question. Throughout the Algerian 
war, British policy towards France and the Algerian rebellion was reactive rather than 
proactive. Within Whitehall at times, policy makers, African and Middle East experts 
were critical of France’s conduct during the war but these criticisms were never made 
public, possibly for diplomatic reasons. From its start, up to its conclusion, however, the 
Algerian problem was often raised in the House of Commons by the Opposition Labour 
Party Members, notably Anthony Wedgwood Benn and Fenner Brockway leading the 
way. As subsequent examples will show, on many occasions Government responses 
were often couched in diplomatic and legalistic mumbo-jumbo language, which often 
raised more questions than answers and added further ambiguity on British policy or 
stance. In Fleet Street circles opinions were divided on the Algerian issue; left-wing 
papers were often critical of the French demeanour in Algeria whereas right-wing papers 
usually supported France on the ground that she was protecting wider NATO and 
Western interests in Algeria. The following discussion of this chapter details how these 
three broad sources of the British establishment reacted to and commented on the 
outbreak and development of the Algerian rebellion, and how these commentaries related 
to the broader British colonial and decolonisation policies in Africa.
Commenting early in 1955 on the fall of the Mendes-France regime, The Listener stated 
that North Africa raised for any Frenchman a tremendous political and moral problem 
which could not be easily escaped. The weekly journal warned France that she could not 
manage to keep colonies in the Arab world.18 Britain had realised this impossibility by 
conceding independence to Egypt and Libya, with the implication that France must 
follow suit. The Listener article went further by stating that there was no justification for 
France refusing independence to a country like Tunisia which was by far more modern 
than one such as Libya, granted independence in 1951.19 From this discussion it could be 
seen that the paper was questioning the intransigence of French policy in North Africa.
On 28 April 1955, the Labour Party MP Fenner Brockway raised the whole question of 
North Africa in the House of Commons. He asked the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs why Her Majesty’s Government had given the French Government assurances of 
support for their policy in North Africa.20 The Member of Parliament further wanted the 
Secretary of State to confirm if he stood by the statement made in Algiers on 20 April 
1955 by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British Ambassador in Paris, when he said that France 
could count on the British Government and people to support their point of view in North 
Africa in every possible way. In response R.H. Turton, Joint Parliamentary Under­
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that Her Majesty’s Government considered 
that it was in their interest and that of the free world to support the declared policy of the 
French Government which was aimed at enabling the peoples of the overseas 
dependencies to take their place and play their full part in the Western democratic world. 
21 From this one can infer that Jebb’s remarks were broadly in line with the government’s 
policy.
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Writing to London in July 1955, Ambassador Jebb cautioned and urged the Government 
of the importance of safeguarding France’s position as an international power and ally. 
He stated th a t:
The fact that France’s status as a Great Power depends directly on the 
maintenance o f the French position in North Africa make it doubly 
important fo r  both France and France’s allies that French policy in 
Algeria, should not only be progressive but wise. Moreover France will 
only possess the self-confidence required fo r a liberal approach to the 
Algerian problem if  she considers herself assured o f the unswerving 
support o f her Western allies fo r the French position in that country}2 
From the above words of Jebb it can be deduced that to some within the British political 
establishment, France’s possession of Algeria was important for wide Western interests, 
possibly Cold War supremacy in that part of the world.
As stated earlier about the Philippeville attacks, the rebel killings were brutal and 
indiscriminate with no regard to sex or age. Casualty figures varied from one source to 
the other. According to the British Consul’s Office in Algiers, 200 rebels were killed, 90 
held prisoners and wounded; military and police killed stood at 14, with 33 wounded, and 
20 civilians killed and 30 wounded. 3 The Daily Telegraph recorded 70 Europeans killed 
and 52 wounded, 31 French troops dead and 121 wounded, 15 loyal Muslims murdered 
and 43 sustained injuries.24 In the case of the rebels the paper reported 524 deaths and 79 
left with wounds. In addition 1,022 rebels were reported to be held in custody.25 Most 
sources have settled for the figure of 123 Europeans killed and 1,273 rebel deaths,26
97whereas Algerians themselves claimed a wild figure of 12,000 of their own killed due to 
the arbitrary killing by the colonial state apparatus such as the police, troops and 
vigilantes. Taking into account the wide discrepancy on the figures one is tempted to 
accept the conservative lower one of just over a thousand casualties on the Muslim side.
As part of their information gathering and wanting to get a full picture of the 
Philippeville massacres, the British Government immediately despatched their military 
attache in Paris, Brigadier A.C.F. Jackson, to visit the areas of violent disturbances in 
Algeria and report on the situation. In a synopsis the Jackson report exonerated the 
French army from any wrongdoing and serious brutality. The report blamed the civil 
authorities for not supporting the army with the result that the troops found themselves in 
a difficult situation to which they had to react. In his report Jackson stated the following: 
It is difficult to come to any other conclusion than that there have been 
remarkably few  cases o f atrocities by the French Army in North Africa up 
to the present. Since the August period there may have been a few  cases 
o f injustice but there is no evidence that the number is large considering 
the size o f the force. In order to get a sense o f proportion about such 
cases, it is perhaps worth mentioning that there have been at least four 
proved cases o f atrocities committed by British troops or police in Kenya 
and they did not make pretty reading. Algeria is perhaps fifty times as big 
as the Man Man country and there are perhaps about, ten times as many 
troops in the former as in the latter. When one recollects the French 
record o f similar operations in North Africa, some o f them quite recent,
the present record is a very real improvement, and something o f which
28one feels the French Army has every reason to be extremely proud.
Such a report would no doubt have delighted the French. As far as the British 
government was concerned, it was calculated to confirm the stated support for the French 
in Algeria. But the reference to Kenya is significant where Britain was into the third year 
of a full scale colonial war against the Mau Mau fighters. It is quite clear that Her 
Majesty’s Government perceived the similarity, and was equally aware of the 
implications namely that however good the colonial case might seem to be, it was fatally 
undermined by atrocity on the part of the security forces. The analogy of Kenya, applied 
to Algeria, shows that the British were sympathetic to the French and felt that they were 
both in the same boat in relation to colonial problems.
Whereas the outbreak of the war brought Algeria to the attention of the world, 
Philippeville was the first dramatic “media event” to hit the world’s headlines. Its 
general effect was to put France in the wrong, and thus to drive France, and its argument 
that in repressing the rebellion, France was defending the free world, on to the defensive. 
That led quickly to the accusation that France was being betrayed by the free world, 
notably by the Americans. Britain as the other half of the “Anglo-Saxon” alliance, was 
clearly liable to its share of the blame. Nevertheless, the French were pleased with 
comments such as those contained in the Jackson report.
Continued British support for French actions in Algeria, by the government and in the 
press, was again in evidence when the Algerian question was raised again at the United 
Nations in September 1955. On 30 September 1955, the UN Assembly voted twenty- 
eight to twenty-seven to put Algeria on the agenda of the Assembly.29 The Arab-Asian 
bloc including the Soviet Union voted in favour of the proposal. The French delegation 
led by Antoine Pinay walked out in protest. The British delegation voted against the 
proposal. This British support for France was on the grounds that discussion of colonial 
policy was outside the mandate of the UN Charter.30 To reciprocate this favour, France 
supported Britain over the question of Cyprus where the British insisted that tenure of the 
island was strategically imperative and had distinct parallels with French policy in 
Algeria.'’1
The British and French stance at this session of the United Nations received positive 
coverage in certain sections of the British media. According to the Spectator the vote 
was a much-needed diplomatic success for France. And the vote had sent a clear 
message to the Asian and Arab countries that they must not push the colonial powers too 
far.02 For his part The Listener’s Bickham Sweet-Escott argued that if the UN debated 
Algeria, then it was logical for the body to debate issues such as South Carolina, Wales or 
Essex,00 and surely according to The Listener article the UN was not for debating such 
“trivial” issues. Sweet-Escott went further by challenging the Eastern bloc and Arab- 
Asian countries to explain what they meant by colonialism or the so-called Colonial 
Powers. The article further stated that there was nothing wicked about having a colony. 
The weekly journal called on the Communist countries to stop attacking the West since 
the former also had minorities in their own countries but did not want it to be said they 
had colonised those people. For example the Russians had Ukrainians and Mongols etc.
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The Chinese had the Tibetans. The Listener concluded by saying that those who attack 
Colonial Powers like France only want to weaken the Western Alliance and serve the 
interests of the Communists.34 The Listener article thus put its finger, knowingly or 
inadvertently, on the crux of the French position, in Algeria and on Algeria, namely that 
the country was both part of France, recognised as such in international law on the 
strength of its annexation by France in the nineteenth century, and an overseas colony of 
European immigrants, thinly disguised by the citizenship granted to the native muslim 
majority after the war, but never fully realised.
In London however, the government remained open to attack. Briefing the press in Paris 
on 6 March 1956 Jebb expressed British solidarity with France in Algeria. Responding to 
a question in the Commons on Algeria on 15 March 1956, Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
stated that he endorsed the speech which the British Ambassador in Paris had made on 
the Government’s authority that Algeria was part of Metropolitan France and that Her 
Majesty’s Government could have nothing but sympathy with the efforts of the French 
Government to improve conditions and preserve peace in Algeria.35 In essence that was 
broadly the view of the House. Five days later Lloyd told the House of Commons that 
there was no direct or indirect help going to the French in Algeria. But the Foreign 
Secretary was soon to be embarrassed by his Consul in Algiers, D. J. Mill-Irving, who on 
the occasion of the Queen’s Birthday party in front of Diplomatic Corps pledged the full 
support of Her Majesty’s Government and of the British people for the French policy in 
Algeria. The Consul went further by expressing the hope that France would resume her 
civilising actions in Algeria. Mill-Irving’s speech raised a storm in Westminster, and on 
9 July 1956 the matter was raised in the august house by Anthony Benn, who wanted to 
know if the speech was made with the authority of the Foreign Secretary.36 Lloyd’s 
response was in diplomatic and ambiguous terms which did nothing to satisfy the 
questioner.
The opposition once again queried British support for France, when still on 9 July 1956 
Benn took the Algerian issue further in the Commons. He wanted to know from the 
Foreign Secretary how many helicopters had been supplied by Britain to France for use 
for operations in Algeria ; how many were still on order from Britain and what was the 
policy of Her Majesty’s Government towards the supply of these aircraft for this 
purpose/’7 In response Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd stated that it had been the policy 
of successive Governments not to disclose details of military equipment sold to foreign 
Governments, In relation to policy he stated that the French Government had the full 
sympathy of the British Government in their efforts to re-establish peaceful conditions in 
Algeria. Not convinced by the answer Benn pushed the matter further by asking the 
Foreign Secretary if he was aware that American, French and British newspapers had 
reported a supply of helicopters by Britain to France including eight from the Royal Air 
Force (RAF). To this supplementary question, Lloyd in quite a dismissive answer stated 
that even if what the MP said was correct, he did not think there was anything frightfully 
lethal in the supply of helicopters.38 Thus far, it does appear that the unstated British 
policy was one of offering moral and at least indirectly, military support to the French in 
their Algerian incubus but questions on this matter were not easily brushed aside by the 
front bench.
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This was made explicit in July 1956 by the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn 
Jebb who wrote a dispatch to the Foreign Office suggesting that the British should come 
out firmly and openly in support of the French in Algeria/9 He argued that the Soviet 
Government and the Arab League were out to threaten Western interests in Africa, so it 
was as much a British as a French interest to combat the threat. The action which the 
Ambassador recommended was a public encouragement of French policy in Algeria, 
Jebb argued that the French would be greatly encouraged by public statements that 
Britain was on their side in North Africa generally, rather than on that of the Arabs. 
Britain was therefore to make a candid statement that she would not let the area be used 
as a strategic springboard by Colonel Nasser and the Soviet Union. Secondly, Jebb 
recommended that instructions be given to Her Majesty’s Representatives in “anti- 
colonial” countries. The Heads of Missions at certain posts, when speaking to the 
Governments to which they were accredited, should put French policy in its most 
favourable light.40
The third recommendation by the diplomat was gifts of military equipment. He 
contended that the French would be generally encouraged if they were to receive gifts 
from the British of equipment such as helicopters and light aircraft, which were 
particularly useful for operations they were carrying out in Algeria 41 In addition, there 
was to be an exchange of army officers in North Africa, that is, British army officers 
might do a turn of duty in North Africa on an exchange basis. Lastly, Sir Gladwyn 
suggested that there should be military liaison arrangements between the French Army in 
North Africa and the British with the dual purpose of boosting French morale and of 
exchanging valuable experience on guerrilla warfare and infiltration tactics. The Foreign 
Office response was a measure of agreement on the first two recommendations but 
opposition to the re s t42 By the time action was taken on the memorandum, however, 
Nasser had the previous day announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and there 
was some thinking among Foreign Office officials that an open mind should be adopted 
in relation to the rejected recommendations depending on how joint Anglo-French co­
operation over Suez progressed. It is to Britain’s reaction to Egypt’s nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal and the Suez Crisis that ensued, and its relevance to the Algerian conflict, 
that this discussion now turns.
c. Britain and Egypt, 1945 to Nationalisation of C anal, 1956
Article 16 of the 1866 agreement between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company, stipulated 
that the Suez Canal Company was Egyptian and was subject to the laws and customs of 
Egypt43 The Convention of 1888 had not changed the status of the Canal Company, 
while its provisions were not to affect the sovereign rights of Egypt. In the Preamble to 
the Convention of 1888 it was stated that there should be established a “definite system 
destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Canal.”44 
Such a system, which would be established with due regard to the sovereign rights of 
Egypt, should assure efficient and dependable operation, and the maintenance and 
development of the Canal as a free open secure international waterway 45 From the 
preceding discussion it can be seen that the legalistic language used in the agreement
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governing the canal was ambiguous, and provided room for manoeuvre for Egypt or any 
of the countries having a stake in the Canal.
The question was not simply commercial. Since its construction the Suez Canal occupied 
an essential position in the British imperial system, linking the Mediterranean with the 
Red Sea. The Canal’s strategic importance was the main motive for the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882. Ever since the end of the First World War the control of 
the Suez Canal continued to be the basis of British power in the Middle East. Britain 
assured her position in the region with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 
which established the British position in the Suez Canal Zone, allowed for the stationing 
of 10,000 troops in Egypt during peacetime, and confirmed Egypt’s pivotal position in 
Britain’s “informal” Middle Eastern empire.46 During the Second World War the 
Egyptian nationalist movement for independence was repressed by the British. After the 
war, however, the British presence in the Middle East was increasingly resented and 
challenged by the Egyptians, who felt that the British had betrayed the Arabs, especially 
in the British support for the creation of the Jewish State of Israel in 1948.
In 1949 the Suez Canal agreement was renegotiated and gave Egypt a mere seven per 
cent of gross profits and only a minor presence on the board of directors 47 In monetary 
terms this translated to about $3 million yearly. In 1951, however, the Egyptian 
government decided to repudiate the 1936 treaty and also refused to join the British 
favoured Middle East Command. Repudiation of the treaty was met with scenes of great 
jubilation in the streets of Egypt, everything British was attacked, persons as well as 
property. The turning point for the British presence in Egypt came in January 1952 when 
there were civil disturbances in the country instigated by the Egyptian nationalists. 
British property was burnt and some Britons killed. Seizing on this political unrest the 
Free Officers in the military staged a coup d ’etat against the British-backed monarchical 
government of King Farouk in July 1952. One of the coup leaders in the army was the 
young and charismatic Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser who became Prime Minister of 
Egypt in 1954, after deposing General Mohammed Neguib. The new Egyptian rulers 
were as much opposed as the previous ones to British presence in both Egypt and the 
Sudan,
Britain and Egypt reached an agreement in October 1954 over Suez. The British were to 
evacuate the Canal and this was to be completed within twenty months, subject to rights 
of re-entry in the event of an attack on any Middle East country.48 During these 
negotiations for evacuation of the Canal, divergence in British and American policies in 
the region came to the fore. The Americans whose overriding concern in the region was 
the Cold War with the Soviet Union believed that Egypt’s goodwill might be secured by 
establishing some cordial relations with its new leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, whereas to 
the British the loss of Suez was a serious blow. In February 1955 Turkey and Iran, 
concerned about the Soviet Union, signed a defence pact in Baghdad, which they were 
encouraged to do by Britain. Britain joined in April, and it became known as the 
Baghdad Pact.49 It is important to note that that the Pact came about as a result of a 1953 
American initiative to create the “Northern Tier,” which was a defence system from 
Turkey to Pakistan as a means of containing the Soviet Union threat. Britain saw the
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Baghdad Pact as a potential force for order in the Middle East, but to Nasser the 
strengthening of the monarchical Hashemite regime in Iraq, which was Egypt’s main 
regional rival, was a hostile act.50 Furthermore, to Nasser the real threat in the region was 
not the Soviets, but the Jewish State of Israel. From now onwards Nasser opposed the 
Baghdad Pact, which to Britain was a sign that Nasser was a threat to the region’s 
security and stability,
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s hatred of Nasser pre-dated the Suez crisis of 
1956. At the end of 1954 the United States and Britain embarked on a secret project 
code-named Alpha in the Middle East.51 This project was aimed at bringing about an 
Arab-Israeli settlement. Project Alpha to be successful had to involve painful sacrifices 
on the part of Israel, that is, she was to surrender some territory as part of the price for 
Arab recognition. In the early months of the project, there were signs that it was 
progressing quite well. The Americans, because of the powerful Jewish lobby in that 
country were compelled to make the Alpha Project public. The news was cautiously and 
politely received throughout the Middle East. The prospect of some kind of peace 
settlement, guaranteed by the United States and Great Britain raised hopes in the region. 
The project, however, was thrown into disarray in September 1955 when Egypt signed an 
arms deal with Czechoslovakia which was a Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe.
Both Washington and London were angered, irritated and dismayed by this development. 
Britain, especially was concerned at the long-term implications for her regional 
dominance. Eden’s initial reaction was telling particularly bearing in mind what 
happened later in 1956. He requested some vital information from the British 
Ambassador in Cairo, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan. The Ambassador was to furnish London 
with information pertaining to an estimate “as to Nasser’s present position, the extent of 
his support, and the chances of any rival.”52 The reply from the British Cairo Mission 
was discouraging as it was stated in categoric words that “there are no reliable signs of 
the regime losing its grip of the situation or its opponents gaining ground.”53 After Eden 
and his Cabinet had been briefed by Foreign Office Middle East experts about the 
difficulties of dealing with Egypt and the strategic economic importance of the region, 
the British government now decided to adopt a strategy of “appeasement”54 towards the 
Egyptian leaders. Part of this “appeasement” was to be British support, albeit, not 
financially, of the Aswan High Dam Project by Egypt. Britain was to be the midwife and 
encourage America to put resources towards the envisaged huge project. But British- 
American peace plans for the Middle East were finally scuppered in March 1956. The 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement was abandoned due to the uncompromising stances of Nasser 
and the Israeli Prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Then, Britain and America agreed a 
joint strategy for Egypt. The plan, code-named Omega, was adopted, the aim of which 
was to destabilise the Nasser regime “through propaganda and a series of economic and 
political measures.”55
Increased loathing for Nasser by Eden was once again in evidence in March 1956. On 1 
March 1956, the pro-British King Hussein of Jordan dismissed the British General Sir 
John Glubb as head of the Jordanian Army. Eden, for his own reasons, believed that 
Nasser’s hand was behind King Hussein’s move, moreso that Egyptian propaganda
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through Radio Cairo had permeated the whole of Jordan and increasingly made the 
King’s position vulnerable. So, King Hussein was under mounting pressure to distance 
his regime from the British. Eden’s irritation against Nasser appeared to have no limits. 
Sir Anthony Nutting, then Minister of State at the Foreign Office and protege of the 
Prime Minister, summed up Eden’s reaction to Glubb’s sacking in the following 
behaviour and words :
Eden's reaction to Glubb ’s dismissal was violent. He blamed Nasser and 
decided that the world just wasn ’t big enough to hold both o f them. One 
had to go. He declared that night a personal war on Abdel Nasser. I 
spent most o f that night with him, first in the Cabinet room and then, 
when he retired to bed, I  sat with him and we went on arguing until five 
o'clock in the morning. He simply would not accept that the dismissal o f 
Glubb was not Nasser’s doing...56 
So, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal only served as a spark to what had always been 
Eden’s intent, the undermining of the Egyptian regime and ultimately the removal of 
Nasser from the world political scene.
d. The Suez Crisis
The Suez Canal crisis which began in July 1956 set in motion a delicate unity of purpose 
between Britain and France. The crisis reached its peak in October 1956. During this 
crisis both Britain and France agreed to use force against Egypt, while their collusion 
with Israel and their subsequent actions were heavily opposed by the United States. This 
Anglo-French axis of fragile unity was aimed at “regime change” in Egypt. Despite the 
coming together of these two European colonial powers, the motives were different. For 
France the overriding factor was Algeria whereas for Britain it was the wider Middle East 
interests which she felt were threatened by “Nasserism” and communist penetration.
Though the Suez crisis especially in Britain was presented in economic terms, that is, 
Nasser’s illegal seizure of an international waterway, political considerations became the 
dominant factor in the crisis. In this section of this chapter an attempt is made to see the 
extent to which both Britain and France were able to persuade one another that Algeria 
should be an issue in the crisis. Broadly speaking it does not appear that the Algerian war 
was enough to persuade Britain to collude with France against Egypt. The central issue 
that seems to have finally convinced Britain to act conceitedly with France against Egypt 
was the convergence of their colonial programme or interests in that sphere of the world.
Ownership of the Canal was under an international company dominated by British and 
French shareholders. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. This was cleverly done as it 
happened a month after the British had evacuated the Suez zone base. The pretext that 
Nasser used was that the Western Powers had refused to finance the Aswan Dam project, 
which was to be the basis of Egyptian economic independence. For Britain Nasser’s 
action seemed to pose the gravest threat to vital British interests. As Christopher 
Goldsmith put it, Nasser’s action was seen as jeopardising the whole British position in 
the Middle East, a key strategic region in geopolitical terms.57 The Canal was, of course,
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important to Britain. British ships were the largest users of the Canal, carrying both 
imports ancl export in large volume. A large percentage of the oil required for the British 
economy came through the Canal from the Middle East. So if the Canal were 
mismanaged or not expanded for future needs Britain would suffer first and most. 
Nasser, said Prime Minister Eden, could not be allowed to “have his thumb on our wind 
pipe.”58 As the events unfolded Eden appointed a seven-man inner group of the Cabinet 
called the Egypt Committee or Britain’s “War Cabinet” to deal with the crisis.
The British Government perceived the seizure of the Canal endangering much more than 
the Canal itself. What was at stake was the whole British position in the Middle East. 
London believed that, if Nasser was not brought under control he would exploit Arab 
nationalism to dominate the region, including the sources of Middle Eastern oil which 
had become vital for the British and European economies. One Bank of England official 
was said to have warned that Egyptian nationalisation “imperilled the survival of the 
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and represented a very great danger to 
sterling.”59 Harold Macmillan as Chancellor of the Exchequer supported Eden’s tough 
stance of military action. In Macmillan’s view, Nasser could block the Suez Canal and 
once this happened it would require a massive American loan to provide dollars to 
purchase oil supplies from Latin America.60 From the onset of the crisis the Eden 
Administration contemplated the use of force to resolve the problem, which would be 
bitterly opposed by the United States throughout.
The first of the British Prime Minister’s bellicose positions was stated in a message 
relayed to President Dwight Eisenhower of the United States on 27 July 1956. It read 
thus:
This morning I  have reviewed the whole position with my Cabinet 
colleagues and Ch iefs o f Staff. We are all agreed that we cannot afford to 
allow Nasser to seize control o f the Canal in this way, in defiance of 
international agreements. I f  we take a firm  stand over this now, we shall 
have the support o f maritime powers. I f  we do not , our influence and 
yours throughout the Middle East will, we are concerned, be further 
destroyed....My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, in 
the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses.61 
The above British message attempted to present the Suez Canal issue as a trans-atlantic 
Western problem that had to be confronted immediately. Implicit in this statement was 
that Western interests would be threatened in the region by other outside forces, possible 
reference being to the Soviet Union.
France’s policy in the Suez Crisis closely paralleled Britain’s. Though there were 
economic interests at stake, it does appear that political concerns were paramount. 
Economically, though less so for Britain, a considerable percentage of French oil supply 
came through the Canal Company, Thousands of French investors held about half the 
shares of the Canal Company, and its main office was in Paris and its general manager 
French.62 Yet deep animosity to Nasser was the prime factor in French policy. The key 
to that antagonism was the Algerian rebellion which had erupted in November 1954. 
Despite heavily expanded forces France had failed to suppress the rebels. In their
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frustration French leaders, including Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, attributed their failure 
largely to Nasser’s support of the Algerian rebels. For some time, Nasser had indeed 
provided supplies, aid and encouragement to the Algerian nationalists not least through 
Cairo radio.
Just like the British government the French authorities suspected that Nasser had wide 
ambitions to dominate the Middle East and North Africa. In March 1956, Christian 
Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, had visited Cairo mainly to discuss Algeria. On his 
return to Paris, he told the National Assembly that Nasser had assured him that Egypt was 
not training Algerian guerrillas, but Nasser had made no similar pledge about shipping 
arms.6'1 Despite these Egyptian half-hearted assurances the French were firmly convinced 
that toppling Nasser was the only way to defeat the Algerian rebellion. Robert Lacoste, 
the French Resident Minister in Algeria, was later quoted as saying “Better one French 
division in Egypt than four divisions in Algeria.”64 Thus for France, the nationalisation 
of the Canal presented both a provocation and a pretext. According to Pineau, if Egypt 
were allowed to succeed in grabbing the Canal, the Algerian nationalists would be given 
new encouragement in their struggle.
Beyond the Algerian war, there was an urge within the French establishment to wipe out 
the memory of a succession of humiliating failures; the defeat of 1940; Indo-China; and 
Morocco and Tunisia, which had just been relinquished. So the French desperately 
needed a victory to bolster their self-esteem, the more so since the morale of the army 
was very low. In Robert Bowie’s words, interviews taken at the peak of the Suez Crisis 
are highly revealing of the state of mind of the French elite, one was said to have uttered 
the following words;
We are trying to turn history back, to wipe out the stains o f Munich which 
led to our defeat in 1940 and our failure to prevent Hitler from taking over 
the Rhineland in 1936. ...Nasser is the symbol o f all France’s enemies....of 
all France’s humiliation in the past.65
In an article in the Spectator, Darsie Gillie stated that the unanimity in the French press in 
demanding a vigorous Western counter-stroke to Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal was surprising.66 He contended that most Frenchmen detested what the Suez Canal 
Company stood for, so the unity of the French was not for the Canal per se. But what 
was at stake was that France hoped that a strike at Nasser would lead to a solution of her 
North African problems which if not solved, would leave her no place on the south shore 
of the Mediterranean or ultimately in Africa.67 According to the Spectator article, for 
long Frenchmen had felt that they were fighting Nasser in Algeria and that in Tunisia and 
Morocco the problem had been to reach agreement with those nationalists who wished to 
reject the domination of Cairo.68 French unanimity was based on the conviction that if 
Nasser got away with it, the vigour of the rebellion in Algeria would double and the 
moderate nationalists in Tunis and Rabat would have to identify themselves with the 
extremists in order to retain any support. The article concluded by stating that France 
was now making big sacrifices in the hope of creating a situation in which the two 
million Europeans in the Maghreb could continue to live there, and her vast West African 
territories could remain in close political association with France. Also the exploitation
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of the mineral wealth of the Sahara had become one of the great hopes of France’s 
future.09 This was a reference to the large reserves of oil and gas that had been identified 
in the Algerian Sahara, which promised to transform the struggling French economy, and 
make Algeria into a major economic asset -  a good reason for the French to resist 
Algerian demands for independence.
From the beginning of the crisis the United States opposed any use of force before all 
peaceful means for resolving the issue had been exhausted. This did not deter Eden from 
presenting Nasser as a fascist-style dictator to the Americans. In one of his 
correspondences to Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden stated th a t:
....Nasser has embarked on a course which is unpleasantly familiar. His 
seizure o f the Canal was undoubtedly designed to impress opinion not 
only in Egypt but in the Arab world and in all Africa too. By this assertion 
o f his power he seeks to further his ambitions from Morocco to the 
Persian Gulf ...I know that Nasser is active wherever Muslims can be 
found, even as fa r  as Nigeria ...I have never thought Nasser a Hitler, he 
has no warlike people behind him. But the parallel with Mussolini is close 
...The removal o f Nasser and the installation in Egypt o f a regime less
70hostile to the West, must therefore also rank high among our objectives.
Although Algeria was not mentioned, it was clearly included in this reference to Nasser’s 
appetite to expand his influence in the Muslim world.
In opposing the use of military force against Egypt, President Eisenhower sent the 
following letter to Eden :
From the moment that Nasser announced nationalization o f the Suez 
Canal Company, my thoughts have been constantly with you ...But early 
this morning I received the messages communicated to me through 
Murphy from you and Harold Macmillan, telling me on a most secret 
basis your decision to employ force without delay or attempting any 
intermediate and less drastic steps...For my part, I cannot over-emphasise 
the strength o f my conviction that some such method must be attempted 
before action such as you contemplate should be undertaken. I f  
unfortunately the situation can finally be resolved only by drastic means 
there should be no grounds fo r belief anywhere that corrective measures 
were undertaken merely to protect national or individual investors or that 
the legal rights o f a sovereign nation were ruthlessly flouted. A 
conference, at the very least, should have a great educational effect 
throughout the world. Public opinion here and I am convinced in most o f 
the world, would be outraged should there be a failure to make such 
efforts. Moreover, initial military successes might be easy but the 
eventual price might become fa r  too heavy. I have given you my personal 
conviction, as well as o f that o f my associates, as to the unwisdom even o f 
contemplating the use o f military force at this moment.....I personally feel 
sure that the American reaction would be severe and that great areas o f
71the world would share that reaction.
This was the first warning by President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden that in the
58
view of the American administration the use of force to resolve the dispute was 
unacceptable. These warnings would be repeated consistently throughout the crisis. In 
Washington on 8 August 1956 the President’s friend and Defence Secretary, Charles 
Wilson described Nasser’s grab of the canal as a “relatively small thing.”72 He said that 
Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal Company “can be settled by a conference rather than 
by waving a big stick and threatening people.” Wilson went further to state that 
American military policy could not “flip up and down” because of a minor thing. He 
added “I hope this will be a local friction and not something which will involve East and 
West.”73 Finally he said that they should all seek honourable means of reaching a 
peaceful settlement.
As the Crisis unfolded and reached critical moments, divisions within the British public 
and Fleet Street became pronounced. Right-wing papers such as the Daily Express, Daily 
Mail and Daily Telegraph supported the Government’s position of ultimately using force. 
The left-wing Daily Mirror was in the forefront of the papers warning Eden against the 
use of military force. It called on the Prime Minister to rid his mind of the dangerous 
delusions from which he was suffering about the state of British public opinion in this 
challenging but changing situation.74 It warned him against being influenced by what the 
paper called sabre-rattlers and gunboat diplomats. The former in an unusual attack, it 
identified as right-wing papers such as The Times, Daily Mail and Daily Express 75 In a 
prophetic and ominous fashion the Daily Mirror warned Eden that failure to resolve the 
problem in a statesmanlike way would cost him his Premiership. The paper’s article 
concluded by stating that world opinion from the United States, Arab States and Asia was 
against military action. It further cautioned Eden from paying too much attention to the 
applause that he was getting from France since the latter would be of little help, because 
she was already bogged down in a bloody war against Arab nationalism in Algeria.76
Various attempts at resolving the dispute through peaceful means were undertaken. At a 
meeting between US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and British and French 
leaders on the other hand in London in early August, the Americans proposed the holding 
of a maritime conference of Canal users. The British though with some reservations 
agreed to this American proposal, and the French followed suit. The Conference of 
Maritime Nations duly met between 16 and 23 August 1956 at Lancaster House in 
London. Of the thirty-two nations attending, eighteen supported an American-led 
resolution which called upon Egypt to accept that the Canal should be run by an 
international board and it should not be closed to any user for political reasons.77 At the 
end of the London conference, a five-man mission headed by Australian Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies was despatched to Cairo to put the plan before Nasser, but the mission 
failed as Nasser flatly rejected the proposal. As this happened Britain and France were 
already drawing up a plan for combined operations if it became necessary to use force to 
recapture the Suez Canal. In the meantime, President Eisenhower restated America’s 
hope that the dispute should be settled through peaceful means. In a September 3, 1956 
letter to Eden, the President warned against the negative consequences of the use of force, 
he stated the following ;
I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible 
means. The use o f force would it seems vastly increase the area o f
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jeopardy, I do not see how the economy o f Western Europe can long 
survive the burden o f prolonged military operations, as well as the denial 
o f Near East oil. All the peoples o f the Near East and North Africa, and, to 
some extent., o f all Asia and cdl o f Africa, would be consolidated against 
the West to a degree which I  fear could not be overcome in a generation 
and, perhaps, not even a century particularly having in mind the capacity
» * 78o f the Russians to make mischief 
On 4 September 1956, Dulles recommended to both Britain and France the convening of 
another international conference in London; the French were very hostile to this proposal 
but later consented.
In its leading article on 15 September 1956, the New Statesman accused the French of 
desperately hoping that the problem of the Suez Canal could be used to involve Britain in 
their war against Arab nationalism in Algeria.79 By involving Britain the French hoped 
to relieve their struggling administration of some of the pressure which French official 
opinion claimed largely to originate from Cairo. Alexander Werth reporting for the New 
Statesman on the growing crisis in Algeria argued that the French policy of “pacification” 
was failing to produce the desired results, and blamed this on Robert Lacoste (Resident- 
General).80 Most French officials in Algeria however, believed that all the evil in the 
colony was coming from Cairo, Cairo radio, and from Nasser’s friends, Ben Bella and 
Ferhat Abbas,81 and hoped that if Britain and France invaded Egypt and overthrew 
Nasser, it would be the end of the war in Algeria.
A conference of eighteen nations duly met between 19 and 21 September 1956 and set up 
a body known as the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA). With this the threat of 
military action seemed to have temporarily receded and there were hopes that a 
diplomatic solution might be found. This respite was however shortlived, as suddenly 
out of the blue the use of force was revived, with a new player on the scene. This was 
Israel. French-Israeli contacts antedated the Suez crisis. From 1954 on, Franco-Israeli 
links grew closer, leading to substantial arms sales, including an agreement to furnish 
planes in November 1955. Soon after becoming Prime Minister early in 1956, Mollet 
described French relationship with Israel as the assistance to a small, courageous, 
democratic nation threatened by aggressive neighbours, especially Nasser, who, as it 
happened, was accused of helping to fuel the Algerian revolt. French-Israeli collusion 
over Suez began in early August 1956 when French Defence Minister Maurice Bourges- 
Maunoury and a senior official in the Israeli Defence
Ministry, Shimon Perez, signed an arms deal in which France was to provide arms to 
Israel.
On 26-27 September 1956, Eden and Lloyd visited Mollet and Pineau in Paris in order to 
concert strategy. The two British politicians found the French to be stubbornly resolute 
about the necessity of bringing down Nasser by force as soon as possible. The “tough 
and uncompromising” position of the French impressed Eden, who saw; “the beginning 
of something like a renaissance of strength in France.”83 Israel’s blatant involvement in 
the crisis became apparent on 30 September to 1 October 1956, when Foreign Minister
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Golder Meir and Chief of Staff, General Moshe Dayan from the Israeli side met Christian 
Pineau the Foreign Minister and Deputy Chief of Air Staff General Maurice Challe from 
the French side for high level talks in Paris. The French were less inhibited than the 
British about co-operating directly with Israel to destroy Nasser, since their credibility 
and reputation had already been eroded in the Arab eyes because of the Algerian conflict. 
Israeli participation in the collusion between the British and the French was first raised by 
Chancellor of Exchequer Harold Macmillan, one of the leading hawks in the Egypt 
Committee, but was swiftly dismissed by Eden on the grounds that this would unite all 
the Arab countries of the Middle East against Britain. France on the other hand had 
hardly any standing left to lose by intervening with Israel, while for both countries Nasser 
was seen as the common enemy.
On 14 October 1956, Prime Minister Eden received two French envoys, Acting Foreign 
Minister Albert Gazier and General Maurice Challe, at his country home Chequers to 
discuss Israel participation in the dispute. At this meeting, the Anglo-French military 
option had been revived and the idea of working with the Israelis had been approved by 
both sides. The Chequers meeting no doubt was a turning point in the crisis. In order to 
formalise the collusion plans, Britain, France and Israel held a secret meeting at Sevres 
outside Paris on 22 October 1956. Those attending included Ben-Gurion ( Israeli Prime 
Minister), Moshe Dayan (Israeli Chief of Staff), Shimon Perez, Guy Mollet, Christian 
Pineau, Bourges-Maunoury, Selwyn Lloyd and Patrick Dean (Deputy Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office). The outcome was a secret three-power agreement setting out the 
timetable and moves in the concerted attacks by Britain, France and Israel. Israel was to 
attack on 29 October 1956, and seem to threaten the Canal. The British and French, 
acting ostensibly to protect the Canal and separate the combatants, would issue an 
ultimatum calling on Israel and Egypt to accept temporary occupation of key positions on 
the Canal by the Anglo-French forces to guarantee freedom of passage through the Canal 
by vessels of all nations until a final settlement was found. During these clandestine 
tripartite meetings and planning the Americans were kept in the dark.
As planned by the conspirators, Israel attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956. The attack 
began by the dropping of paratroops at the Mitla Pass, forty miles from the Suez Canal, 
and was followed up with a military thrust into the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt. The 
following day both Britain and France sent their prearranged ultimatums to Egypt and
o
Israel. In the House of Commons Eden explained the attack. Meanwhile at the United 
Nations, the United States had tabled a resolution before the Security Council that 
labelled Israel as the aggressor and required it cease all hostilities against Egypt. The 
American resolution was vetoed by both Britain and France, as was a later Soviet Union 
resolution. On 31 October 1956, Anglo-French air attacks were launched against 
Egyptian targets and the United Nations Security Council called an emergency meeting 
of the General Assembly. In the House of Commons, Selwyn Lloyd misled the House by 
denying collusion with Israel. British-American relations were now at their lowest ebb. 
Dissent against Anglo-French action peaked in Britain on the weekend of 3-4 November
1956. The opposition Labour Party escalated its onslaught on the Government’s 
decision. At the United Nations, Britain and her allies faced a barrage of criticism in the 
Security Council for their military adventure in Egypt from a wide range of countries
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including the United States and some Commonwealth countries. The General Assembly
* 85voted sixty-four to five for the American resolution for an immediate cease-fire. On the
morning of 4 November 1956, the General Assembly adopted a second resolution, this
one asking the body’s Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold to arrange a cease-fire 
86within twelve hours.
Justifying their action to President Eisenhower on 5 November 1956 Eden issued the 
following statement:
It is a great grief to me that the events o f the last few days have placed 
such a strain on the relations between our two countries. O f course 1 
realise your feelings about the action which we felt compelled to take at 
such short notice...! am convinced that, if we had allowed things to drift, 
everything would have gone from bad to worse. Nasser would have 
become a kind o f Moslem Mussolini and our friends in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and even Iran would gradually have been brought down. His 
efforts would have spread west wards, and Libya and all o f North Africa 
would have been brought under his control...We and the French were 
convinced that we had to act once to forestall a general conflagration
87throughout the Middle East.
To the United States the attack on Egypt was a gross misjudgement on the part of Britain 
and France. Even if the attack succeeded in discrediting and dislodging Nasser, 
Washington was worried about the long-range damage to Western influence in the Arab 
region, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Furthermore, the United States wanted to 
prevent the Soviet Union from capitalising on the attack for Cold War supremacy. So, 
American pressure and the international uproar that was caused forced both Britain and 
France to abruptly bring military hostilities to an end.
e. Conclusion
British interest in Algeria began to grow after the outbreak of the rebellion in November
1954. This was shown by the reports and comments that were coming from Her 
Majesty’s diplomatic missions abroad. Even within the press a week hardly passed 
without an article or story on the war in Algeria. The British position since the beginning 
of the war up to the Suez Crisis was to give implicit moral support to French policy in 
Algeria as a fellow colonial power, although there were dissenting voices in certain 
quarters. From 1955 onwards Algeria became a common subject of debate among British 
legislators as this had a bearing on Britain’s colonial status.
The Suez Canal crisis intensified and extended the international reverberations of the 
Algerian conflict. In so doing, it provoked a division in the Western alliance that brought 
out the contradictions in Western thinking between the defence of the West, the defence 
of empire, and the need for decolonisation. Where the British and French associated the 
defence of empire with the defence of the West, the Americans preferred to associate the 
defence of the West with decolonisation. At the level of relations between the two 
imperial powers, there were further differences. Whereas France attacked Egypt in the 
hope of ending the Algerian colonial problem, Britain entered into this venture for her
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own wider Middle East interests, not to save or help France from her colonial nightmare.
As one historian has put it, Franco-British co-operation over Suez was a marriage of
88convenience rather than a long-term commitment to a joint policy in the Middle East.
In the case of Britain the biggest casualty of the Suez fiasco was Prime Minister Eden, his 
Chancellor the beneficiary. The Americans were angered by the fact that the planning for 
the Suez attack was done behind their back and were kept in the dark by their European 
allies especially Great Britain. France believed that victory was snatched from her by 
United States pressure. So, the end of the crisis meant that she had to divert all her 
resources to Algeria to prove a point. The Suez Crisis was one of those rare moments 
that Britain and America found themselves at odds with each other. It is to the mending 
of fences in the Anglo-American alliance that the next chapter discusses and how les 
Anglo-Saxons came back in full swing to criticise French conduct in Algeria from 1957 
onwards. The outcome was that Britain realigned itself with the United States on the 
principle that the defence of the West went hand in hand with decolonisation, while 
France was driven into isolation. Her argument that the defence of empire, in Algeria, 
was essential for the defence of the West was effectively rejected. She was left alone to 
fight what proved to be a hopeless battle.
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CHAPTER 5
ALGERIAN WAR, END OF 1956 TO MAY 1958
a. Introduction
As stated in the conclusion to the previous chapter, the Suez Crisis elevated Harold 
Macmillan to the British premiership. One of his major tasks was to repair the Anglo- 
American “special relationship”. This he did through summits at Bermuda in March 
1957 and Washington in October respectively. His mission succeeded as the Anglo- 
American alliance was put on the right footing whereas Anglo-French relations became a 
hot potato, the issue being Algeria. 1957 began with what was called the “battle of 
Algiers,” at the same time the Algerian problem became internationalised. In this chapter 
an attempt is being made to dissect the intricate events of 1957 before moving to the 
bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef in February 1958. This saw 
Anglo-American “special relationship” in full swing as the two Western Powers 
endeavoured to broker peace between France and Tunisia through their “good offices,” 
one of the factors that contributed in May 1958 to the fall of the Fourth Republic.
b. Course of the war, end of 1956 to end of Battle of Algiers
An account of the war for this period is given for British government purposes in 
Consular Reports for 1957 to 1958.1 The “Battle of Algiers” lasted for nearly nine 
months from January to September 1957. It was preceded by major events as 1956 drew 
to a close, which were centred around the city of Algiers where most Europeans resided. 
In mid-1956 two FLN fighters who had been under sentence for months were executed 
by the French authorities in Algeria. The executions were politically motivated, as 
Robert Lacoste (Governor-General) wanted to please the colons so that they would 
support his loi-cadre (basic law or outline law). The FLN then took the decision to 
embark on urban terrorism. This idea of urban terrorism was the brainchild of Ramdane 
Abane who, after the Philippeville uprising, came to believe that terror pays. The attacks 
were orchestrated by Saadi Yacef, Commander of the Autonomous Region of Algiers. 
Throughout November and December 1956 a series of terrorist bomb attacks took place 
in Algiers. These were especially notorious because of the part played by three middle- 
class women, namely, Zohra Drift, Djamila Bouhired and Sarnia Lakhdari, who placed 
bombs in a student dance spot, the fashionable milk bar on the Place Bugeaud, and in the 
down town terminal of Air France.2 Two of these bombs exploded causing considerable 
damage especially the one at the Milk-bar. On the whole three Europeans were killed, 
scores were wounded including children. Only the third bomb placed by Djamila 
Bouhired in the hall of the Air France terminus failed to detonate. The climax came with 
the assassination in December of that year of the Mayor Amedee Froger, President of the 
Federation of Mayors of Algeria3 and political leader of the European right extremists.
As terror raged on throughout the city, Governor-General Lacoste put in place counter 
measures. These were the responsibility of the commander-in-chief, Raoul Salan, and
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General Jacques Massu, commander of the Tenth Paratroop Regiment, still bitter about 
the Suez fiasco. On 8 January 1957 Lacoste officially granted Massu the onerous task of 
maintaining law and order in Algiers. By granting such powers to the army, Lacoste 
delivered the government of Algeria still further into the hands of the military. Massu’s 
men embarked upon the destruction of the terrorist network through any means at their 
disposal. The first task for Massu and his men was to break a week’s “insurrectionary 
general strike” called by the FLN in Algiers and other towns. The strike began on 28 
January 1957. The strike did not last long as it was effectively broken after two days by 
the full might of the French forces. Muslims were arrested at random and systematic 
institutionalised torture became the regular French police and army intelligence policy of 
interrogation. Through their cruel and inhumane methods Massu’s paratroops of the 
tenth division were able to destroy the terrorist organisation in the city. In the 
countryside, the French established centres of regroupment where thousands of Algerians 
were resettled in camps surrounded by barbed wire, and where they lived for months in 
appalling conditions. As some Algerians fled into Tunisia and Morocco because of the 
fighting in the interior the French moved in to secure the borders of these countries. This 
was done through the erection of the electrified fence called the Morice Line, named after 
the then French Minister of National Defence Andre Morice.
The FLN was now heavily defeated in the major cities and its units more isolated in the 
coutryside than ever before. On the one hand those who managed to escape across the 
border regrouped in Tunisia and Morocco and formed the ALN (National Liberation 
Army) which became the military wing of the FLN. Some internal leaders such as Ben 
Mhidi were not so lucky as he was captured and executed by the French. There is no 
doubt that the battle of Algiers was the most testing time for the Algerian freedom 
fighters and showed how determined the French were in keeping French Algeria. 
Though the French won this battle militarily, however, the victory was a pyrrhic one. 
The two societies were more than ever further apart and hated each other greatly. With 
most internal leaders of the FLN now forced into exile, a political vacuum was created in 
the movement in Algeria. As a result, the external leadership assumed the direction of 
the movement. The first meeting of the external leadership was in Cairo in July 1957 at 
which the CNRA decided to raise the membership of the CCE from five to nine. One of 
the new additions being Ferhat Abbas4 who had now joined the struggle after seeing the 
futility of his assimilationist tendencies. The Cairo gathering reversed Soummam Valley 
decisions establishing the primacy of the interior and the superiority of the political over 
the military. By September 1957 the battle of Algiers was over.
Meanwhile the French were in trouble both at home and abroad. As the battle of Algiers 
began the Algerian question was debated at the Eleventh United Nations General 
Assembly session in February 1957. France participated in this debate, but with a very 
serious reservation made at the beginning, to the effect that France would be unable to 
accept any action by the United Nations. France questioned the competence of the 
international body in dealing with the issue, on the legal ground that the Algerian 
problem was within her domestic jurisdiction,5 since Algeria was a part of France. The 
French position was in accordance with the programme set forth by Premier Guy Mollet 
upon taking office in January, 1956. The programme was based on the notion that
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Algeria was part of metropolitan France, but proposed:
To recognise and, respect the Algerian personality and to achieve political 
equality o f all inhabitants...., to hold as soon as possible a popular referendum 
through free elections to a single electoral college..., to effect the immediate 
release o f political prisoners.6 
its implementation had so far been deferred; nevertheless the UN debate on Algeria 
ended with a compromise resolution to the effect that “a peaceful, democratic and just 
solution would be found.”
By March 1957 however, France was facing insurmountable difficulties both at home and 
abroad. For instance on 30 March 1957, Morocco and Tunisia signed a treaty in Rabat 
pledging their “good offices” in finding a just solution to the Algerian problem. At the 
same time execution of the war in Algeria was putting a strain on the economy. 
Moreover, there was mounting criticism of the Government at home and abroad for 
atrocities committed by the army authorities against the Algerian population. As a direct 
consequence of this, on 6 April 1957 a permanent Human Rights Commission was 
appointed in Algeria.7 A combination of these factors contributed to the fall of the Mollet 
Government on 21 May 1957; and a new government was formed by Maurice Bourges- 
Maunoury. The irony of it all was that it adopted the policies of the previous 
government, and immediately requested a tax increase to cany on the war.
In mid-1957 negotiations were opened between France and Algerian representatives. 
These, however, did not bear any fruits and subsequently collapsed. On 16 July, 1957, 
twenty-two Afro-Asian countries requested that the Algerian question be inscribed on the 
agenda of the UN Twelfth Assembly. An explanatory memorandum was appended to 
this request, accusing the French army of genocide against the Algerian people. Clearly 
from the above Algeria had now become an international issue.
Politically, during the course of 1957 the French Government attempted to create a new 
political framework within which a solution could be found, by implementing the Mollet 
programme of the previous year. This led to the presentation of the loi cadre (basic law) 
to the French Parliament in September 1957. The loi cadre, it was explained, sought 
absolute equality for all citizens, limited local autonomy, and the development of 
Algerian institutions. Furthermore, the loi cadre's purpose was to “respect Algerian 
identity” while also keeping Algeria “an integral part of France”9 two aims that were 
difficult to reconcile. In reality the French purpose through the loi cadre was to divide or 
break Algeria into autonomous territories or departments opposed to each other. The 
goal was to destroy Algerian nationalism by playing upon regionalism and ethnic 
loyalties or rivalries. As with all other colonial powers France wanted to apply the idea 
of “divide and rule” in Algeria. But because the loi cadre further promised future 
elections with all inhabitants of Algeria voting, this incensed the Algerian European 
settlers and the right extremists. The result was that the French Parliament rejected the 
loi cadre on 30 September 1957 and Bourges-Maunoury’s Government fell.10 The 
succeeding Government of Felix Gaillard now accepted a watered-down loi cadre after 
some amendments. In Algeria, it was accepted neither by the Algerians nor the colons.
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The year 1957 closed with the Algerian issue back at the United Nations, which adopted 
a compromise resolution on 10 December 1957.11 The resolution took note of the offer of 
good offices made by Morocco and Tunisia and expressed the hope that talks be held 
toward a solution of the Algerian problem. In mid November 1957 the UK and US 
announced the shipment of arms to Tunisia; France protested or objected on the grounds 
that the arms would be send to the Algerian rebels. On 14 December 1957 the Human 
Rights Commission report was published, and did not make good reading on the subject 
of the French army’s activities in Algeria.
c, Britain, post-Suez, and Africa, end of 1956 to March 1958
Harold Macmillan was elevated to the British premiership against the backdrop of the
Suez debacle of 1956. It does appear that he was not as committed to the Empire as his
predecessors, Churchill and Eden. Macmillan appears to have been a political adventurer
who was not afraid to change position on issues as long as it suited his purpose. This was
exemplified by his position during the Suez crisis, when he was one of the hawkish
members of the cabinet, but at the height of the crisis was the first to urge a volte-face.
Meanwhile he recognised that African nationalism was a force, which could not be
resisted. The Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya had demonstrated how costly in lives and
12money a counter-insurgency campaign could be. The uprising had also shown the 
futility of using force to dampen nationalist sentiments. Macmillan’s realisation of the 
dangers of force was reinforced by the painful French experiences in Indochina and 
Algeria, as well as by the Suez fiasco. Suez had revealed the depth of anti-colonial 
feeling in the international arena. It was clear to British politicians such as Macmillan 
that any use of British troops to suppress a nationalist uprising in Africa would be met 
with worldwide condemnation. Furthermore, Macmillan recognised that the economic 
advantages of the colonies were no longer significant enough to justify maintaining the 
Empire.
But although the British premier was firmly convinced of the need to address the African 
problem before it got too late, and was said to have persuaded himself that Colonial 
Empire was an albatross, his colonial policy from 1957 until 1960 was characterised by 
caution. His motivation for this cautious approach was the overriding need to heal the 
wounds inflicted on the Conservative Party by the Suez Crisis. Speaking to Lord 
Swinton, he said;
Our first objective must be to keep the party together, at all costs united. I t’s like 
keeping five balls in the air simultaneously, knowing that we are doomed if we
13
drop one.
As a consequence of this Macmillan decided not to undertake any initiative that might 
divide the party. There was still in the Conservative Party back-bench a significant group 
that argued that Britain must keep the Empire and were equally ardent supporters of the 
European populations in Central and East Africa. They wanted Britain to safeguard the 
interests of these settlers all the time.
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On becoming Prime Minister in January 1957, Macmillan commissioned a Cabinet 
Colonial Policy Committee to determine which colonies might become self-governing in 
the near future, which ones would become eligible to join the Commonwealth, and what 
should be the fate of those ineligible for entry.14 Macmillan wrote the following to the 
Lord President of the Council (Lord Salisbury) on 28 January 1957:
I should like to see something like a profit and loss account fo r  each o f 
our colonial possessions, so that we may be better able to gauge 
whether, from the financial and economic point o f view, we are likely to 
gain or lose by its departure. This would need, o f course, to be 
weighed against the political and strategic considerations involved in 
each case.
The committee convened from February to September 1957, when it produced its final 
report. On political developments in East Africa, especially Kenya, the report stated that 
the political pressures were those of an unstable multi-racial society. On the economic 
front, the cost to the Exchequer, via the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, was 
very limited. The main drain on Britain had been caused by the Mau Mau emergency, 
but the greater part of this had now been met.16 On the East African region as a whole, 
the report stated that the region was a “testing ground” for “multi-racial development;” 
the “balance between racial groups” was maintained “only by the jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom;” without it, there would be political conflict, social disintegration, and 
economic bankruptcy.17 East Africa was identified as having great potential strategic 
importance. As such premature withdrawal would lead to a “disastrous decline in the 
prestige and influence of the United Kingdom,” and would “bring to a shabby conclusion 
an important and hopeful experiment in race relations.” 18 The consequences would be 
dire as markets would be lost and the area would be vulnerable to subversive penetration 
from the Soviet Union. So, strategic consideration dictated a continuing British presence 
in East Africa.
On the whole, the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee study concluded that the economic 
costs of Empire were evenly matched and the economic interests of the United Kingdom 
were unlikely in themselves to be decisive in determining whether or not a territory 
should become independent.19 Although damage could certainly be done by the 
premature grant of independence, the economic dangers to the United Kingdom of 
deferring the grant of independence for her own selfish interests after the country was 
politically and economically ripe for independence would be far greater than any dangers 
resulting from an act of independence negotiated in an atmosphere of goodwill such as 
has been the case with Ghana and Malaya.20 Though the impact of “Macmillan’s audit” 
was not immediate, it does appear that some aspects of the report did influence the post- 
1957 policy towards decolonisation.
As alluded to earlier on, that when the Federation of Central Africa was formed, part of 
its aim was to create a multiracial society, the British pursued this objective throughout
1957. The Federal authorities hoped to ameliorate minor African grievances, and the 
result would be to encourage the gradual growth of an African middle class willing to
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enter the political system dominated by European settlers. In order to achieve this 
endeavour, particular importance and financial support was accorded education. For 
instance, in 1957, of the sixty-eight full-time students admitted at the University College 
in Salisbury (Harare), seven were African men, one African woman and one Asian.21 
Meanwhile in the course of 1957, London announced that there would be a constitutional 
review for the Federal constitution in 1960. There were growing concerns among 
Africans that this constitutional review would complete the transfer of power into the 
settlers’ hands. By the turn of 1958, the Colonial Office was continuing with carefully 
calculated constitutional reforms in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, designed to give 
limited African electorates a minority interest in the formulation of policy. At the same 
time, there were indications that the white settlers position in Southern Rhodesia was 
hardening. This was shown by the overthrow of the reformist Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia, Garfield Todd, by the United Federal Party in February 1958. It was now clear 
that the Europeans in the Federation would not approve the coming constitutional review 
acceptable to the UN, Commonwealth and Africans in the Federation.
d. Britain and Algeria, end of 1956 to March 1958
Now, with the preceding discussion of intense activity in Algeria throughout 1957, what 
was British reaction or response to the Algerian conflict? The “battle of Algiers” added to 
the growing internationalisation of the Algerian war especially in Britain. The British 
press reported the battle of Algiers extensively especially on French atrocities. For 
instance in March 1957 the British newspaper, the Manchester Guardian ran instalments 
on Henri Alleg’s La. Question. He was an Algiers based journalist who was arrested by 
Massu’s men during the battle of Algiers. Alleg described how he was tortured by the 
paratroops and other victims corroborated his charges as they had experienced the same 
treatment.
In the House of Commons, the Labour Party MPs Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Konni 
Zilliacus and Fenner Brockway took the Government to task to explain its position on the 
abuse of human rights in Algeria by the French. For example, on 17 March 1958 Konni 
Zilliacus asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he would draw the 
policy of repression in Algeria to the notice of the Security Council under Article 34 of 
the Charter as a circumstance tending to cause friction between France and her Arab 
neighbours; and if he would put on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, under 
Article 10 of the Charter, the systematic violation of the French Army authorities in 
Algeria of Article 5 of the Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the General 
Assembly in 1948, which prohibited torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
and punishments.22 On the same matter Fenner Brockway asked the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs if he would, under Article 24 of the 1950 Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, draw the attention of the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe to the breach by the French military 
authorities in Algeria of Article 3 and 15, paragraph (2) of this Convention, prohibiting 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment even in times of war or public 
emergency, and request him to bring the matter to the notice of the European 
Commission on Human Rights. 23 The Government’s response by Commander Allan
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Noble, Minister of State, Foreign Affairs, was negative as he stated that it would be 
inappropriate for Her Majesty’s Government to take the action requested by the 
questioners. He argued that the matter was for the French Government, who had shown 
their seriousness by appointing a Commission to investigate all allegations of torture in 
Algeria.24 Once again the British position was one of hands-off on Algeria. On several 
occasions in 1957 when the Algerian question was before the United Nations, Britain 
always voted for or supported the position of France. Possibly, this was because like 
France, Britain thought she was in the same boat on colonial problems, so she had to 
support a fellow imperial power. Britain only voted in the affirmative on the compromise 
resolution of 10 December 1957. This was in no way a shift in the British position 
because she thought the resolution was mild and could not do much harm to France.
The French authorities had arrested and put on trial some of those who took part in the 
battle of Algiers. One of those arrested was a twenty-two year old Algerian woman 
Djamila Bouhired of the Air France terminal bomb. Her case was highly controversial 
and highly publicized. She was later condemned to death by a military tribunal whose 
decision was upheld by the court of appeal, also a special military tribunal. Djamila 
Bouhired’s case exemplifies British Government position of non-interference in the 
Algerian conflict. The only people who intervened on her behalf in Britain were members 
of the public and seventy-two members of Parliament of the opposition Labour Party who 
wrote a letter to President Rene Coty of France on 5 February, 1958 to ask for her 
reprieve.25 The French government did not take kindly to this as they perceived it as 
interference from outside on a matter that was within the competence of France.
The British government made every effort to discourage any attempt by British citizens 
to intervene on behalf of the convicted Algerian woman. The official British position 
was that such intervention would do more harm than good for the woman especially 
when a pardon came to be considered by the French authorities. Correspondence on 
Bouhired’s case also shows attempts that were made by French Quai d’Orsay officials 
to have the British Obsei-ver correspondent Nora Beloff26 expelled from Paris for her 
extensive and critical comments about the case, which were unpalatable to the French 
authorities. Up to this point, Britain, and British public opinion, was clearly worried 
about the escalation of the war in Algeria, but criticism was focussed on a side issue, the 
conduct of the security forces, with which Her Majesty’s Government refused to concern 
itself. In 1958, however, French conduct of the war led to a major international incident, 
with which Her Majesty’s Government itself was immediately concerned.
e. Sakiet Sidi Youssef and the Good Offices mission
The year 1958 opened with the bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef by 
the French. This incident was directly linked to the Algerian conflict and became a major 
international issue. It is to this crisis that this section of the thesis turns, making a 
detailed and critical analysis of this incident, which has not been treated at length by 
historians. The crisis pitted France against her Western allies namely Britain and 
America as they endeavoured to mediate through their “good offices.” Following Suez in 
1956, the bombing of the Tunisian border village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef on 8 February,
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1958 was the second international crisis directly linked to the Algerian war of 
independence. The international uproar generated by this incident publicised the 
Algerian war. It led to a souring of relations between France and Tunisia, and motivated 
both Britain and America to attempt mediation between France and Tunisia through what 
was called the “good offices” mission. This section looks at the events leading to the 
bombing of this Tunisian border village, the international outcry that resulted out of this 
incident especially in France, Britain and America. The section will further look at how 
the good offices mission began, the progress it made and obstacles encountered, what 
conclusions came out of the mission and finally the record that the mission left for the 
course of the Algerian liberation struggle.
Before dwelling on this incident in great detail, a brief historical background is worth 
mentioning on why France had a large contingent of troops stationed in Tunisia. This is 
important because it was one of the major stumbling blocks for the resolution of the 
Franco-Tunisian dispute as a result of the Sakiet attack. When the French Protectorate 
was established in 1881 the Tunisians signed, under some restraint of course, the Treaty 
of Kassar Said of 12 May 1881.27 This treaty entitled the French to maintain troops in 
Tunisia until both parties were agreed that the Tunisians could maintain order. Since the 
French imposed some restrictions on the number of troops that the Bey was to have, 
naturally this point of Tunisia being able to maintain law and order was never reached. 
The Conventions of 3 June 1955, by which France conceded internal autonomy to 
Tunisia, expressly left that treaty in force. The Declaration of 20 March 1956, however, 
by which the French conceded independence to the Tunisians, contemplated revision of 
both the Treaty of 1881 and the Conventions of 1955. This was thought to be necessary 
because the two were incompatible with Tunisian’s independence. Negotiations were 
envisaged for the possibility of new instruments to replace them. In particular a Treaty of 
Common Defence or Alliance was something contemplated or intended by both 
countries.29 This was the nature of the state of affairs prevailing between France and 
Tunisia at the beginning of 1958.
The military successes of the French in Algeria had driven many guerrillas to seek 
sanctuary in Tunisia, where they had been prevented from reentering Algeria by the 
Morice line. They had, however, repeatedly tried to do so, and over the months leading 
to the beginning of 1958 there had been a considerable number of shooting incidents on 
the Tunisia-Algeria border. These reached a peak on 11 January 1958 when a small 
French detachment was ambushed by the FLN from over the Tunisian border, and fifteen
on
French troops were killed. On 29 January 1958, the French Cabinet agreed in principle 
that some sort of reprisal should be carried out against the FLN concentrations on the far 
side of the Tunisian border. Then on 7 February 1958, a French plane was shot at from 
the Tunisian village of Sakiet. The following day, the village was bombarded by the 
French Air Force but without the authorisation of Paris. The raid left seventy Tunisian 
civilians dead, twenty-five of them school-children,31 although the War Ministry in Paris 
tried to deny that children were among the casualties.
In France, reaction to this attack varied from condonation to condemnation. Defence 
Minister Chaban-Delmas expressed his satisfaction at this attack as an “act of legitimate
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defence.”32 The army headquarters in Algiers published a communique stating that “no 
civilian objectives and Red Cross vans were damaged,”33 but this report was later found 
wanting when weighed in the balance against eye-witness accounts of Swiss and Swedish 
Red Cross officials. A number of French Cabinet Ministers led by Foreign Minister 
Christian Pineau deplored the attack and favoured some sort of apologetic gesture by 
France. Their hopes were dashed on Tuesday 11 February 1958 when the Prime Minister 
Felix Gail lard addressed the National Assembly and defended the raid as an operation 
against a “purely military” objective and said that most of the victims were Algerian 
rebels.04 His speech was ambiguous and confusing to say the least because he had also 
stated that the Government did not admit any culpability in the affair. After his speech, 
by 339 votes to 179 the French National Assembly adopted a motion regretting the 
civilian losses in Sakiet and expressing confidence in the Government.05
In Tunisia, immediately after the attack President Bourguiba said that Tunisia would 
lodge a formal complaint with the United Nations. President Bourguiba then resorted to 
various diplomatic retaliatory measures against France. He summoned his Ambassador 
from Paris, and called for the evacuation of Tunisia, including Bizerta, by French troops 
of whom 20 000 were still in the country under the independence treaty.36 The Tunisian 
authorities also confined the French troops to their barracks and cut off all outside food 
and water supplies for them. Tunisia further retaliated by closing French consulates in 
the country. Co-operation between French official experts and Tunisians was stopped. 
Meetings of Franco-Tunisian working groups dealing with problems of transfer of
37authority from France to Tunisia since its independence were cancelled. On the whole 
Tunisia said the French air raid was an “act of particular gravity.... threatening
38international peace.”'
With British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd away in Athens, R.A. Butler (Secretary of 
State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal) convened a cabinet meeting on 12 
February 1958, at which the Tunisian incident and its international repercussions formed 
one of the main items on the agenda.39 The same day Commander Allan Noble, Minister 
of State, Foreign Office, in a statement to the House of Commons expressed British 
government’s “grave concern” at the French raid on Sakiet.40 He said that the 
Government deplored the loss of civilian lives and were discussing the situation with the 
French and Tunisian Governments, with both of whom they were in close and friendly 
relations. Commander Noble further said that the British Ambassadors in Paris and Tunis 
had been instructed to urge on the French and Tunisian Governments the need for 
moderation and restraint41 Still in the House of Commons, Aneurin Bevan said the 
Labour Opposition shared the deep shock that the incident had caused to public opinion 
in France, where many Frenchmen of distinction had expressed their horror at what had 
happened.
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The Opposition Labour Party took the matter further, when three of its members in 
parliament namely Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Mrs. Barbara Castle and Fenner 
Brockway on 12 February 1958 tabled a motion calling on the Government to ask for an 
immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation which had 
developed out of the attack on Sakiet a threat to peace. The motion read thus:
That this House, being profoundly shocked by the bombing o f Sakiet in 
Tunisia by French aircraft, with the loss o f many lives, calls upon Her 
Majesty’s Government (a) to make available, at once, such medical and 
other supplies as may be thought necessary by the Red Cross authorities 
on the spot; (b) to ask fo r  an immediate meeting o f the Security Council.
..(c) to instruct its permanent representative at the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation to raise with the Secretary General the question o f the use 
by the French Government in Algeria on this occasion o f aircraft and 
other equipment supplied to them by, through, and for NATO and. (d) to 
take an immediate initiative to open negotiations designed to secure a just 
and peaceful settlement o f the Algerian question in accordance with the 
United Nations resolution o f December 10, 1957.42 
The motion was never debated. On the whole the British Government said that its 
aim was to help in restoring friendly relations between France and Tunisia. But 
the British Government was careful not to say anything that would offend or sour 
her relations with France. This was manifestly clear when the Sakiet incident was 
raised in the House of Lords by Lord Stansgate who asked Lord Gosford 
“whether bombers were supplied by America and whether they have been used in 
this way. Is there any form of restraint on them?”4j P.G. Hancock of the Foreign 
Office issued a memorandum in which he advised Lord Gosford along the lines 
to take when responding.44 The State Department in Washington had provided the 
British Embassy there with the details of the equipment used and under what 
terms they were provided for between France and United States and the limits of 
their use. Though the British Embassy in Washington had relayed this 
information to the Foreign Office, the bulk of which could have been used to 
address the question asked, this was suppressed. The only information was that 
given by the French themselves. In response to Lord Stansgate question Lord 
Gosford said:
I am afraid that the only information available is a statement 
made by M. Chaban-Delmas, the French Minister o f Defence, at 
a press conference, that, the eleven B26 bombers and six Corsair 
fighter-bombers o f American manufacture used in the raid on 
Sakiet belonged outright to France by purchase and had not been 
assigned to her fo r  use within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation:45
Some sections of the British media were outright in their condemnation of the 
French actions over Sakiet. In its lead story headlined “The Western Man’s 
Burden,” the New Statesman said that since the end of the Second World War
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France had hung like a millstone round the neck of the West.46 It stated that 
France’s blind efforts to cling to the tattered relics of her empire have been a 
source of constant embarrassment and sometimes of grave danger to her anxious 
and weary Western friends. The paper called the Sakiet bombing “treacherous 
and brutal and there was no justification” for it. It argued that the bombing was a 
direct concern for the West as a whole. It called upon Britain and America to take 
stock of their dealings with France now, saying that for many years Britain and 
America had gone bail for France at the United Nations. For instance the 
December 1957 General Assembly resolution on Algeria refrained from outright 
condemnation of France and simply directed her to make peace largely because of 
British and American intervention. Now again the West’s “protege” France has 
broken probation and the West must expect to share the guilt of the Sakiet attack.
The New Statesman further argued that Washington had herself to blame if 
Moscow accused her of complicity in the attack because the majority of the 
aircraft used were supplied by America under NATO. What made the matter 
worse was that the attack was launched less than a week after Washington had 
accorded France a further loan of $650 million which both parties were fully 
aware would be used to prolong the Algerian war. The paper warned the West 
that she must not be surprised if the uncommitted nations turn their backs on the 
West and go East. The New Statesman advised that, while Britain and America 
must dissuade Bourguiba from any act which would deepen the crisis, they must 
support Tunisia’s case at the United Nations. This Sakiet incident was according 
to the paper the opportunity for the West to prove to the world that right and 
wrong are more vital to them than the amour-propre of even an important ally. 
Tunisia being the only independent Arab state which has opted for the West of its 
own free will, was of great importance of itself, but more significant still as a test- 
case. The uncommitted world would want to know if the West was prepared to 
regard the ex-colonial nations as full members of the international community? 
Or does the West see them as merely second-class citizens whose sovereign rights 
could be freely ignored? The West would have to answer these questions before 
Asia and Africa concluded that friendship with the West paid no dividends, that 
even neutrality was dangerous, and that the best safeguard of their independence 
might be to have it underwritten by Moscow, concluded the New Statesman.
The Spectator was equally forthright in condemning the Sakiet attack and went 
further to offer some advice to Britain and America on how to deal with France 
and North Africa. According to The Spectator, the French reactions to the Sakiet 
blunder showed that the already existing lack of realism in their North African 
policy had now grown to a terrifying extent47 It argued that the attack had almost 
dashed the hope of associating North Africa in an alliance with Western Europe. 
France’s allies in NATO now found themselves embroiled with the Afro-Asian 
block by a policy which was neither of their making, nor to their advantage. It 
argued that it would not be surprising if Britain and America were soon to decide 
that this had gone on long enough, and that there were limits to the allowances 
which could be made for the difficulties of the French in Algeria. The paper
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urged both Britain and America to formulate some realistic policy of aid to those 
states which were still holding out against the pressures exercised from Moscow 
and Cairo. The West should support those countries who fear the extension of 
Egyptian influence; something more was required, if the whole of the Arab world 
and a substantial part of Africa was not to fall under Soviet influence.
For The Spectator the real threat to Western interest was the Cold War and the 
Sakiet incident might provide an opportunity for the East to penetrate other parts 
of world such as the Middle East and North Africa. So what the West was 
supposed to do was first to prevent the existence of legitimate Russian interests in 
these areas. The West must make discreet support for her remaining friends, 
whether Arab or not. Among the West’s remaining friends was Bourguiba and it 
was here that French policy in North Africa had done so much damage already 
and would do more unless Britain and America intervened to cut the losses. 
Finally, the paper urged both Britain and America to show the French authorities 
that, if the Sakiet affair was debated in the United Nations, France would find 
itself alone.
Reacting to the Sakiet attack the Washington Post called it “an act of utter 
madness.”48 The State Department issued a statement on 9 February 1958, in 
which the United States Government stated that it was “profoundly disturbed” by 
reports of the French air raid on a Tunisian border village. “We are concerned at 
the effect this occurrence may have on the relations between two nations, both 
friends of the United States, who we continue to hope would find means of 
reconciling their differences in the interest of the peaceful progress of the North 
African area.49 President Eisenhower, who was personally angered by this action, 
instructed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to call the French Ambassador 
Herve Alphand to his home and to personally express to him the Government’s 
deep concern over the attack. The French Ambassador is said to have left after 
the meeting grey-faced.50 The Americans warned France that they would vote 
against her if the matter was raised in the United Nations Security Council. At his 
press conference on 11 February 1958 when commenting on the French attack on 
Sakiet, Dulles said the United States deplored incidents like this which tended to 
reverse the trend towards co-operation between North Africa and Western 
Europe.51 The evident fear of the American Government was that the 
repercussions of this incident could only play into Russian hands, if Tunisia 
sought assistance from the Russians.
The Sakiet raid was shocking and embarrassing to both Britain and America 
because it was later discovered that the equipment used originated from the two 
Western Powers. Lord Gorford’s statement in the House of Lords had been 
“economical with the truth.” A British Embassy memorandum from Washington 
addressed to the African Department in the Foreign Office (London) revealed the 
origin of most of the equipment. The information was obtained first by the State 
Department from the French Embassy in Washington at the former’s request. The 
State Department then passed the information to the British Embassy. According
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to the information from the French the Bombers B-26’s had been bought by the 
French Government from the surplus United States Air Force stock some two 
years ago.52 This had been strictly a commercial transaction and no restrictions 
had been placed on the use of the planes. In addition to the bombers, however, 
some half dozen “Corsair” fighter aircraft, of the type known officially as the 
F4U7, took part in the raid. These planes were received from the United States 
under the Military Assistance Programme.53 In addition, the French admitted that 
some of the tracer bullets, the 1000-lb bombs 5001b bombs had also been 
provided under the Military Assistance Programme. They said, incidentally, that 
a number of 5001b and 2501b bombs dropped on Sakiet were of United Kingdom
• ■ 54origin.
Since the Corsair aircraft and the bombs had been provided as grant aid under the 
Military Assistance Programme, they were subject to the provisions of the 1950 Bilateral 
Agreement between France and the United States, which dealt with Mutual Defence 
Assistance between the two countries. Article I (paragraph 2 and 3), of the Agreement 
defined the circumstances in which equipment could be used. It read as follows:
Each Government undertakes to make effective use of assistance received 
pursuant to paragraph I of this article;
(a) For the purpose of promoting an integrated defence of the North 
Atlantic area and for facilitating the development of defence plans 
under articles 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and
(b) Neither Government without the prior consent of the other, will 
devote assistance furnished to it by the other Government to 
purposes other than those for which it was furnished.55
Section 105 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (as amended) under which the 
United States Government is authorised to make deliveries under the Mutual Aid 
Programme also provides that equipment may be used “to maintain...internal 
security”. It adds: “The President shall be satisfied that such equipment and 
materials will not be used to undertake any act of aggression against any 
nation.”56 France had consistently taken the line that Algeria, being part of 
metropolitan France, comes within the NATO area. So far as the obligations 
assumed by the French Government were concerned, however, the 1950 
Agreement was the operative document. Whether the 1950 or 1954 Agreement 
was the operative one at the time of the raid, it was clear that the French did not 
abide by either Agreement. The State Department had never raised with the 
French Government the use which had been made of American aid equipment in 
Algeria. They felt, however, that the raid on Sakiet fell into a different category 
and therefore considered making a protest to the French Government and asking 
for an assurance that there would be no repetition.
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In the House of Commons on 12 February 1958 Anthony Wedgwood Benn of the Labour 
Party asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, what instructions had been given 
to the British delegate at NATO to take up the question of the use of American bombers, 
supplied under NATO, for this attack upon a third country which was not only a breach 
of the Charter but of Articles 1 and 7 of the NATO Agreement itself.57 In response 
Commander Noble stated that the British representative at NATO had been instructed to 
emphasise the importance of a constructive effort to restore the situation. Britain did not 
want to take any stance that would either offend France or the United States at the NATO 
meeting.
Since the Sakiet incident created an international hullabaloo that was likely to draw the 
Arab world on one side and France on the other, both Britain and America acted quickly 
to stabilise the situation by offering intervention through their good offices. The exercise 
of good offices by the British Government began informally on 12 February 1958 when 
the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau told Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British 
Ambassador in Paris that he would be grateful if Her Majesty’s Government could do 
anything to persuade President Bourguiba to relax the blockade of French forces in 
Tunisia.58 On the same day the British Government made representations to the Tunisian 
Government, through their Ambassador in London Taleb Slim and also through Angus 
Malcolm, British Ambassador in Tunis, to the effect that the continued denial of essential 
provisions to the French forces in Tunisia would inevitably lead to a further crisis. 
President Bourguiba refused to lift the ban on food supplies but on February 15 he stated 
that he would reverse this decision if asked to do so by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations Dag Hammarsjoeld.59 The Secretary-General duly intervened on the same 
day and was given a favourable reply. But the Tunisians wanted an assurance that the 
French would not abuse the sending of foodstuffs and water and this assurance was 
granted.
Still on 15 February 1958 the French Government spokesman announced that the 
meeting of the Council of Ministers had decided on the possible compensation for the 
Tunisian civilian population.60 The Government had decided to ask the French Red Cross 
to get in touch immediately with the Tunisian Red Crescent with a view to proceeding 
with the assessment of losses suffered by the civilian population only during the 
bombing. The same spokesman said that the French Government was determined to 
accept any good offices which are offered to them to mediate, but in no case would 
France accept an offer of arbitration.61 At the beginning both Britain and America 
thought it wise to wait for the Secretary-General of the United Nations to mediate if he 
wished to. But he informed them that he did not propose to take any broad initiative 
himself in the absence of a lead from Britain and America.62 As a result an agreement 
was reached between the British Government and the American Government to propose 
their good offices in Paris and Tunis. This was done on 16 February 1958. On the same 
day Sir Gladwyn Jebb expressed his worries about concerted Anglo-American action.63
In a letter to the Foreign Office he cautioned against both Britain and America applying 
the stick on France. He said that it was better for the Americans to apply the stick while 
Britain had recourse to the carrot.64
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Jebb’s fears were that if both applied the stick there was likely to be political unrest 
similar to the one in November 1957 that nearly brought down the Fourth Republc. So 
the Ambassador pressed for caution.
Meanwhile both Tunisia and France had accepted the British and American offer of good 
offices. The good offices offer in essence came to involve shuttle diplomacy between 
Paris, Tunis and London. The scope of the good offices was not precisely defined at this 
time, so its first task was to work out the modalities and issues to be tackled by the 
mission. The way the mission was to proceed was put by the Americans to British 
Ambassador in Washington Sir Harold Caccia on 17 February 1958.65 Initial American 
thinking was that the United Kingdom and United States coordination of policy should be 
effected in Washington. But they began to turn over the idea and thought that the two 
countries, Britain and America could jointly agree on some neutral point, for example 
Rome, where they might seek to bring the French and Tunisians together.66 If this 
happened, special representatives would have to be appointed by the four Governments, 
and these representatives would have to be given wide discretionary powers for them to 
be effective. Sir Harold Caccia expressed his doubts about the feasibility of these 
American suggestions. He said that while there might be some advantage in a neutral 
point, there looked to him to be serious operational difficulties. For instance there were 
already five places where action might have to be taken, that is, Washington, London, 
Paris, Tunis and New York.67 To add a sixth would surely be complicating what was 
already difficult enough. Moreover, the issues at stake between British and American 
relations with France on the other hand and North Africa on other were so great that it 
would not in practice be easy for any of the countries to give their representative any 
wide degree of discretion.
In response the Foreign Office shared most of Sir Harold’s concerns. They stated that the 
position of the British Government was that they should begin by taking action in Paris 
and Tunis,68 and that the British and American representations would always be closely 
coordinated but sometimes made separately. The Foreign Office stated that it had been 
advised by Sir Gladwyn that the French would be unlikely to agree at this stage to attend 
four power meetings or go to a neutral place 69 It does appear that the British position 
was sympathetic to the French because to the French a neutral venue would have meant 
that there was a dispute between herself and Tunisia. Even in British government circles 
they had always wanted to treat the Sakiet attack as a situation not a dispute. The Foreign 
Office was also against the idea of special representatives at a neutral venue, arguing that 
for any progress to be made they had to speak to the principals,70 that is Bourguiba and 
Gaillard, on a constant basis. Also the sixth centre of activity was unnecessary.
It appears that at this stage British proposals carried the day. It had been hoped that 
acceptance of the Anglo-American offer of mediation would lead to the adjournment of 
the debate on Fran co-Tunisian problem in the United Nations Security Council due to 
begin on 18 February 1958. This was not to be the case. The meeting went ahead as 
scheduled, on its agenda was the Tunisian complaint against France for the Sakiet 
bombing, and the French counter-complaint about Tunisian aid to Algerian rebels.
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Both countries did not object to the other’s complaint when it was tabled. Britain and 
America were eager to keep the meeting procedural, and keep away from a debate on 
matters of substance. This was because any debate would have been embarrassing to both 
of them and would have been more likely to exacerbate than to improve Franco-Tunisian 
relations. The Council meeting was adjourned indefinitely to allow time for the exercise 
of the British and American good offices to compose the differences between the two 
countries. The British and American representatives Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. 
Wadsworth informed the council that their Governments might have positive suggestions 
to offer the parties at the centre of the conflict.
On 19 February 1958 the State Department released the following statement to the 
press:
...The Secretary o f State has designated Deputy Under-Secretary Robert 
Murphy to represent the United States in exercising this Government’s 
good offices in conjunction with the Government o f the United Kingdom 
in order to assist the Governments o f France and Tunisia to settle the 
outstanding problems between them...As one o f the two Powers which 
are extending their good offices, the United States hopes to be able to 
offer affirmative suggestions to advance the objective o f a. peaceful and 
equitable solution o f the problems to be considered.71
Back to the House of Commons on 19 February 1958, Wedgwood Benn asked the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd if he would undertake to look at the 
most difficult question of all, which was the continued presence in Tunisia of 20,000 
French troops by virtue of the old Protectorate Treaty, but under no international 
agreement, which was one of the greatest causes of difficulty between the two 
countries.72 In response Lloyd stated that it was well known that there were a number of 
matters in dispute between the two Governments, that was why Britain had offered her 
good offices. On a related matter Paul Williams (Sunderland, South) asked Lloyd if he 
would agree that there was considerable sympathy in Britain with the role France was 
trying to carry out in North Africa.73 Lloyd answered by saying that he was glad to 
acknowledge the special position of France in North Africa and the importance to this 
and to other countries of friendly relations between France and the people of North 
Africa.74
On 20 February 1958 the Foreign Office spokesman said that Her Majesty’s 
Government regarded their offer of good offices as applying to the whole range of 
questions directly at issue between the French and Tunisian Governments. On the same 
day Harold Beeley, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office was appointed to represent the 
British Government in the exercise of the good offices. On 22 February 1958, Robert 
Murphy arrived in London and had the first meeting with Beeley 75 The following day 
he met Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. 
After these consultations it was agreed that Murphy must go alone to Paris and Tunis. 
The British Government recalled its Ambassadors in Paris and Tunis, Gladwyn Jebb and
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Angus Malcolm respectively, to London to report on the latest developments and for 
consultations on the good offices attempts.
In its editorial comment on 22 February 1958, the Daily Telegraph had a message of 
warning for the Anglo-American good offices mission. The paper warned against the 
perception in some quarters that France’s acceptance of the Anglo-American good 
offices might be the thin end of the wedge which in time would prise open the door to an 
international settlement of North African problem.76 It also questioned the basis for the 
argument that Sakiet might have made possible some compromise solution for the 
Algerian war. The above assumptions, the paper argued, were unfounded and, if acted 
upon by the American and British Governments, could produce ills in Europe far graver 
than any it might cure in North Africa. The article further stated that Western 
Governments seeking to help must just accept, as the starting point of their good offices, 
that any insistence on putting Algeria on their agenda would subvert the Fourth 
Republic.
The Daily Telegraph went further and warned both the British and American 
administrations that it would be a great error on their part if they drew any false parallels 
between the success of outside intervention in ending the Indo-China war and the 
opportunities that existed at the moment in North Africa. According to the paper the 
situation in Algeria was quite different because the French army was not defeated as it 
was in Dien Bien Phu. Any withdrawal in Algeria, therefore, must be voluntary and be 
based on the free agreement of the French which was lacking at the moment. So only an 
internal coup cTetat which could overthrow the Fourth Republic or Anglo-American 
pressure might succeed in imposing a settlement in Algeria, but at a heavy price. This 
would be the collapse of France as a member of the Western alliance. The paper then 
appealed to both Murphy and Beeley to limit their objectives strictly to the letter of their 
terms of reference. It concluded by warning that any attempt to use the French 
Government’s present embarrassment over Sakiet as an excuse to push them into an 
over-all settlement would be to give way to a lethal temptation.
Murphy had his first meeting with Gaillard and Pineau on 24 February 1958. It was 
during these exploratory talks undertaken by Murphy in Paris and Tunis that serious 
differences began to emerge between France and Tunisia. The French Government 
wanted the talks to be limited in scope, namely to three points: First, restoring freedom 
of movement for French troops and settling the questions of the five closed consulates 
and the security of French settlers; second, Algerian frontier control; third, helping 
towards a resumption of direct Franco-Tunisian negotiations on more fundamental 
matters such as the long term future of Bizerta.77 The Algerian problem was to be 
excluded, a point that was clearly taken note of by London and Washington. Murphy 
saw President Bourguiba in Tunis on 25 February 1958. In their meeting President 
Bourguiba stated that acceptance by the French Government of the principle of total 
evacuation of their troops was a prerequisite for a settlement.78 Bourguiba further said 
that he hoped that in the “good offices” discussion a solution would be found to the 
Algerian problem. This clearly showed that there were contrasting views between 
France and Tunisia. At the same meeting with Murphy, Bourguiba stated that he would
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agree to neutral observers on the airfields, but rejected the idea of a frontier commission 
under a neutral chairman, on the ground that this would involve Tunisian cooperation 
with France against the Algerian rebellion.79
After these exploratory consultations Murphy had to report to Dulles. In a letter to the 
Foreign Office, and stamped strictly confidential and to be distributed in Whitehall, Sir 
Gladwyn Jebb, who had been given the information by his American colleague Amory 
Houghton, gave a summary of Murphy’s report to Dulles.80 Murphy had concluded that 
France had no case for retaining her troops in Tunisia, and consequently recommended 
that the French Government should forthwith agree in principle to withdraw all French 
troops in Tunisia with the exception of those in Bizerta,81 and then to do so within a 
reasonable period of time. On the Tunisian side, Bourguiba should agree to allow 
neutral observers to be stationed on the military airfields so as to prevent the utilization 
of the latter by the FLN and, in addition, acquiesce in some international regime of 
inspection on the border.
Murphy met Premier Gaillard in Paris on 3 March 1958 at which he presented to him his 
proposals. The French produced their counter proposals. Murphy then returned to 
London on the same day. After consultations with Beeley, the two “good officers” left 
for Paris where they met Gaillard on March 5. At this meeting Murphy and Beeley 
presented a five-point plan to Gaillard for solving the Franco-Tunisian deadlock. So, as 
a way out of the deadlock and as a future resumption of Franco-Tunisian talks on the 
long-term future of Bizerta the British and American good offices representatives 
proposed the following: Immediate withdrawal of all French forces in Tunisia to the 
Bizerta region, a token evacuation of French forces from Tunisia, cancellation of 
measures taken against French civilians; neutral supervision of military airfields at 
present under French control to ensure that they were not used by Algerian rebels and 
finally a neutral commission to supervise the Algerian frontier.83 Beeley was quick to 
emphasise that Her Majesty’s Government fully associated themselves with this 
approach to the problem. In response Gaillard conceded that the presence of French 
troops outside Bizerta and the airfields was not intrinsically important, and did not 
dispute the “good offices” argument that control of the airfields be assured by neutral 
observers. Gaillard concluded by saying that he would have to consult his colleagues.
The question of supervision of the Algerian frontier was of direct concern to Britain. 
The concern was economic. Britain was obtaining iron ore from the Ouenza mines 15 
miles west of the Algeria-Tunisia border. The mines were in the wooded mountain 
region 130 miles south of the port of Bone. Output from the Ouenza mines in 1955 
totalled 2,683 000 tons, of which 1,693 000 tons went to Britain. Algerian rebel activity 
and sabotage in 1956 reduced output to 1,695 000 tons, of which Britain took 1,057 000 
tons. In 1957 the output rose to 1,966 000 tons, of which 1,213 000 tons went to Britain. 
The Algerian rebels were now hampering deliveries by sabotage in the mining region 
and by attacks on the railroad. It was for these reasons that Britain had other interests in 
border control.
Gaillard informed the good offices team about the French Government’s final views on
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the proposals on 10 March 1958. He said that France would be prepared to withdraw 
from Tunisia all their forces outside Bizerta in return for the reversal of Tunisian 
measures against French civilians, the re-opening of the consulates, freedom of 
movement for the troops, the restoration of normal diplomatic relations, neutral control 
of the airfields and of the frontier and bilateral negotiations for a provisional agreement 
on Bizerta, pending its inclusion in a multilateral defence arrangement.85 Robert 
Murphy and Harold Beeley then flew to Tunis to meet President Bourguiba on 11 March 
1958. In meetings with Bourguiba and his senior officials very little progress was made 
by the good offices mission. The French conditions were unacceptable to the Tunisians. 
The issue of Bizerta proved to be the main sticking point. President Bourguiba insisted 
that he could not enter into any conversations about the future of Bizerta until the French 
had agreed in principle to the total evacuation of all their forces from Tunisia.
The good offices mission was now in a stalemate and there was the danger of a 
breakdown of the talks. As a way out of the imminent impasse the “good officers” 
decided to draft a document for establishing a basis for agreement and on which the 
approval of the Tunisian and French Governments would be sought. The drafting of the 
document was to try as far as possible to bring the Tunisians in the direction of the 
French Government’s requirements.86 This document was presented to, and approved by 
the Tunisian Government on 15 March 1958. In brief, the salient features of the 
document were as follows; measures were to be taken for neutral observers to have 
access to the military airfields which would be evacuated by the French forces; all 
French military personnel outside the Bizerta perimeter would be withdrawn from 
Tunisia as soon as possible; when normal relations had been re-established, the Tunisian 
Government would study sympathetically, within the framework of a consular 
convention, such requests as the French Government might make for the opening of 
additional consulates; pending the gradual normalisation of relations between the two 
countries, each of the two Governments would continue to make every effort to protect 
and safeguard the nationals of the other country residing in its territory.87 In the second 
phase the document stated that it was understood that the French Government did not 
dispute the sovereignty of Tunisia over Bizerta, and that a provisional regime for this 
base would be defined by mutual agreement between the two Governments.88 Finally, 
during these conversations the Good Offices of the Governments of Great Britain and of 
the United States would continue to be available to the and French and Tunisian 
Governments.
The text of the proposals by Murphy and Beeley were presented to Gaillard on 19 March 
1958. The aim was to get the agreement of the French Government to the proposals. 
Premier Gaillard and Foreign Minister Pineau took strong exception to the absence of 
any provision for frontier control on the proposals. Gaillard undertook to consult his 
Cabinet colleagues, but already since his Government was a coalition his position was 
made difficult by the leakage of the proposals. The Independent Party in his 
Government was already agitating against the withdrawal of French forces from the 
Tunisian airfields.89 From now on the Independents would be a thorn in Gaillard’s side 
when dealing with the good offices mission. The French Council of Ministers met on 21 
March 1958. At this meeting Gaillard successfully resisted the pressure of the
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Independent ministers to reject the proposal for withdrawal from the airfields and the 
stationing there of neutral observers. The concession he made to the Independents was 
that the Government would take a firm stand on the principle of Tunisian non­
interference in Algeria.90 Murphy and Beeley met Gaillard and Pineau again on 25 
March 1958. French and Tunisian Governments. At this meeting the French made the 
counter-proposal that they would be ready to implement the March 15 proposals if the 
establishment of some kind of neutral system on the frontier had been agreed in 
principle.
Murphy and Beeley decided that rather than taking this French counter-proposal to 
Tunis immediately, they could convey it to President Bourguiba through their respective 
Ambassadors in Tunis, Lewis Jones and Angus Malcolm. President Bourguiba’s 
reception to the French counter-proposal was negative and said that he even did not want 
to discuss it with the good offices representatives. At a March 27 meeting between 
Gaillard and Pineau and the Anglo-American representatives it was agreed that rather 
than any further move on the part of the mission, the “good officers” should discuss the 
situation with the United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold who was at that 
time on his way from Moscow to London.91 The Anglo-American representatives 
wanted to enquire from the Secretary-General if there was any possibility of his 
intervening to facilitate the establishment of a system of neutral investigation on the 
Algeria-Tunisia frontier. Murphy and Beeley met Hammarskjold in London on 30 
March, 195 8.92 The “good officers” gave him an account of their work. In response 
Hammarskjold told them that he would consider it within his powers to establish a 
neutral system of investigation on the frontier without a resolution of the Security 
Council or the General Assembly. But he added that if he was to act on his own 
authority he must be requested to do so by both parties. In the end the Secretary- 
General authorised the good offices men to repeat to the Tunisians, that a neutral system 
of investigation of incidents on the frontier was a reasonable proposal and one in which 
he would be prepared to cooperate.
In its editorial comment of 5 April 1958, the Daily Telegraph expressed some guarded 
optimism about the settlement in the Franco-Tunisian dispute. According to the paper 
this was because of the new factor which was the active interest now shown by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations by meeting the Anglo-American good offices 
representatives.9^  The Telegraph said that the Franco-Tunisian dispute was indeed 
almost a text-book case for United Nations intervention.94 It argued that peace was 
manifestly endangered as long as France believed that Tunisia was helping the Algerian 
rebels and Tunisia accused France of trespassing on her sovereignty. The issue was, 
moreover, one in which the United Nations should be able to afford the practical 
safeguards required by France without the offence to Tunisian pride which would be 
caused if the French enforced them themselves. So, according to the Telegraph, only 
the United Nations could provide a mutually acceptable way out of the dilemma, 
affording France the safeguards she rightly required, but without affront to Tunisia.95
After their meeting with the Secretary-General the good offices agents met President 
Bourguiba in Tunis on 4 April, 1958. President Bourguiba maintained his refusal to
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cooperate voluntarily in any measures designed to help the French to police the frontier 
between Tunisia and Algeria. He further said that he would accept a decision by the 
Security Council, but warned that if the matter returned to the Security Council the 
Tunisian Delegate would be instructed to reopen the question of Bizerta and would also 
raise the Algerian question. This Tunis meeting was a failure because President 
Bourguiba and his advisors were uncompromising on the question of border control. 
The disappointment was expressed by Harold Beeley when he said to reporters “I do not 
believe there is a definitive check to the talks. No agreement has been reached and this 
could be called a temporary setback.”96
The Anglo-American officers returned to Paris during the Easter holiday, and had a 
meeting with Gaillard and Pineau at Barbezieux in south-western France on 9 April 
1958.97 Murphy and Beeley gave an account of their talks in Tunis. They discussed 
with the French the various ways of getting out of the impasse to which the good offices 
had come. One of the ways which came as a suggestion from Sir Gladwyn Jebb to the 
“good officers” and the French was to the effect that the French Government should 
accept the proposals of 15 March 1958 unconditionally, while at the same time 
reserving their right to refer the frontier question to the Security Council.98 Once this 
was said, Gaillard then put two questions to the meeting : In the event of a debate in the 
Security Council would the United Kingdom and United States Governments support 
France (a) in asking for frontier control and (b) in resisting attempts to put the Algerian 
question as such on the Agenda.99 The meeting concluded with Gaillard saying he 
would call a Cabinet Meeting on Friday 11 April, 1958 and expressed his wish to have 
answers to the above questions before then.
Through Ambassador Jebb the British Government informed Pineau on April 11 that 
they were most anxious to avoid the Franco-Tunisian issue going back to the Security 
Council in a spirit of recrimination. But if a debate became inevitable they would 
support the French Government in pressing for some form of frontier control and in 
opposing the inscription of the Algerian question as such on the Agenda on the ground 
that it was ruled out by Article II (7) of the Charter.100 However, the British added that 
they hoped that the French Government would appreciate that there might be other 
aspects of the Franco-Tunisian dispute on which the views of Britain and France might 
differ. On the same day President Eisenhower sent a private, but strongly worded letter 
to Gaillard.101 In the letter the President emphasised the importance attached by the 
United States Government to the acceptance by the French Government of the modus 
vivendi defined in the proposals of March 15. The Eisenhower letter went further and 
warned that refusal by France to abide by these proposals would force the United States 
to withdraw all diplomatic support from France.10 This letter seems to have caused 
panic within the French Government and that day’s Cabinet meeting was postponed to 
the following day.
On 12 April 1958 A. Houghton and R. Murphy informed Louis Joxe, Secretary-General 
of the Foreign Ministry of France that the United States favoured in principle the idea of 
neutral frontier control in circumstances such as those existing on the border between 
Algeria and Tunisia, and that, although they could not give a definite commitment, they
would presumably support a resolution to this effect in the Security Council, The answer 
to the question on Algeria was not given. Like the British, they did not recommend 
recourse to the Security Council. The French Cabinet met on the morning of the same 
day and it was one of the longest cabinet meetings, taking almost eleven hours to come 
to a conclusion,103 The meeting was very heated and only the personal intervention of 
President Rene Coty stopped the five Right wing Independent Ministers from resigning, 
which could have led to the collapse of the Government. At the end a communique was 
issued which stated that: “The Cabinet has agreed to accept as a basis for the discussion 
with Tunisia the results of the contacts made by Murphy and Beeley,” the American and 
British good offices commission.104 The French also reserved their right to raise 
problems concerning the control of the frontier before international bodies.
The State Department in Washington immediately issued the following statement:
that it was “much encouraged” by the French Cabinet’s decision to 
accept the findings o f the Anglo-American good offices mission as a basis 
fa r  talks with Tunisia.105
Though the French Cabinet decision was to the United States liking, the fact that 
President Eisenhower had sent a message to Gaillard before the meeting raised a storm of 
protest in Paris. The French complained of “Anglo-American pressure” on France. The 
British Embassy had to state that no pressure had been exerted by Britain on France 
during the talks which took place within the framework of the good offices mission.
The April 12, French Cabinet meeting conclusions meant that they had to be approved or 
endorsed by the National Assembly. So it was decided that Parliament would be recalled 
on 15 April 1958. The decision to recall Parliament was primarily the idea of the 
Independent Ministers. At the request of the French Government it was agreed by the 
four parties in the negotiations that the document of March 15 should remain secret until 
after the French National Assembly had met. It was hoped that in the National Assembly 
debate Gaillard would only summarise the contents of the document. Unfortunately the 
document was immediately leaked, but what did not become publicly known was the fact 
that the March 15 proposals were embodied now in a document which had been approved 
by both the Tunisian and French Governments. At this time there was some ray of 
optimism in all the parties that the prospect of Franco-Tunisian conversation was 
possible.
The editorial comment of the Daily Telegraph of 14 April 1958 could sense something 
ominous coming for the French Government in the National Assembly debate the 
following day. The newspaper comment attempted to identify what the real issues were 
in the Franco-Tunisian dispute, the way out of the obstacles and what the National 
Assembly debate would mean. The article stated that if Gaillard survived in the 
Assembly, that would not be salvation but a precarious respite to go on with a task that 
remained as difficult as ever. The paper argued that agreement could be achieved by 
either of the following; further Tunisian concession, of which there was no sign at the 
moment, or further yielding by France, which would split and destroy the Government.106
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The paper, rhetorically asked, could international action offer a way out? On this 
approach there was also a deadlock. France would not tolerate international interference 
in her handling of what she perceived to be a domestic revolt in Algeria. Conversely, 
Tunisia regarded Algeria as an enslaved Arab nation, and would accept international 
negotiation only if it was directed towards eventual Algerian independence. These 
fundamental divergences, the paper argued, had restricted the scope of the Anglo- 
American good offices mission and bedevilled the prospect of any sort of international 
patrol or observation of the Tunisian-Algerian frontier. The paper suggested the way out 
of this impasse was that, since France’s main concern was to prevent border infiltration, 
she should not insist on reciprocity.107 In other words the observer teams could still do an 
effective job even if they were deployed on one side of the border, that is, the Algerian 
side.
As planned the French National Assembly met on 15 April 1958. The debate culminated 
in a vote of no confidence on the Gaillard Government by a vote of 321 to 255.108 This 
meant the collapse of the Gaillard regime and of the Fourth Republic. The parliamentary 
debate was said to have been dominated by anti-American and to a lesser extent anti- 
British feeling. This was confirmed by Gaillard when he made his last speech to the 
Assembly. He said the debate was dominated by “xenophobia towards certain countries 
which have often been our allies and helpers, and sometimes our saviours. I must say 
that for the dignity of France. They have often helped us in difficult debates at the United 
Nations over Algeria.”109 To the Right-Wing Independents whose vote led to the 
downfall of the Government, Gaillard had this say:
You condemn, and mistrust the good offices mission. It is always a sign o f 
weakness to look abroad fo r the causes o f one's own troubles.110
Earlier on in the National Assembly debate one of the right-wing leaders, the former 
Governor-General of Algeria and erstwhile liberal Jacques Soustelle, had made a 
ferocious onslaught on the United States by saying:
We are allies when they need us in Europe, yet when it comes to the 
Middle East or North Africa they ignore us. It is well known that the State 
Department is prepared to sacrifice everything, including its oldest and 
strongest friends, in the hope o f acquiring the friendship, or least the 
tolerance o f the Arabs.111
Gaillard’s last appeal was to ask Murphy and Beeley on 16 April, 1958 that they should 
ask President Bourguiba to ensure that during the interregnum in France nothing should 
be done to close the door to the restoration of satisfactory relations after the formation of 
a new French Government.
The editorial comment of the Daily Telegraph of 17 April 1958 headlined “The More it 
Changes...” criticised the way time and time again French Governments are brought 
down over particular policies which the next Government had proceeded to adopt and got 
away with. It called the ousting of the Gaillard Government an “indecent mating”
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between the Communists and the extreme Right.112 The paper expressed the wish that all 
hope must not be lost of chances of a negotiated settlement in Tunisia, The Telegraph 
article argued that the criticism of the Anglo-American terms totally lacked conviction. 
There was no alternative proposals submitted by those opposed to the Anglo-American 
ones, except the hysterical Poujadist policy of withdrawing France from NATO and 
reconquering Tunisia.1 lj The article concluded by a word of warning to the next French 
Government that if it was not willing to negotiate along the lines agreed by the Anglo- 
American intermediaries, there was a real danger of an explosion in Tunisia. This could 
be triggered by an attack on the French troops there and would have serious 
consequences in France.
On 19 April 1958 the American ambassador Amory Houghton was summoned by the 
acting French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau to his office to explain American press 
reports and news agencies that “an authorised source” had said that the United States now 
favoured France negotiating a settlement with the rebels in Algeria.114 It was alleged that 
the same source had said that the United States no longer felt Algeria was an entirely 
French matter but an international issue. All eyes now turned on Murphy who was 
suspected to be behind these statements. What is certain is that on 16 April 1958 Murphy 
had a secret press conference with selected American correspondents in Paris. This off- 
the-record private press conference once again raised an angry cry of American 
interference in French affairs. In Washington after a meeting between the acting 
Secretary of State Christian Herter and French Ambassador Herve Alphand, the State 
Department issued a statement. In it they stated that American policy on Algeria had not 
changed. The United States hoped that France herself would find a solution to the 
Algerian problem.115 The State Department concluded by saying that reports that the 
United States favoured direct talks between the French and Algerian rebels to end the 
hostilities were “without foundation.”116 Whatever the United States denial, what is clear 
and certain is that from there onwards there was a shift in American policy in dealing 
with the Algerian war.
f. The revolution of May 1958
Political wranglings and instability within the Fourth Republic finally led to its collapse 
in May 1958. This created a political vacuum both in France and Algeria. The ensuing 
turmoil provided the opportunity for General Charles de Gaulle to present himself as the 
panacea of the political troubles that had resulted. The death-blow to the Fourth Republic 
began in late April 1958 when the liberal politician Pierre Pflimlin was mandated by the 
President of the Republic to form a new government. In both France and Algeria those in 
the right were from the outset opposed to his government on the grounds that it was 
moderate and that he favoured a negotiated settlement for Algeria. According to the New 
York Times most right-wing French called him the “notorious liquidator” of overseas 
possessions.117 The government thathe contrived to form in May lasted no more than a 
fortnight before the coup which brought De Gaulle back to power. It is this crisis, the 
French empire and the Algerian problem that the next chapter discusses.
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Conclusion
From the above discussion it could be seen that after Suez, beginning with the battle of 
Algiers the Algerian war not only became a French colonial problem but an international 
one. What the battle of Algiers signifies is that it did bring the war to the doorsteps of 
both the British and French public. Whereas the FLN suffered militarily, its regrouping 
in Tunisia and Morocco did provide a new lease of life to the movement and it gradually 
came to be the recognised internationally. The Sakiet Sidi Youssef incident truly 
internationalised the Algerian conflict. After the incident and the Anglo-American 
attempts at mediation, the course of the war changed and both Britain and America never 
thought the same of the conflict from then onwards.
The work of the Good Offices mission nevertheless survived. Though in a March 1958 
meeting with British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, de Gaulle had expressed 
his misgivings about the “good offices” mission by saying that;
he was against the good offices mission in principle...as they were 
something very near foreign interference in French affairs and their 
activities could, only make the whole thing more difficult..11^
he had accepted the results of the mission within a few weeks of coming to power.
Quite often, a great deal of emphasis is made about the “smooth” coordination of 
the mission by Britain and America, but in reality this was not the case. Whereas 
America was forthright in criticising French actions during the raid and refusing 
to recognise France’s special position in North Africa, Britain pursued a much 
more conciliatory tone. Britain cautioned the United States against heavy 
criticism of France, as this might eventually alienate French public opinion, 
London also urged Washington not to insist that the Sakiet raid was directly 
linked to the Algerian conflict.
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CHAPTER 6
DE GAULLE AND ALGERIA, MAY 1958 TO JANUARY 1960 
a. The coming to power of de Gaulle
Events reached crisis point in both Paris and Algiers on 13 May 1958. A few days before 
this date the French executed three FLN fighters convicted of terrorism. In reprisal the 
FLN also killed three French prisoners in their custody. This was unpalatable to the 
Europeans settlers in Algeria and greatly infuriated them. On May 13, a huge crowd of 
colons descended on government buildings in Algiers. There, they proclaimed a 
“Committee of Public Safety” with General Massu as its head. He usurped all civil and 
military powers. He also demanded the resignation of the newly installed Government of 
Pflimlin. Salan the Commander-in-Chief also demanded the formation of a government 
of Public Safety in Paris and suggested that it be led by General Charles de Gaulle. 
Massu’s actions were in essence a coup d ’etat directed against Paris. As with all other 
previous Governments of coalitions, the Pflimlin regime could not cope with the tide of 
events in Algiers and Paris and it fell. As the May events unfolded R.Lacoste ( Minister 
for Algeria) forecast in gloomy terms a “diplomatic Dien Bien Phu.”1
With Pflimlin gone, all eyes turned to General de Gaulle, the Second World War hero, 
leader of wartime Free French who enjoyed the respect of the army as it considered him 
one of its own, who could not betray it. According to David Reynolds, de Gaulle had 
been preparing the ground for his recall and he cannily represented himself as the 
alternative to both political paralysis and a military coup.2 de Gaulle accepted President 
Rene Coty’s request to form a new government. De Gaulle was invested as Premier by 
the National Assembly (329 to 224) on 1 June 1958/ It is important to note that de 
Gaulle had accepted the invitation to form the new government after attaching strings to 
the request. He obtained the power to rule by decree for six months, and within that 
period he was given the right to prepare, and submit to popular approval through a 
referendum, constitutional changes which would give France a strong executive and put 
an end to “government by parliament.”4 The national plebiscite was held on 26 to 28 
September 1958. It was held not only in Metropolitan France but in Algeria, and 
throughout the French Union, and was overwhelmingly in favour.
b. De Gaulle and the French empire, May 1958 to January 1960
As mentioned earlier, France’s relationship with her colonies under the Fourth Republic 
was known as the French Union. This was to change under the Fifth Republic, the 
alliance now came to be known as the French Community. The socialist Government of 
Guy Mollet that came to power in early 1956 granted independence to Morocco and 
Tunisia in March of that year. Concerned about future repercussions of this development 
the Mollet regime decided to grant the remaining colonies greater autonomy. The 
outcome was the Defferre law, named after the Minister for Overseas France, Gaston 
Defferre.5 The new loi-cadre that came into effect in April 1957 had the following 
crucial aspects. It confirmed the November 1955 decree which had extended suffrage to
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all French citizens throughout the empire except Algeria. As a consequence of this, since 
most of these colonies had small numbers of white settlers, the latter lost their influential 
position. The loi-cadre also granted the local assemblies increased powers to debate and 
vote on territorial budgets and administrative matters without having to seek the consent 
of the French High Commissioners.6 Lastly, the Defferre law increased the powers of 
government councils elected by territorial assemblies. 7 No doubt, by 1957 some of the 
Africans in the French “associated territories” enjoyed more rights than in other European 
colonies including those of Britain. This does not in anyway imply that France wanted 
to give these territories independence, limited autonomy was enough. The shine over the 
French dependencies was in any case eclipsed by the British decision to grant Ghana full 
independence in 1957. This was the state of affairs prevailing in the relationship between 
France and her colonies in May 1958 when the Algerian problem precipitated the coming 
back to power of General Charles de Gaulle.
When de Gaulle came back to power a lot changed in the colonies. Though his plan was 
for the preservation of the different statuses of overseas departements, tenitories and 
associated states, he severely truncated these dependencies powers in assemblies and 
government councils. In other words, what was given in 1956 was taken away in 1958. 
The French Union was now replaced by the French Community, but France still 
maintained her dominant role in this new grouping. Under this new arrangement France 
was still to continue to control foreign affairs, defence, currency, economic and financial 
policy, justice, higher education, overseas transport and telecommunications of the 
“Community.”8 Furthermore, it was stated that each colony would be given the 
opportunity to vote in a referendum on its future status, that is, whether to remain a 
territory, be fully integrated into the French Republic as a departement, or go its own way 
as an independent state with or without association with France. De Gaulle himself 
preferred the association route. But, there was a trap laid down for the colonies, if a 
colony voted to separate from France, it would lose French financial and technical 
assistance. This was an enticement for the small and poor overseas territories to retain 
some form of association with France.
Between 20-29 August 1958 de Gaulle visited Madagascar and Africa where he spoke of 
the upcoming referendum, and also defined the future policy of the Fifth Republic toward 
Africa after being prompted or urged to do so by African nationalists and the crowds he 
addressed. On 24 August 1958 in Brazzaville, he declared : “Whoever desires 
independence may have it immediately.”9 A “No” vote in the referendum meant 
secession, but he assured his audience that independence was not irrevocably surrendered 
in the event of a “Yes” vote. He went further and stated that if some territory within the 
Community should in the long run, at the end of a specified time whose end shall not be 
stipulated, felt capable of exercising all the duties and obligations of independence, then 
it may decide through its elected assembly, and if necessary, through a referendum of its 
population, to become independent.10 After which, the Community would record its 
decision, and an agreement would regulate the conditions of transfer between the territory 
assuming its independence and following its own path, and the Community itself.
However, despite this French canvassing and manoeuvres to influence the referendum
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vote, there were some brave leaders in the colonies such as the trade unionist Sekou 
Toure of Guinea who seemed unfazed by this French blackmail. The referendum was 
held on 28 September 1958 in French Africa, as far as Djibouti and the Comoros. Most 
leaders in these French dependencies campaigned for the “Yes” vote, that is, to continue 
some affiliation with France in exchange for aid. Only Sekou Toure campaigned for the 
“No” vote, demanding complete independence or separation from France. Toure is told 
de Gaulle to his face that “we prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery.”11 Toure 
succeeded in his mission and Guinea vote “No.” The country was granted independence 
in October 1958. This, however, was granted with a vengeance by the French. The 
French are said to have removed everything as they left, even telephones were ripped off 
the walls.12 De Gaulle repeated his threat of cutting aid to Guinea.
Those territories that voted for affiliation with France celebrated the birth of the 
Community in Paris on 14 July 1959. De Gaulle gave each new head of state a French 
tricolour. Article 86 of the Community’s constitution stipulated that a member of the 
grouping could become independent, but ceased then to belong to the Community. The 
celebrations were shortlived as events soon revealed. In September 1959 after de 
Gaulle’s self-determination speech on Algeria, the African heads of the Community’s 
government asked de Gaulle to give them complete authority, as permitted under the 
constitution. Now, ideas of an Algerian settlement came to be linked to the whole 
question of the French presence in Africa. In December 1959 General de Gaulle visited 
West Africa and delivered a speech in Mali on the future of that territory, other members 
of the Mali Federation and the French Community as a whole, saying that he would 
support and aid them in their endeavour for independence, which de Gaulle himself 
preferred to call “international sovereignty.”13
Between June 1958 and the end of the year General de Gaulle paid five visits to Algeria. 
He used these visits to set out his policy in a series of characteristically lofty speeches 
and to establish personal contact with all shades of opinion, official and unofficial, 
European and Muslim, and with junior as well as senior officers of the Army. The broad 
outlines of his policy for Algeria were stated in his very first speech in Algiers to an 
enthusiastic crowd of Europeans, the Army and Muslims, de Gaulle raised his arms in a 
V sign and exclaimed, “I have understood you.”14 Then he went on to praise the army for 
its discipline and dedication in serving France. To the Muslims, he told them that from 
now onwards they were Frenchmen in the true sense of the word. In short, his policy for 
Algeria could be summarised as the attempt at a political solution by trying to win the 
nationalists back into the political arena by encouraging the candidacy of non-militants at 
the elections and so as to achieve peace. Simultaneously in the long term his Algerian 
policy was to press ahead with a great programme of economic and social reform based 
on the plans for capital development elaborated in a series of official studies since 1955.15 
To the settlers, army and Muslims alike the de Gaulle of June 1958 seemed the perfect 
man to address their various needs, but how mistaken they were.
c. De Gaulle and Algeria, May 1958 to January 1960
In the referendum of 26-28 September, in Algeria 79.7 per cent of registered electors
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voted, and 96.5 per cent of them voted “Yes.”16 This was in contrast to the vote in France 
where 22 million voted and 4.5 million were the “No” vote.17 This referendum as stated 
earlier also covered French Black Africa. What is also of significance to this referendum 
was that for the first time Muslim women had the franchise. Meanwhile, to counter some 
of de Gaulle’s initiatives the FLN announced the formation of a Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) or Government-in-Exile on 19 September 
1958 in Cairo. The GPRA established itself in Tunis and was headed by Ferhat Abbas 
whose statesmanship and moderation was renowned abroad. The GPRA was 
immediately recognised by more than a dozen states, which included the Arab States of 
the United Arab Republic (URA), Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia and Morocco. Britain and 
America did not recognise the new regime. France declared that recognition of the 
government-in-exile by any foreign state would be considered an “unfriendly” act.18 The 
creation of the GPRA was by far the best ever attempt by the FLN to create a broadly 
based leadership, taking into account regional, ethnic and educational diversity in the 
movement.
The September 1958 referendum gave birth to what came to be known as the Fifth 
Republic in France. It was officially established on 6 October 1958. It shifted the 
balance of governmental power in favour of the executive. There was now a strong 
Presidency and a weak legislature with the President nominating the Prime Minister, 
dissolving Parliament, and having power to rule by decree and appeal to the electorate 
through referenda. The President was to seek a fresh mandate after every seven years. 
More importantly, the Fifth Republic and its constitution now meant the end of France’s 
post-1945 political instability.
Following his success in the Referendum on his fourth visit to Algeria on 3 October 
1958, de Gaulle made one of his famous speeches at the city of Constantine on future 
economic, political and social development of Algeria. This was to be a five year root- 
and-branch programme that was to bring economic, social and political benefits to the 
Algerians. De Gaulle guaranteed the Muslims a statutory majority whereby Muslim 
deputies elected to the National Assembly in Paris should outnumber the Europeans by 
two to one. He further guaranteed to the Algerians ten per cent of the places in the 
military and civil services of the French State. In essence the salient features of the 
Constantine plan were that in five years France would have redistributed 250,000 
hectares of state lands to the Arabs, built 200,000 new houses for Moslems, created 
400,000 new jobs. Wages were to be improved to be in line or par with those of 
metropolitan France, while a massive programme of education expansion was announced 
in which two-thirds of Muslim children would have access to schooling.19 In Raymond 
Bett’s words the Constantine Plan was a modemisation plan of previously unimaginable 
proportions, which in two years led to impressive works projects, public housing and 
pipeline construction, and financial support for schools.20 Along the same lines, Charles 
Ageron states that the Plan meant a fantastic expenditure by France and resulted in a real 
rise in the standard of living for thirty per cent of Muslims living in the cities, and 
Europeans alike.21 Furthermore, in case of politics and administration, the number of 
Muslim servicemen and public employees went up to a point at which Muslim mayors 
outnumbered the French.22
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To most settlers, however, despite some benefits, the Constantine speech was unpalatable 
and attempts were made to protest against it. In the same vein, the FLN rejected the 
Constantine plan. On face value, one could think that the Constantine programme 
achieved its objectives, but what is important is that this was a programme conceived 
against the backdrop of decades of institutionalised inequality and mistrust between the 
two communities, French and Algerians, and was unlikely to reverse or hold the tide of 
nationalist sentiment. Even by the time the Constantine speech was made, de Gaulle’s 
policy on the future of Algeria was still not elaborated. Crucially important was that in 
all his speeches in 1958 he made the studious omission of any other precise forecast of 
the political future of Algeria other than a general reference to its remaining within the 
French Community. At the same time, post-May 1958 was the period when the Algerian 
problem moved to a higher level, from an internal French affair to a major international 
issue.
The year 1959 was significant in a number of ways. France still regarded the FLN as a 
“bunch of rebels” bent on violence while claiming to represent the majority of the 
Moslem population of Algeria, and in 1959 France’s army under Massu’s replacement 
Maurice Challe came as close as ever it would to ending the Algerian war militarily. 
Paradoxically, however though France had won the war in Algeria itself, there was the 
move from a military solution towards a political solution. 1959 was important for de 
Gaulle’s decision to move towards Algerian independence.
On 3 September 1959 the American President Dwight Eisenhower arrived in Paris for 
talks with President de Gaulle. Though not much was revealed in the joint communique 
issued at the end, it does appear that President Eisenhower did exert some pressure on the 
French leader to pursue a more liberal policy in Algeria so that negotiations could take 
place between the antagonists later. The visit aroused much speculation in London and 
Paris that President de Gaulle was about to make an important announcement on Algeria. 
The speculations were finally confirmed on 16 September 1959 when General de Gaulle 
addressed the nation via radio and television on Algeria’s future. For the first time de 
Gaulle uttered the words “self-determination” and said that peace must come first. This 
was part of what he said in his speech :
..../ deem it necessary that recourse to self-determination be here and now 
proclaimed. The question, obviously will be put to the Algerians as
individuals. There has never been, throughout recorded history, any 
Algerian unity or state, fa r  less any Algerian sovereignty.
He went on further to say that as for the time of elections ;
/  will decide upon it at the latest four years after the actual restoration o f 
peace ; that is to say once not more than 200 persons a year will lose their 
lives, either in ambushes or isolated attacks....But since fo r a year now it 
has been settled thcit-through the institutions o f equal rights, the single 
college, and the emergence o f a majority o f Muslim representatives-the 
political future o f Algerians is to depend on Algerians...what then could be 
the meaning o f rebellion?... Why then, should the odious strife and the 
fratricidal murders, which are still drenching the Algerian soil with blood
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continue } A
President de Gaulle then offered the Algerians three choices:
either-secession, “where some believe independence would be found. ”
France would then leave Algeria. “I am convinced personally that 
such an outcome would be incredible and disastrous...secession would 
carry in its wake the most appalling poverty, frightful political chaos, 
widespread slaughter, and soon after, the warlike dictatorship o f the 
communists... Those Algerians, regardless o f origin, who might wish 
to remain French, would do so in any case, and France would arrange 
if  need be, fo r  their regrouping and resettlement. On the other hand, 
the operation o f oil wells, the handling and shipping o f Saharan oil- 
which is the result o f French efforts, and which is o f interest to the 
whole Western world-would be ensured in any event. ” 
or-out-and-out identification with France (that is, integration), “such 
as is implied in equality o f rights: Algerians can accede to all political, 
administrative and judicial functions o f the state, and have free access 
to the public service... and become part and parcel o f the French 
people...
or-the government o f Algerians, backed up by French help, and in close 
relationship with her, as regards the economy, education, defence and 
foreign relations (that is, association). “In that case, the internal 
regime o f Algeria should be o f the federal type, so that the various 
commiinities-French, Arabs, Kabyle, Mozabite-who live together in the 
country, would find guarantees for their own way o f life, and a2 c ' 1
frameworkfor co-operation.
He then concluded by referring to the violence and turmoil in saying :
Unless it be the work o f a group o f ambitious agitators, determined to 
establish by brute force and terror their totalitarian dictatorship, and 
believing that they will one day obtain from the [French] Republic the 
privilege o f discussing with it the fate o f Algeria, thus building up these 
agitators into an Algerian government. There is not a chance that France 
would lend herself to anything so arbitrary. The future o f Algerians rests 
with Algerians, not as forced on them by knife and machine-gun, but 
according to the will which they will legitimately express through 
universal suffrage. With them and fo r them, France will see to the 
freedom o f their choice.26 
De Gaulle still hoped that any solution arrived at on the Algerian question would be one 
of association with France not full independence.
There is no doubt that de Gaulle’s speech and actions were contrary to the army’s wishes 
and expectations. Imposing his authority on the army de Gaulle is said to have angrily 
told Massu in September 1959 that “all the colonised peoples of the world were throwing 
off the yoke,” and added that : “You are not the Army for its own sake. You are the
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Army of France. You exist only through her, for her and in her service.” This clearly 
shows that de Gaulle was a step ahead of the army. After dithering for a while the FLN 
welcomed the speech as a positive step towards achieving peace. To the settlers and the 
French army in Algeria the speech was a fatal blow. The settlers viewed the speech as 
taking away their birthright as French citizens in Algeria. The army began to doubt the 
wisdom of fighting for a country that would later be given away. From then onwards the 
army and colons forged an “unholy alliance” to preclude any move of relinquishing 
Algerie francaise.
What came to be known as the barricades week began on 24 January 1960 and ended at 
the beginning of February. What lay at the heart of this rebellion was the 16 September 
speech of de Gaulle offering self-determination to Algeria. The European colons felt that 
they were being abandoned, and some sections of the army under General Massu tended 
to sympathise with them. They began to build barricades around the city of Algiers in 
protest. As days passed by the situation became tense all over the country and there were 
reports of skirmishes between the army and protestors. In one of these clashes nineteen 
people were killed and one hundred and forty-one were wounded. After de Gaulle’s 
radio and televised broadcast on 29 January 1960 which was relayed by Eurovision to 
listeners in Britain and most Western European countries, the barricades began to 
disintegrate. The general impact of de Gaulle’s speech was that it shifted military and 
public opinion in his favour. But it marked the end of whatever honeymoon de Gaulle 
had enjoyed in Algeria, and the beginning of the final run-in to independence.
d. Britain and Africa, May 1958 to January 1960
As stated earlier, the coming back to power of de Gaulle marked a new relationship 
between France and her African colonies. For instance in Septemberl958 he had offered 
the French Commonwealth free option of association or independence. A year later he 
shocked the French army and settlers by offering self-determination to the Algerians. 
French moves in her other African territories meant that Britain was now being left 
behind in the march towards decolonisation. Instead of taking the lead in withdrawal 
from Africa, Britain was now in danger of being one of the last, ahead only of the brutal 
and more repressive Portuguese. This section of the discourse deals with the evolution of 
British policy towards Africa in a space of about two years beginning in May 1958. As 
mentioned in chapter two, one of the central tenets of post-Second World War British 
colonial policy was planned evolution of the colonies towards self-government and 
ultimate independence. The international climate after May 1958 was to put this policy 
to the test, and it is part of the purpose of this section to investigate how British colonial 
policy adjusted in this changing international situation. By the second half of 1958, 
Britain still believed in this policy of controlled evolution of the colonies and further still 
believed that events could be controlled and managed for the benefit of Britain as she had 
various interests in various colonies. For instance, in some colonies London had to 
contend or deal with the question of the presence of large numbers of European settlers, 
and in others strategic considerations relating to British global influence during this era of 
Cold War rivalry involved the maintenance of military bases or rights.
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The year 1959 was crucial for British colonial policy makers and it became more clear 
that there was gradual flexibility sinking into British policy towards her colonies. The 
shift in British policy could be attributed to what was happening in the colonies 
themselves and the metropole. A combination of factors or events came into play and 
facilitated this colonial policy shift. In January 1959 the then Colonial Secretary Lennox- 
Boyd set dates for independence for East African colonies. Tanganyika was to achieve 
independence in 1970, Uganda in 1971, and Kenya in 1975.29 But within less than five 
years all these countries were independent, and it is part of this section to investigate why 
there was a sudden shift towards this trend.
By 1959 there was growing evidence that the colonial territories in Africa would soon be 
engulfed by the kind of large-scale unrest and turmoil which had swept across Asia at the 
end of the Second World War. The most striking example of this was to be found not in 
tropical Africa but in Algeria in the Muslim Mediterranean north, but the fierceness of 
the struggle there which had already, by 1958, brought down the Fourth Republic in 
France, seemed likely to encourage anti-colonial resistance elsewhere.30 In January of 
that year (1959) there were violent disturbances in Leopodville, which up to then was the 
tranquil Belgian Congo. In March 1959 two crises in British territories sent a clear 
message to London that not all was well in British Africa. In March, eleven of the 
thousand “hard-core” Mau Mau rebels still incarcerated were beaten to death at the Hola 
detention camp in Kenya. An inquiry was set up and the resulting White Paper, issued in 
June, condemned the lack of oversight at the camp.31 The Hola killings received wide 
coverage in the British press. Still in March in 1959, African nationalists in Nyasaland 
embarked on a campaign against repressive Southern Rhodesian policies, where the 
Federal government was based. Fifty-two Africans were killed and sixty-six members of 
the Nyasaland African National Congress party were detained, including the colony’s 
most prominent black leader, Dr. Hastings Banda.32 The Federal authorities then 
imposed a state of emergency. The British cabinet authorised a formal inquiry which 
resulted in the Devlin Report. The report was released in July and accused the colonial 
administration of running a “police state.”33 Meanwhile in May of the same year there 
had been an orchestrated campaign of violent intimidation directed against Asian traders 
in Uganda, and towards the end of the year there were serious riots in two urban areas in 
South Africa.34
There is no clear evidence to show that these incidents were in any way connected. In 
each case they were related to social grievances, particularly among residents of the 
towns, where unemployment was rife and living conditions appalling, but also to the lack 
of African representation in government. They continued well into the 1960s, however, 
and prompted Whitehall officials to think critically about colonial policy.
One of the initiatives that Macmillan undertook in 1959 was the creation of a Royal 
Commission under Sir Walter Monckton charged with investigating and reporting on the 
viability of the Central African Federation prior to the Constitutional Conference set for
1960. To the Central African settlers it was widely hoped that this constitutional review 
conference would lead to the white-dominated Federation’s full independence along the 
South African model. Despite heated opposition from Sir Roy Welensky, the European
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Prime Minister of the Federation, Macmillan was determined to send the Commission as 
he remarked that “ Unhappily, African opinion is all the time being inflamed.”35 In his 
brief to Monckton, Macmillan revealed his assessment of the problem :
...I am sure that this is one o f the most important jobs in our long history 
for, if  we fa il Central Africa to devise something like a workable multi­
racial state, then Kenya will go too, and Africa may become no longer a 
source o f pride or profit to the Europeans who have developed it but a 
maelstrom o f trouble into which all o f us will be sucked...The cruder 
concepts, whether o f the left or right, are clearly wrong. The Africans 
cannot be dominated permanently ( as they are trying to do in South 
Africa) without any proper opportunity fo r  their development and ultimate 
self-government. Nor can the Europeans be abandoned. It would be 
wrong for us to do so, and fatal fo r  African interests...36
One of the decisive factors in the evolution of British colonial policy after 1958 was the 
appointment of a new Colonial Secretary, in the person of Iain Macleod, following the 
October 1959 general election. Macleod was a passionate, forward-looking and 
committed liberal Tory, who despite back-bench revolt courageously presided over 
British withdrawal from the majority of its African territories. It appears that after the 
holding of the October 1959 general election which returned the Conservative Party to 
office with an increased majority, Macmillan was encouraged to approach the African 
problems with greater confidence and determination.
On 1 November 1959, Macmillan made the decision to visit Africa himself at the start of 
the new year. He then wrote the following informative message to Cabinet Secretary 
Norman Brook ;
Young people o f all Parties are uneasy about our moral basis. Something 
must be done to lift. Africa on to a more national plane, as a problem to 
the solution o f which we must all contribute, not out o f spite...but by some
' 37really imaginative effort...:
The African tour was to last six weeks and to cover Nigeria, Ghana, The Central African 
Federation and South Africa. The choice of South Africa raised a storm in the House of 
Commons. The country had come to occupy a unique position internationally because of 
its white supremacist racial policy of discrimination called apartheid adopted since 1948. 
In the House of Commons, the opposition Labour Party members of Parliament 
frequently challenged the Prime Minister to explain the purpose of his visit to South 
Africa. They argued that the Prime Minister’s proposed visit would be interpreted very 
frequently as meaning an endorsement of the apartheid system to which the moral 
conscience of the whole world was opposed.38 For instance in the House, the leader of 
the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell asked the Prime Minister that “in view of the 
repercussions, however, which the policy of apartheid has in other parts of the 
Commonwealth, will the Prime Minister urge upon the Prime Minister of South Africa 
the desirability of modifying that policy as soon as possible?”39 On the whole, the 
Opposition wanted Macmillan to declare himself against apartheid, by doing which he 
would be doing a great deal to strengthening the real bonds of the Commonwealth which 
were being weakened by this policy of racial discrimination.
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Meanwhile, in the course of 1958, Whitehall had initiated a major interdepartmental 
discussion of British colonial policy in Africa. On the eve of Macmillan’s tour, this 
culminated in an influential December 1959 Foreign Office memorandum entitled 
“Africa : The Next Ten Years.” The paper was to provide a framework for discussion 
between Britain and her Commonwealth and Western allies, namely France and the 
United States. It was to decide what attitude the West should adopt towards what it 
called the “rapid march of events in Africa.”40 The Foreign Office’s memorandum 
discussed the influences at work in the continent examining the Soviet penetration and 
the development of Pan-Africanism. On the former the paper stated that it was one of the 
negative influences at work in Africa. On this Soviet threat the paper commented that if 
the Western Governments appeared to be reluctant to concede independence to the 
African dependent territories, they might alienate African opinion and turn it towards the 
Soviet Union after independence. On Pan-Africanism the paper noted “one simple and 
recognisably common factor in the political ferment at work in all African territories 
today, namely, the desire on the part of Africans generally to be rid of external European 
domination and their belief in their right and ability to govern themselves.”41 According 
to this memorandum it was stated that the form and pace of constitutional advance in 
much of British East and Central Africa were likely to vary from those typical in other 
parts of Africa owing to the presence of considerable non-African settled communities on 
which most of these territories were largely dependent both economically and 
administratively 42
The Foreign Office paper went on to consider the next decade and set out the likely 
developments in the colonies. It drew pessimistic conclusions. In its general assessment 
of the future development of Africa, the memorandum concluded that Africa would 
become “Balkanised,” divided into a large number of independent states in which black 
people would have achieved de facto control and would have established governments 
which, though professing to be democratic, would in fact be largely authoritarian in their 
outlook.4'1 In East Africa by 1970 Tanganyika and Uganda would have attained internal 
self-government and Kenya would still being prepared for this process. But, owing to the 
backwardness of the majority of Africans in all three territories and the multi-racial 
nature of Kenya, in particular, British authority would remain and would still, in the last 
resort, prevail. In the case of Central Africa, the Foreign Office memorandum stated that 
while the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had considerable economic achievement 
to its credit, it was bedevilled by Africans fears being dominated by local Europeans and 
by European fears of being submerged by an “uncivilised” African nationalism. 4
The memorandum went on to state that if the following year’s Conference on the Central 
African Federation was a success, this would mean that by 1965 the Europeans would 
still be the main driving force of government in Southern Rhodesia, and the central 
Federal Government. The United Kingdom Government would still be in ultimate 
control of the Governments of the two Northern territories. In Northern Rhodesia, 
Africans would be playing an increasingly substantial part in the legislature as well as 
participating in the executive. In Nyasaland, Africans were likely to form an unofficial 
majority in the legislature and also playing a prominent part in the executive. The
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political situation would remain stable in the next five years. But, the Foreign Office 
cautioned that if the 1960 Conference failed to find a solution acceptable to both parties 
concerned (Africans and Europeans), the picture was likely to grow bleaker.
What was to be British interest in Africa in the next ten years? The memorandum 
concluded that Britain’s interest would be general ones such as those of the West, mainly 
the maintenance of peace and political stability in Africa, the exclusion of subversive 
influences and the encouragement of pro-Western sentiment. There was to be the 
maintenance and development of British trade with Africa and the encouragement of 
British investment. Britain was to ensure the safety and welfare of white settlers and 
other minorities in her former colonial territories and she also had to fulfil certain 
defensive requirements in Africa.45 For instance, Britain was to maintain in Kenya an 
element of the strategic reserve to reinforce the small detachment which could be quickly 
deployed in the Persian Gulf. And, in addition, Britain was to retain modest but equally 
important naval facilities at Mombasa. Britain was also to secure over-flying and staging 
rights in other parts of Africa such as Nigeria, Gambia, or Sierra Leone to serve as back­
up for East Africa, Middle East and South-East Asia 46 Finally, the way London handled 
constitutional advance and racial relations in Central Africa would be critical for the 
future interests of the United Kingdom and the West. If the “partnership” and 
“federation” experiment failed Southern Rhodesia might be forced into the orbit of the 
Union of South Africa, while the two northern territories in whole or part might join the 
African bloc north of the Congo river. Consequently, if Federation was maintained by 
force and without the consent of the African people, the Western position in black Africa 
would be seriously weakened.
Macmillan himself had maintained interest in the debate leading to the production of this 
Foreign Office memorandum. In a personal minute in July 1959 he minuted that 
“African problems will undoubtedly become more important to us in the next ten years 
and this was one of the few parts of the world in which the European powers still have 
direct influence.”47 He went on to state that he did not propose a quick readjustment of 
policies in Africa but it was time to start thinking of future policy. He further minuted 
that there was need to examine the relative success of the various Colonial systems in 
developing a type of African political system capable of standing on its own feet and 
favourably disposed towards the W est48 Plans for consultations with American, French 
and Belgian officials were drawn up in preparation for a new African initiative. The 
memorandum provided the Prime Minister with the briefing he required for his mission.
e. Britain and Algeria, May 1958 to January 1960
As the political turmoil in France reached a critical moment in the last week of May 
1958, most French newspapers were censored. For the British press, this was manna 
from heaven and they had a field day. British newspapers were in big demand in Paris as 
the French were starved of the news of the unfolding political crisis in their midst. Only 
the Manchester Guardian took advantage of this scenario and wrote directly to the 
French public. On 27 May 1958 the paper published its first leader in French, and this 
was later reproduced by Figaro and Le Monde 49 As the drama unfolded in the final
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week of May, each change and shift in the events dominated the front pages day by day 
of Fleet Street and special correspondents were despatched to every corner of France, 
who left no facet of this confused story unreported. Most of the British newspapers’ 
comments endeavoured to illuminate the complexities of the French situation and the 
personality of de Gaulle himself. Generally, British press reportage of the prospect of de 
Gaulle assuming the reins of power once again was mixed, ranging from pessimism to 
guarded optimism.
The Daily Herald warned of the menace of dictatorship in France if General de Gaulle 
returned to power. On Tuesday 26 May 1958, it advised de Gaulle to take “the only 
honourable course” and “renounce his bid for power.”50 This was a somewhat unrealistic 
advice in view of the momentum of events in France. The following day the paper 
headlined its leader “Betrayal.”51 In this article it argued that nothing could now disguise 
the fact that de Gaulle was thinking like a dictator. It went further to state that the pillars 
of freedom everywhere were shaken. The News Chronicle also warned that the danger 
with France was that the country was separated by one slip of the knife from military 
dictatorship. The Manchester Guardian argued that if the choice for France was between 
de Gaulle and civil war, then the former was preferable. But if the choice was between 
de Gaulle and parliamentary government, then every sound instinct would be for 
Parliament. The paper placed its hope in de Gaulle’s wish to come in by the “regular 
procedure.”
For its part the Daily Telegraph, though with some reservations welcomed de Gaulle’s 
emergence as a contender for power. It argued that his decision to form a government 
was “a constructive and welcome move.” It went further and stated that if the General 
did not exist, France would have to invent him. Nothing was to be gained by discussing 
de Gaulle in any other context than the collapse of normal parliamentary authority. The 
Daily Mail along the same lines as the Telegraph went further and stated that France 
under de Gaulle could stimulate Western thinking on world problems. The Daily Express 
for its part wrote that the news coming out of France of the political situation were 
inconclusive and as such this could only bring dismay to her friends. The Daily Mirror 
in its usual critical reportage stated that “no democratic newspaper and no democrat,” 
could possibly welcome the news that the sexagenarian General was poised to take over 
power in France with a blank cheque.52
In the House of Commons during Prime Minister’s Question time on 10 June 1958 the 
coming to power of General de Gaulle became a burning issue in which the Prime 
Minister was taken to task on the matter. Stephen Thomas Swingler asked the Prime 
Minister why he sent a message of congratulation to General de Gaulle on his investiture 
as French Prime Minister.5"5 On the same subject Konni Zilliacus asked the Prime 
Minister why, in view of the circumstances in which General de Gaulle acceded to 
power, he considered it desirable to send the General a message of congratulation 
couched in the particular term used.54 Standing in for the Prime Minister was R.A.Butler 
(Lord Privy Seal) who responded by saying that the Prime Minister’s message to his 
French counterpart was designed to accord with the spirit of friendship between Britain 
and France.55
i l l
Not at all amused by this answer Swingler supplemented his question by asking if the 
House was to take it that it was now routine custom for the Prime Minister to send a 
message of congratulation to all incoming Prime Ministers? He went further and asked if 
the Lord Privy Seal was aware that de Gaulle came to power as a result of a blackmailing 
threat of armed rebellion and immediately sent the French Parliament packing? How do 
congratulations serve the interest of either discretion or democracy.56 Butler responded by 
saying that there was nothing unprecedented or improper in the Prime Minister sending a 
message of congratulation to another Prime Minister, nor can he find anything that was 
open to criticism in the terms of the Prime Minister’s message. This was the typical 
Foreign Office answer avoiding the real issue at hand.
Now what was Whitehall’s official thinking now that de Gaulle was in power? The 
answers to this are quite revealing. It is quite clear that once it became apparent that de 
Gaulle would be the next leader of France, the Macmilllan administration expected quite 
a lot in his dealings with the Algerian problem and other Western alliance concerns. This 
was revealed by Macmillan’s personal letter to de Gaulle on 3 June 1958. Macmillan 
expressed the wish that the imminent visit by de Gaulle to Algeria be a success and hoped 
that it might lay the foundations for a satisfactory settlement of the North African 
problem.57 Macmillan noted that if de Gaulle could achieve such a settlement, the 
General would indeed have rendered a notable service, not only to France, but to the 
Western Alliance as a whole, whose interests are so bound up with the peaceful 
development of Africa and Asia. The Prime Minister went further and said that the 
British would certainly watch de Gaulle’s efforts to bring about an improvement in the 
situation in North Africa with every sympathy. Macmillan concluded by stating that 
Britain hoped that any solution to the North African problem would take into account the 
leading role France had played in that part of the world and must have regard for France’s 
special responsibilities and interests. From the above, it can be said that there was fairly 
general satisfaction in London about de Gaulle’s return to power.
Unlike London, Washington had extreme concerns about the return of de Gaulle to 
office. A Whitehall brief to Macmillan on 6 June 1958, as he was about to set out on a 
visit to the United States, cautioned him about the kind of atmosphere he was likely to 
encounter mainly on American views on the accession of de Gaulle to power. The brief 
also stated what kind of attitude or relationship Britain must adopt in dealing with France. 
On the first issue, the brief stated that the Americans were distrustful of de Gaulle and 
believed that his advent to power was bound to end disastrously for NATO,58 In the 
British view de Gaulle’s Government was faced with two main problems, namely, 
Algeria and the financial situation. It was argued that it was in British interests to help 
General de Gaulle as much as possible to solve the above two problems, so as to avert the 
consequences of an angry reaction against him by his disappointed compatriots. A 
positive solution to these obstacles, London believed, would be an inestimable service not 
only to France but to the whole alliance.
Macmillan was advised in the brief to dissuade the Americans from pushing France too 
far such as by demanding her to commit herself about her NATO and European policies.
112
Britain was to aim for a united stance in public, though just like the Americans the British 
had worries or reservations about French policy in NATO or anywhere else. The Prime 
Minister was also advised not to offer any advice about North Africa for the time being. 
This was because de Gaulle’s policy was not yet enunciated. But, Whitehall speculated 
on the likely course of de Gaulle’s North Africa policy. It was believed that de Gaulle 
was not likely to follow the wishes of the extremists in Algeria. His probable course was 
likely to favour a solution which he had always had in the past, in which Algeria would 
form a unit in a Federation which would include Morocco and Tunisia. Now that the 
latter two were independent, such ideas might be thought to be out of date. Nevertheless, 
Downing Street speculated that de Gaulle might still want to revive such ideas in some 
form or other.
The Prime Minister was to impress upon the Americans the importance of de Gaulle 
remaining in office. According to Her Majesty’s Government, if de Gaulle’s government 
collapsed the consequences would be dire. So, the Americans ought to be generous or 
supportive of him as they had been to his predecessors. On the Soviet threat, Macmillan 
was to disabuse the Americans of any ideas they might have had of France cohabiting 
with Moscow. In London’s view, Paris was well aware of the nature of the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union. So, de Gaulle’s experiment was to be helped or supported by his 
Western allies so as to succeed. The success would be measured by what the General 
was able to do with Algeria. In other terms, Britain regarded de Gaulle as the man of the 
moment who if steered in the right course could bring the Algerian problem to a 
resolution and result in France playing a vital role within the NATO alliance, more so 
that the Communist threat was escalating.
In its outlook of the political situation in Algeria and France, a British annual review 
report of 1958 on Algeria concluded that General de Gaulle enjoyed the confidence of the 
Moslem population in a way enjoyed by no other French leader since the outbreak of the 
rebellion.59 It went on to say that the new constitution offered some stability and 
removed the fear of sudden changes of direction which were inspired by the unstable 
French Governments of the Fourth Republic. But the report went further to state that 
most Algerians did not understand the sweeping economic projects of the Constantine 
programme.60 And for some reason, most Moslems had the blind hope that de Gaulle 
would somehow bring the war to an end in agreement with the FLN. This British annual 
review report ended in a sanguine note that whatever agreement de Gaulle reached with 
the FLN, he seemed certain of the wholehearted support of the entire Moslem population 
and possibly of a larger part of the European population,61 despite the continuing terrorist 
attacks.
After Michel Debre’s (French Prime Minister) visit to Britain in April 1959, the two 
countries agreed to hold official discussions about Africa twice a year.62 Interestingly, 
the discussions dealt in fact only with Africa south of the Sahara and specifically 
excluded Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria 63 These bipartite talks were thought to be very 
useful in bringing British and French policies in Black Africa generally into line.
On a stop over in London to Paris at the end of August 1959, President Eisenhower
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discussed Algeria with the British Prime Minister Macmillan at Chequers. President 
Eisenhower was going to Paris to urge President De Gaulle to take a definite action to 
end the Algerian conflict. In these discussions the American President stated that he 
would be willing to support the French over Algeria if they were proposing a reasonable 
policy to bring about a settlement in that colony.64 The President stated that he did not 
think and believe that a solution could be found only through military means. In 
response, Macmillan expressed sympathy for the French difficulties and dilemma in 
Algeria. The Prime Minister went on to say th a t:
They had a great record o f colonial achievement there. They had 
developed the country, and given its inhabitants the benefits o f education 
and. freedom from disease - with the result that the Arab population had 
risen from 3 million to 11 million. They now faced the difficult problem o f 
transition from dependence to self-government - a problem made even 
more acute by the presence o f one million French colons. They had to 
find, a way o f constitutional development suited to a multi-racial 
community - and the British knew, from experience, how difficult it was.
But the multi-racial state presented one o f the most urgent and important 
problems in Africa as a whole. It was not peculiar to Algeria; it 
confronted the United Kingdom also in East and Central Africa. It was 
vitally important that the attempts to solve this problem on a multi-racial 
basis should succeed. For, i f  they failed, there were only two alternatives 
: either the white settlers would assert their right to rule by force, or the 
Africans would assume power by violence.65 
As a further sign that Macmillan was very worried by this French agony he went on by 
saying to Eisenhower that: “We have our Algerias coming to us - Kenya and Central 
Africa.”66 Macmillan’s statements were made against the backdrop of British colonial 
embarrassments in March 1959, namely the Hola camp killings in Kenya and the 
Nyasaland (Malawi) riots. At the same time the Commonwealth Relations Office had 
warned that Britain could not sustain much longer the contradictions between “one 
person, one vote” in West Africa, and a multiracial balance weighted against blacks 
elsewhere.67
The 16 September 1959 speech on “self-determination” of Algeria was a turning point in 
France’s policy towards the North African colony. The interest that the speech attracted 
in the British press, government circles, and across the atlantic attested to this. In the case 
of the British press, the reportage ranged from unequivocal welcome of the speech to 
pessimism in some quarters. The Times reported on the 17 September 1959 that the 
importance of the speech, both in its international and national setting, was clearly likely 
to be great.68 Self-determination for Algeria had now been declared in the most solemn 
manner possible to be the main aim of French policy. Even more striking was the 
inclusion of secession among the choices which the Algerians would be called upon to 
make.69 In the same edition, The Times diplomatic correspondent reported that the 
Foreign Office gave an officially cautious welcome to President de Gaulle’s statement on 
Algeria, but there was no mistaking the real warmth with which the statement had in fact 
been greeted in London.70
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The Daily Telegraph reported that from Washington, President Eisenhower in his press 
conference had described General de Gaulle’s Algerian proposals as “constructive.”71 He 
said he was “greatly encouraged” by them, although he was quite sure they would be 
attacked by the extremists on both sides. He praised General de Gaulle for his initiative 
and said it was fully worthy of his efforts. The plan was completely in accord with the 
American position that the right to self-determination should be extended to all people. 
The plan was one which he believed the United States could support.
In its editorial comment the Daily Telegraph unequivocally welcomed the speech and 
singled out General de Gaulle for praise. The paper said that General de Gaulle had 
radically altered French policy in Algeria and this was shown by the warm welcome 
President Eisenhower gave the new offer. The Telegraph argued that from now onwards 
there should be no further question about the correct policy for the United States and 
United Kingdom to adopt at the United Nations. They should concentrate every shred of 
influence they could muster in marshalling maximum support for France. The paper went 
further and stated that the FLN should be left in no doubt that the General’s offer 
appeared fair and just to world opinion of all races. One of the virtues of the plan, argued 
the Daily Telegraph was that it did not appear to require any humiliating surrender from 
the rebels such as raising a white flag and admitting defeat in Paris. What they had to do 
was to reduce the scale of killings to below two hundred a year. The article further 
argued that, if the FLN had any prudence left, or any confidence in the validity of its own 
claims to speak for the Algerian people, it would be well advised to take advantage of 
this piece of inspired political conjuring. For in effect the General was showing the rebels 
how to change from outlaws into legitimate politicians without anybody noticing the 
transformation. The Telegraph editorial comment went further and stated that, when it is 
recalled that fifteen months ago General de Gaulle was swept to power to the cry of 
Algeria Francaise, his offer now of independence was little short of miraculous. And 
having been brought to power by the Army and the settlers it was feared that General de 
Gaulle would remain their captive. In proving these past fears false the General made it 
possible that hopes about the future of Algeria would at last turn out to be true.
For its part the Guardian was not so welcoming, but instead questioned the premise of 
President de Gaulle’s offer. The paper stated that the last of the three choices offered to 
the Algerians was evidently not exactly that of a member-state of the French community 
though it resembled it. The President described it as “government of the Algerians by the 
Algerians supported by French aid and in close union with her for economic policy, 
education, defence, and foreign relations.”72 It thus appeared that the only form of self- 
government that the President was offering Algeria would differ from that of, say, 
Madagascar or Senegal, in that the internal arrangements of Algeria would have to be 
approved by France, whereas this was not the case with the Constitutions of the member- 
states of the French Community. The Guardian stated further that, earlier in his speech 
de Gaulle had accepted the view of those French historians who had always stressed the 
lack of continuous Algerian State in the past. So, according to the paper, the offer he was 
making was an alternative to independence and to integration but one which lacked 
attraction for those young Algerians who insisted upon their desire to be a nation, 
whether or not they had been one in the past. The Daily Herald dismissed the speech
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saying that the only development in de Gaulle’s plans for Algeria in it was the promise 
“to consult Algeria about its future within four years of the end of the fighting between 
French troops and rebels.”73 Implied in the paper’s article was that the statement 
indicated no change of French policy towards Algeria.
Now, what were Whitehall’s reaction to the September speech on self-determination? As 
soon as De Gaulle finished the speech, Ambassador Jebb wired the Foreign Office and 
stated the following as his immediate reactions. “The speech was magnificently 
delivered and, so far as it went convincing.”74 Then, he went on and stated his main 
deductions which were:
The General has written off the FLN as hopeless and is attempting to 
appeal over their heads to the Algerian Moslems. As expected, he 
offered the Algerians as a whole complete independence at the end o f 
period o f up to four years from the time pacification is achieved, if  they 
so desired. But i f  they do choose independence it is clear that anyone 
who wants to remain French (and more especially the “Colons") will 
be “regrouped, ” while in all events France will hang on to the oil o f 
the Sahara. The prospect o f independence is thus not very alluring and 
no doubt much will be made o f this by the critics o f French policy. Of 
the two other alternatives, union with France was described in glowing 
terms and the prospect o f autonomy within the French community was 
tempered by the statement that in that event ufederalismi ” would have 
to be imposed in Algeria in order to guarantee the rights o f the various 
communities. In my own view this praise o f “integration” (as it has 
been called up to now) was made to please the French right-wing and I 
doubt whether the General really thinks it is a likely development. On 
the other hand, if  he wants to induce the Moslems to accept autonomy 
he is presumably counting on the internal differences in Algeria 
between Kabyles, Arabs and so forth overcoming the tendency towards 
union which is naturally the objective o f the FLN. In any case the 
General throughout directly contested any claim that Algeria as such 
might have to be considered as a nation. It is clear that there will be 
few critics o f the General’s proposals in France, and possibly even not 
many in Algeria. Whether it will convince neutral opinion is perhaps 
more doubtful. On the one hand it is obvious that the General could 
not have gone much further than he did... But I imagine that, i f  the 
United States Government are prepared to bless his programme, there 
will not now be much danger o f a two-thirds majority against France in 
the United Nations.75
On 17 September 1959, Jebb again wrote to the Foreign Office on the speech. He stated 
that De Gaulle’s categorical acceptance of “self-determination” was in any case a major 
step forward in the evolution of French policy and thinking on Algeria.76 Equally 
important was acceptance of the possibility of independence, even though the General 
preferred to regard this as “secession” and depicted it in luridly pessimistic terms. Jebb 
then went on and considered the prospects for a cease-fire and said:
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The major criticism o f de Gaulle's approach, however valid and 
understandable his reasons, is that he refuses to take account o f the 
reality o f the FLN as leaders o f the rebellion. Indeed (as I have said) it 
looks as if he has given them up as a bad job. His categorical refusal 
to negotiate with them politically (based on the unexceptionable 
principle that only free Algerian elections could qualify them as a 
representative), the excessively disobliging tone adopted towards them 
and the oblique way in which his last year’s cease-fire offer is reviewed 
all make it difficult, i f  not impossible, to see how the FLN could be 
expected to stop fighting and descend into the Algerian political arena.
Perhaps de Gaulle hopes to split the rebel leadership, there is certainly 
much rumoured dissension amongst them; more likely, however, he is 
not thinking in terms o f an immediate cease-fire but hopes that as 
military pacification continues, so disaffection amongst the rebels and 
between them and the civil population will spread and peace thus 
gradually return. His own criterion for the re-establishment o f peace is 
a maximum o f 200 dead within a year. On present form, such a figure
77  'seems still fa r  from achievement.
Jebb concluded his despatch with the following summary:
We presumably welcome wholeheartedly the principles now enunciated 
by de Gaulle. His ultimate objective, if attainable, is equally the most 
desirable for the West. In the immediate future, therefore, I 
recommend that we should do all we can to help him, particularly at 
the United Nations. We should not, however, delude ourselves that the 
statement makes much more likely any rapid end to the fighting, failing 
some total collapse o f the FLN, which is I  suppose always conceivable. 
Disheartening as this prospect may seem, it is nevertheless o f major 
importance that French policy should now at least be directed by a 
man pursuing a clearly expressed and consistent aim.78
From Algiers, Her Majesty’s Consul General reported to the Foreign Office that the 
speech was received in complete calm.79 First reactions are expected criticism by the 
Right Wing Echo d ’Alger opposing self-determination as rejection of election and 
referendum of the past year, and unconstitutional as risking integrity of the Republic.80 
Categoric rejection of negotiation with the FLN as mentioned in the speech was 
welcomed.
Meanwhile, in London the Foreign Office released the following statement to the press 
regarding de Gaulle’s speech:
Her Majesty’s Government have read the statement made by President 
de Gaulle about Algeria with the greatest attention. They welcome it 
as a statement o f policy o f the highest importance. It is their earnest 
hope that the policy announced by the President will bring peace to 
Algeria and lead to a settlement which is in accord with the desires 
both o f the people o f Algeria and France. It is clearly in the general
S1interest that such a settlement should be reached.
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Meeting the French ambassador Jean Chauvel on 4 November 1959, Harold Macmillan 
had this say about the French leader, “although President de Gaulle might fall over 
Algeria no-one else could possibly succeed.”96 This was clear endorsement of the French 
President by the British Prime Minister. After de Gaulle’s West African tour in 
December 1959, Foreign Office advisors wanted the Prime Minister, on the eve of his 
own visit to Africa, to personally congratulate the General on his successful mission. 83 
The British Government viewed the General’s success in West Africa as having 
contributed enormously to the prospects of a peaceful evolution in French African States, 
which was a Western as well as a French interest. Though liking to be congratulated by 
the British, de Gaulle was very sensitive to any suggestion that the French Community 
was developing or evolving along Commonwealth lines. He intensely disliked or 
resented the comparison and insisted that the Community was entirely a product of the 
French national genius.
The events of the “week of the barricades” daily dominated the front pages of the 
Manchester Guardian, as it followed the twists and turns of this episode. Though the 
Algerian situation during the week of the barricades did cause some alarm both in 
London and Washington, it does appear from the former that the authorities were 
unexcited by the whole Algiers uprising. It appears that British officials had sufficient 
confidence in de Gaulle’s popularity, ability and resolve to deal with the situation. This 
thinking was expressed in most of Ambassador Jebb’s reports to the Foreign Office.84 
These reports gave factual information of what was happening on a daily basis, but 
seemed not to interest the Foreign Office that much as no detailed comments or position 
paper was produced on the likely wider political implications.
f. Conclusion
The coming back to power in May 1958 of General Charles de Gaulle and the adoption of 
a new constitution, that established the Fifth Republic ushered in a new era in France’s 
domestic and overseas politics. The new constitution created stability and brought to an 
end the perennial problems of government changes that were the hallmarks of the Fourth 
Republic. De Gaulle was now able to bring civil-military insubordination under control 
and this enabled him to carry forward whatever policies that he envisaged for colonial 
problems. In the case of Africa, he overtook Britain in the move towards decolonisation. 
In the much more controversial case of Algeria, his policy was less clear-cut. 
Nevertheless it was clear from the outset that he was determined to put an end to this 
“war without a name,” and so enable France to break out of the position in which she had 
found herself since Suez, vainly endeavouring to equate the battle with the Fin with the 
defence of the West. While still resentful of hostile international opinion, and resistant to 
international pressure, he began to work towards a solution acceptable to all but the 
diehards of “Algeriefrancaise”
It is in between the advent of de Gaulle to power and the declaration of his Algerian 
policy, that we locate the evolution of British colonial policy in Africa. 1959 was a 
critical year which saw the creation of the Monckton Commision on the Central African
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Federation, the decision of the Prime Minister to visit Africa, and the preparation of the 
Foreign Office memorandum setting out the prospects for the future, as a brief for 
Macmillan on his visit. The British position towards France and the Algerian problem 
from May 1958 to January 1960 was mixed. Whereas within Downing Street the feeling 
appeared to be one of welcoming de Gaulle back to public office and having confidence 
in him, there were still dissenting voices in London. This was reflected by the various 
reportage across Fleet Street and debates in the House of Commons. From Paris, 
Gladwyn Jebb was cautious about de Gaulle’s speech on self-determination, arguing that 
it seemed to exclude the FLN from the political process. Official British talks with the 
new French government did not deal with Algeria, but concentrated on French Black 
Africa. Nevertheless, in conversation with Eisenhower, Macmillan showed himself 
aware of the comparison between Algeria and “our Algerias,” Kenya and Central Africa. 
There can be no doubt that Algeria was very much on the Prime Minister’s mind as he 
prepared for his visit.
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CHAPTER 7
THE END OF THE WAR, JANUARY 1960 TO EVIAN 1962
a. De Gaulle and Africa, January 1960 to Evian 1962
The year 1960 was important and a turning point for most of French Africa. With 
unimaginable speed, what were formerly French dependencies and members of the 
Community had in the course of 1960 become independent states under African majority 
rule. The French Community as originally constituted became moribund and ultimately 
relegated to the dustbin of history. France now entered into a new relationship with her 
former colonies. This entailed agreements on political, economic, military, financial and 
cultural cooperation. The stage for the fragmentation of the French Community into 
independent states was set in motion by Mali which in the summer of 1959 sought 
independence in confederation with France.1 France accepted this request in December 
1959 and negotiations with Mali soon began. No doubt, this was bound to set off a chain 
reaction as much in French Equatorial as in French West Africa and it is partly this, that 
this section of the discussion investigates, that is, how the rapid movement and 
momentum of events came about.
A hint in France’s change or shift of policy towards French Black Africa was made by de 
Gaulle at Castres on 26 February 1960 when he said the following :
Our country wants to marry the times in which it lives. We must be 
different with the countries we colonised formerly. They want freedom.
France takes the consequences in a new manner-in the Community in 
which everyon e has his place, freely working for the common good}
In April 1960, France signed with the Mali Federation and Madagascar the necessary 
constitutional instrument for their independence. In preparation for these territories 
independence, Article 86 of the Community’s constitution was amended on 4 June 1960. 
It now stipulated that “A member state of the Community can likewise become 
independent through a special agreement, without ceasing to belong to the Community.”3 
This was contrary to the original Article 86 which as mentioned in the previous chapter 
stipulated that a member of the Community could become independent, but ceased then 
to belong to the Community, Despite some of the French Community’s territories 
demand for independence, they still did not want to sever ties with the metropole and 
wanted to collaborate with her. This was illustrated on 9 June 1960 in the National 
Assembly when Mamadou Dia of Senegal called for a close Franco-African relationship 
on new terms. He said th a t:
This is the occasion to render solemn homage to France which has known 
how to keep all the promises it made including the absolute duty to 
decolonise and the imperative o f cooperation. France is in the process o f 
succeeding in the best possible way in her mission as tutor.4 
De Gaulle continued once again to indicate that France was on the verge of a new era in 
her relationship with her colonies. On 14 June 1960, he spoke of the great movement
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stirring Africa, the spirit of the century, saying that it would be useless to enumerate the 
causes of the evolution which had led France to put an end to colonisation. Because of 
the progress made, France had granted self-determination, for to refuse it would be to 
contradict the French ideal, to start endless struggles, and to draw down on France the 
censure of the world.
The spirit under which the African territories that were to be granted independence were 
to relate with France after this was summarised in a letter by Michel Debre (prime 
minister) to Leon M ’ba of Gabon on 15 June 1960. It does appear that it was not a wish 
on France’s part for this to happen, but an expectation that it would. The letter read thus: 
We give independence on condition that the state once independent 
engages itself to respect the co-operation agreements it first sigjis. There 
are two systems that come into play at the same time: Independence and 
co-operation agreements. One does not go without the other...1 will be 
obliged if you would please, in acknowledging receipt o f this 
communication confirm to me that on the proclamation o f independence 
by the Republic o f Gabon, the government o f the Gabonese Republic will 
proceed to the signature o f co-operation agreements...5
Immediately after this, the Mali Federation became independent on 20 June 1960 and hot 
on its heels was the independence of Madagascar on 26 June 1960. As it turned out, this 
now had unleashed an unstoppable rush towards independence in Black Africa. August 
1960 proved to be a watershed as Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), 
Ivory Coast (Cote d’Ivoire), Chad, Central African Republic, French Congo, and Gabon 
became independent.6 They were subsequently followed by Mauritania in November
1960. This completed de Gaulle’s “wind of change” in French Africa. De Gaulle had 
transformed, within the space of two years of coming back to power, the political 
geography of colonial Africa. In September 1960 more than a dozen new African states 
entered the United Nations, almost all of them francophone or sympathetic to France.
Now with French Africa decolonised, the period between 1960 and 1962 was marked by 
the signing of co-operation agreements between France and her former colonies. The 
agreements were either bilateral or multilateral, that is, organised on a regional basis. 
These accords covered economic, financial, political, military and technical questions. 
The policy of co-operation with Black Africa became one of the basic aspects of de 
Gaulle’s overseas policy. The co-operation agreements thus guaranteed France most of 
the important rights she formerly held as a colonial power. For illustrative purposes, here 
follows what some of the accords dealt with. On political matters, there was to be 
exchange of information between France and the signatory state, but also consultation in 
issues of foreign policy.7 The corollary effect of this was that it allowed France to 
organise bloc votes at fora such as the United Nations, that is, support of French 
positions.
On economic aspects the co-operation agreements provided for French financial aid for 
the economies of the signatory states. The signatory states were accorded mutual 
preferential treatment in trade matters. Most of the countries signing the accords joined
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the Franc Zone, so their currencies were tied to the French Franc, and therefore to the 
Bank of France.8 In case of military agreements they provided for defence accords, 
technical and military assistance agreements, and base rights in francophone Africa. In 
some instances they also covered the transfer of primary resources and strategic minerals, 
obliging the signatory state not only to give France priority in the purchase of such 
resources, but also, where relevant, to buy certain products from France rather than turn 
to other trade partners.9 The granting en masse of independence to the French dominions 
in French West and Equatorial Africa including the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar 
had far-reaching international effects for European colonialism in Africa. With French 
Africa liberated, de Gaulle could now turn his full attention to the Algerian problem still 
with no end in sight.
b. De Gaulle and Algeria, January 1960 to Evian 1962
As alluded to in the previous chapter, the week of the barricades was the moment when 
the Algerian opposition to Algerian independence came out into the open, and began to 
organise itself against the government, thus weakening de Gaulle vis-a-vis the FLN. As 
far as de Gaulle’s opponents in the army and among the colons were concerned, the week 
of the barricades was counter-productive: because it so obviously threatened his position, 
it pushed him towards Algerian independence, and his broadcast of November 1960. 
Despite the fact that after the barricades week de Gaulle increased his rhetoric against the 
FLN, there were also signs that he was willing to establish some contacts with them. In 
March 1960, France attempted to drive a wedge between the FLN inside the country and 
those in exile. The French established contacts with representatives of Wilaya four 
leadership south of Algiers to negotiate the Algerian question. The head of this Wilaya 
was Si Saleh. Though the details of what these early contacts achieved are sketchy, it 
does appear that they established the basis for the subsequent talks which took place at 
Melun in June I960. An analogy could be made to the Zimbabwean situation in March 
1978 when the British government and Ian Smith concluded talks with Abel Muzorewa 
for the so-called “internal settlement” excluding the main nationalist movements of the 
country, the Zimbabwe African National Union-ZANU (PF) and the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union-ZAPU (PF) of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nlcomo respectively. These 
Algerian men who entered talks with the French were disillusioned with the GPRA and 
viewed it as a clique of high-living bureaucrats and power-hungry officers, all looking for 
their own advancement at the expense of the majority of the people.10 From their point of 
view, those who were internal, should be the ones to determine the timing and conditions 
of negotiations since they bore the brunt of fighting. Probably, they were still clinging to 
the Soummam recommendations, which as stated earlier on were overturned by the 
CNRA meeting in Cairo in July 1957.
After some prevarication on de Gaulle’s part, he accepted the inevitable when on 14 June 
1960 he broadcast an invitation to the GPRA to come to France to discuss a ceasation of 
hostilities. Eleven days later, the first official FLN delegation ever to go to France began 
meetings with their counterparts at the town of Melun, south of Paris. The Melun talks 
were held between 25 June and 29 June 1960. Whereas the French insisted on a cease­
fire before everything, avoiding the core issue which was complete withdrawal from
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Algeria, the FLN countered this by arguing that cease-fire was part of a comprehensive 
settlement of the Algerian issue. On 29 June the talks reached a stalemate and broke 
down with very little progress having been accomplished. As in most liberation wars, 
most of the men who took part at Melun were within a year killed by their compatriots, 
possibly for “betrayal of the struggle” or being “traitors.”
Failure of the Melun talks was a welcome development by hard- liners on both sides of 
the conflict. In case of the FLN there was the intensification of terrorist attacks, while for 
the Europeans those who had been arrested for January 1960 insurrection now turned into 
martyrs. De Gaulle now saw that he was likely to lose the initiative so he embarked on a 
series of steps that would pave the way for actual negotiations for a permanent 
settlement. On 4 Novemberl960 in a television broadcast de Gaulle said he looked 
forward to an Algerian Republic in future. Though his speech fell short of offering 
complete independence to Algeria and still hoped that a settlement would be one dictated 
by his own terms; he took the first steps towards that independence when he established a 
Ministry of Algerian Affairs headed by the liberal Louis Joxe. In the same month 
(November) de Gaulle hinted that in the not too distant future he would call a referendum 
of the Algerian and French electorates on the idea of self-determination.
It was announced on I December 1960 that the referendum would be held on 8 January
1961. It was further announced that President de Gaulle would visit Algeria soon to 
prepare for this referendum, and this he did early in December. The FLN denounced this 
referendum as one in the many steps of France’s attempt to impose its will and solution to 
the Algerian question. De Gaulle’s visit to Algeria provided both the FLN and colons the 
opportunity to flex their muscles in demonstrating how much each party had in terms of 
followers. As always intransigently opposed to de Gaulle’s Algeria policy, the European 
settlers called a general strike to protest against the President’s presence in the country. 
They managed to organise a series of demonstrations which in their course increasingly 
became violent. The Europeans vented their fury against everyone including the police 
whose cars were pelted with every missile at their disposal. The demonstrations and 
strikes spread to different parts of the country. On 10 December 1960 in Algiers, in the 
working suburb of Belcourt, a European was reported to have attempted to force a 
Muslim shopowner to close his business in observance of the strike. 15 The Muslim 
shopowner defied the order, the European then fired. This sparked the first Muslim 
counter-demonstration, European cars were smashed or burned in the streets. Word 
spread among the Muslims and disturbances began in other areas. Arab demonstrators 
carried the green-and white flags resembling that of Abdelkader’s shortlived state in the 
nineteenth century. There were also banners inscribed with phrases like “The FLN will 
win” and “Abbas to power”; everywhere there were cries of “long live Ferhat Abbas.”12 
Similar Muslim demonstrations occurred in the European strongholds of Oran and Bone. 
In response, the French troops opened fire on the demonstrators resulting in the death of 
sixty people, of whom six were Europeans and fifty-four were Muslims.13 Once again a 
French officer was said to have commented: “We’ve just suffered a diplomatic Dien Bien 
Phu.” All these disturbances compelled de Gaulle to cut short his visit.
Despite these Muslim and European manifestations de Gaulle did not hesitate, and
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proceeded with the referendum. This was held as scheduled on 8 January 1961. The 
electorate was asked if they approved of “the plan submitted to the French people by the 
President of the Republic concerning the self-determination of the Algerian population 
and the organisation of the public powers in Algeria prior to self-determination.”14 There 
were two articles in the law. The first stated that once the security situation improved, 
the Algerians would be allowed to vote for the political future they desired to develop 
with France. The second prescribed that in the meantime, through decrees, the French 
government should provide for the restructuring of the Algerian government so that it 
could cater for or devolve power in the running of affairs to the Algerians. This was to 
be executed through federal and departmental assemblies, the ultimate goal being to 
promote cooperation between the two societies. New bodies were to be set up and these 
were to provide guarantees for the two communities and deal with other matters which 
affected both Algeria and France.
The FLN appealed to its followers to abstain from the poll, and despite the army’s 
intimidation it does appear that the call was heeded. In metropolitan France 15,196,668 
people voted yes, 4,995,912 voted no, and there were 6,389,428 abstentions.15 In Algeria 
1,749,969 persons cast yes votes as opposed to 767,566 who voted no. Still in Algeria 
there were 1,775,142 abstentions and 109,913 blank ballot papers, which in percentage 
terms was 42 per cent of the electorate.16 For illustrative purposes, there were some areas 
in Algeria which recorded higher percentages of abstention; Setif, Ferhat Abbas’s home 
town and Constantine recorded 51 and 53 per cent respectively. Martin Stone has argued 
that this plebiscite result was rendered questionable by the high abstention rate.17 Overall, 
the results show that 56 per cent of the registered voters in Algeria bothered to vote and 
75 per cent of these gave de Gaulle’s proposals an overwhelming thumbs up. If the two 
results in metropolitan France and Algerian are put together, one can see that the 
Europeans in Algeria were in a minority, not only against the Muslims in Algeria, but 
against the Europeans in France. However questionable Stone may think the outcome in 
Algeria was, de Gaulle won an unquestionable majority overall - a nice use of the fact 
that Algeria was constitutionally part of France to turn the tables on those who demanded 
that it should remain so. Now, we can see quite clearly why the generals and their 
partisans concluded that revolt was their only option.
General de Gaulle’s Algeria policy was once again put to the test in April 1961. Exiled 
Generals Raoul Salan, retired chief of staff Marie-Andre Zeller, General Edmond 
Jouhaud and Maurice Challe mounted an Army putsch on 22 April 1961. Salan and 
Challe had been commanders-in-chief in Algeria. The former had been forced into 
retirement from the army earlier as a result of his anti-Gaullist pronouncements. In 
December 1960 he sought refuge in Spain. The latter could be described as “hero turned 
villain,” the general who nearly totally won the war in Algeria for France, having been 
brought in during the critical period after the 13 May 1958 events, and by the turn of 
1960 having “pacified” most parts of Algeria. During the barricades week in 1960, 
Challe’s credibility and conduct was doubted by his bosses in Paris and consequently he 
lost the confidence of de Gaulle. He was transferred to Central Europe to be commander 
of the NATO forces. In Algiers he was replaced by General Crepin. Though Challe’s 
transfer was some kind of promotion, he left as a bitter man because he thought his
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devoted career in Algeria and his so-called “Challe plan” to pacify the trouble spots in 
Algeria had been unceremoniously disrupted.
Challe resigned altogether from the army in March 1961. Historian Irwin Wall has 
argued that Challe left because he was disturbed by learning that de Gaulle’s policies in 
Algeria had become part of a grand design to break with the United States, construct an 
independent nuclear force, and weaken NATO alliance.18 Furthermore, according to 
Wall, the three other generals apparently shared Challe’s illusion that the United States 
would help France to keep Algeria if France gave up its nuclear weapons and accepted 
integration with NATO; the four generals justified their seizure of power in Algiers by 
claiming that they had prevented Mers-el-Kebir from becoming a Soviet base.19 In other 
words, they considered their action necessary to keep Algeria for vital Western interests 
in the Cold War supremacy.
Following the basically civilian “week of barricades,” the revolt was the consequence of 
the generals’ disillusionment with the policy of self-determination for Algeria. They 
viewed this policy as France’s abandonment of her military and political obligations to 
the European population in Algeria. The order of the generals established a state of siege 
throughout Algeria and pronounced that anyone who had directly taken part in plans for 
the abandonment of the colony would be brought before a military court. The order went 
further and stated that “all resistance would be broken from wherever it came.”20 On the 
first day of the uprising, parachute units were brought into the capital, Algiers, and 
started occupying strategic positions in official buildings such as the Delegation-General, 
post and telegraph offices, and the radio station, which was renamed “Radio France.” The 
Delegate-General and his commander-in-chief General Gambiez were all put under 
arrest.
Leaders of the rebellion now started to make calls around the country to win over 
provincial commanders to their cause. At the heart of this rebellion was a new French 
right-wing body, the Secret Army Organisation (OAS). On 23 April 1961, de Gaulle 
broadcasted a message denouncing the insurgents and referred to them as a quartet of 
retired army generals backed by a group of ambitious and fanatical officers. He went on 
and said, “in the name of France, I order that every means, I repeat every means, shall be 
employed to bar the road to these men, pending their overthrow. I forbid any Frenchman, 
and first of all any soldier, to obey their orders.21 Once again de Gaulle’s oratory paid 
off. After this impassioned plea to the troops the Algiers mutiny crumbled on 25 April
1961. There now followed a purge of senior army officers in Algiers. Challe and Zeller 
were the first among a number of senior officers to be arrested. Salan and others 
managed to go underground. Though some people were killed as a consequence of this 
revolt, what was astonishing was that the insurgents actions amounted to high treason, 
but at their subsequent trial the prosecution did not make any effort to demand the death 
penalty, once again putting the French judicial system on the spotlight for collusion. 
Challe and Zeller were sentenced to fifteen years in prison, but the sentences began to be 
progressively reduced until they were acquitted. One of the factors that caused the April 
uprising to falter and collapse was that all wings of the French army, the air force, navy 
and infantry refused to rally behind the insurgents.
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During this Algiers revolt, rumours abounded in Paris that the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) was behind Challe and his group. Paris took these unproven charges 
seriously. Alistair Horne has stated that there is no doubt that during his stint at NATO 
headquarters Challe did make firm friends of a number of high-ranking United States 
generals, who (Americans) made no secret of their hatred of what de Gaulle was doing to 
NATO....and went so far as to express enthusiasm for anyone who might rid France of 
her turbulent president, or, at least, force him to change his tune.22 Washington 
vehemently denied the charges of involvement and found them to be absurd. Though the 
United States had not been supportive of previous French policy in Algeria they 
supported de Gaulle on the basis that he represented legitimate political rule in France. 
Moreover, the new President John F. Kennedy (inaugurated January, 1961) had as young 
Democratic Party Senator for Massachussetts, been a leading figure since 1957 in the 
Senate advocating Algerian independence. So, it is hard for one to believe that he might 
have supported the Algiers revolt because the generals were totally opposed to Algerian 
independence. In actual fact it is claimed that the American official position was the 
opposite of what was suspected. Kennedy instructed his Ambassador in Paris General 
James Gavin to put American naval units at France’s disposal and to suppress the rising if 
it tried to spread to Paris.20 C.L. Sulzberger has argued that this flurry of rumours of 
American involvement in the revolt emanated from the Soviet press and was then 
propagated and given credence by anti-American forces in France such as Le Monde 
newspaper.24
Though the end of the rebellion did bring the army under civilian authority, the OAS 
terror continued right up to the negotiations between the French government and the 
GPRA representatives, which took place against this background. These negotiations 
centred on the definition of an “Algerian Algeria.” Despite de Gaulle’s proclamation of 
an “Algerian Algeria” late in 1960, it appears that he meant something different from 
what the FLN perceived to mean. The French leader still hoped to achieve a settlement 
fashioned in his own style, and by the way he still did not recognise the FLN as the 
legitimate representative of the aspirations of the Algerian people. At the end of 1960, 
Paul Delouvrier was replaced by Jean Morin as the Delegate-General. Part of Morin’s 
brief was to reorganise the government institutions in Algeria on the basis of an 
“Algerian Algeria.” To Morin this meant a political entity with its own personality, in 
association with France, based on domestic structures of power sharing between the 
Europeans and moderate Muslims outside the FLN.25 The end product of this, it was 
hoped, would be to present the FLN during negotiations with a fa it accompli of a Muslim 
power structure in cooperation with France, It was further hoped that the FLN would 
find this French creation difficult to dismantle but instead join to work within it. The 
result would be a weakening of the FLN obliging it to work within this establishment as 
one among the many parties. This French grand plan failed as subsequent developments 
would reveal.
Though the army had been brought under control, the OAS continued to exist, and 
embarked on a terrorist campaign that formed the background against which the final 
negotiations for Algerian independence were conducted. These had resumed shortly after
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the January referendum, in Switzerland in February 1961, between de Gaulle’s confidant 
Georges Pompidou and the Algerian lawyer Ahmed Boumendjel (who had been at the 
Melun talks). Simultaneously de Gaulle invited President Bourguiba of Tunisia to Paris 
for discussions. Bourguiba, who after the meeting left for Rabat, Morocco for the funeral 
of King Mohammed V, which the GPRA delegation led by Ferhat Abbas was to attend, 
told journalists that indeed he had had fruitful discussions with President de Gaulle. He 
stated further that he felt that de Gaulle was serious about beginning the process of 
decolonisation in Algeria which would culminate in complete independence for the 
country. After the funeral President Bourguiba, the new king of Morocco Hassan II and 
Ferhat Abbas met in what was to be the first North African summit conference. A 
communique issued at the end stated that the three heads of delegations, after hearing 
Bourguiba’s account of his meeting with de Gaulle, had decided that “no obstacles should 
be allowed to stand in the way of direct negotiations between the GPRA and the French 
within the framework of complete decolonisation.”26
Discussions between the French and FLN officials resumed in March 1961. During these 
contacts the French conceded that a cease-fire was no longer a precondition for full 
negotiations. They also stated that they would want to see negotiations started by means 
of official delegations on conditions of self-determination of the Algerian people and 
allied problems. Later in March, both the French and GPRA issued separate 
communiques but conveying the same message that the talks would open at Evian 
(Switzerland) on 7 April 1961. Unfortunately on 31 March 1961, the GPRA announced 
that it would not partake in the proposed talks. The reason given was that they were 
angered by Louis Joxe’s remarks when addressing a press conference in Oran a few days 
earlier, hinting that he was willing to meet with other parties such as the MNA (Algerian 
National Movement) on an equal footing with the FLN. The FLN now had misgivings 
about this French move and questioned their motives, because to them the MNA was no 
longer a force to be reckoned with, as it now represented a small fraction of Algerian 
workers in France. To the FLN, this was a French attempt to undermine them by creating 
a “third force” in the future of Algeria. Despite this setback, and the revolt of the 
generals, contacts between the two enemies continued through the Swiss. The French 
and Algerians finally agreed to meet for earnest talks at Evian on 20 May 1961. Both 
sides sent high-powered delegations. The Algerian negotiating team was headed by 
Belkacem Krim (Vice-President of the GPRA) and the French by Louis Joxe (Minister 
for Algerian Affairs). As the two sides sat down for talks, it became clear that the 
differences between them were unbridgeable. It does appear that the French wanted to 
extract too much from the Algerians. The French first demanded guarantees for the 
European settlers in the form of dual citizenship, protection of European property rights, 
and separation of the Sahara which had vast resources of oil and gas and had only been 
fully integrated into Algeria in 1947. These French demands were hotly contested by the 
Algerians who wanted no compromises. On 13 June 1961 these talks broke down. An 
attempt was made on 20 to 28 July, to resuscitate the talks at Chateau de Lugrin, near 
Evian, but this also failed. Whereas in June it was the French who suspended the talks, in 
July it was the Algerians who broke them off.
In the meantime, as a consequence of the failure of these talks, de Gaulle increased his
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rhetoric against the FLN by threatening to partition the northern coastal regions of the 
country including the Sahara into some form of “bantustcms” (homelands) where the 
Europeans would be regrouped and be in the majority. This was probably a ploy to get 
the FLN back to the negotiating table; nevertheless, the FLN did not budge on its stance. 
The idea of partition was reportedly taken seriously by the Algerians, in the sense that on 
5 July 1961, there were demonstrations in the country accompanied by a general strike. 
The demonstrations are said to have spread to Tunisia where the GPRA denounced 
partition as a threat to negotiations and a negation of the principle of self-determination.
With the talks at a deadlock with the French, the FLN-GPRA retreated to Tripoli (Libya) 
in August 1961 where an introspection of the movement was earned out. The August 
Tripoli meeting of the GPRA resulted in a power shift at the top of the movement. The 
elderly statesman Ferhat Abbas was replaced by the youthful marxist Ben Khedda as 
president of the GPRA. Krim was moved from the ministry of foreign affairs to interior 
affairs and his assistant Saad Dahlab was promoted to head the ministry. Other new 
ministers of the GPRA were from the left wing of the movement. Since the balance of 
power was tipped in favour of the left, it would not be far-fetched for one to hazard that 
an attempt was being made to marshal a team that would adopt aggressive diplomacy, 
bearing in mind the barrage of criticism that the negotiating team received from Houari 
Boumedienne (commander of FLN forces in Tunisa-Morocco) and his external army at 
the August Tripoli meeting. The new team stated that it was still committed to 
negotiations like its predecessor.
Right up to September 1961, France still regarded the Algerian issue as her own internal 
matter, as was exemplified by her rebuff of United States offer of assistance during the 
generals’ revolt in April. But from September onwards French policy was to 
dramatically shift. It is stated that on 2 September 1961, de Gaulle confided to American 
Ambassador General James Gavin that France’s policy in Algeria was one of 
disengagement.27 Algeria had now become a burden on France and was of no use; it 
could go the way it wished, even the “Guinea” way was okay. But de Gaulle still 
entertained the idea of regrouping the European population around Algiers and Oran. In 
his conversation with the American Ambassador, the French leader hinted that he 
understood that the Sahara should revert to Algeria. France’s interests in the area were in 
oil and gas, and she wished for an agreement on common exploitation, but in case the 
FLN refused, she (France) would leave. In a press conference on 5 September 1961, de 
Gaulle abandoned France’s claim to the Sahara and said that he hoped that an agreement 
would be struck which would establish an association that safeguarded France’s 
interests.28 Those interests were free exploitation of the oil and gas, disposal of airfields 
and traffic rights for France’s communications with Black Africa.29 In the same press 
conference, de Gaulle conveyed to the FLN the message that France desired cooperation 
as far as it implied exchange and understanding.
As October set in, hopes were rising among Algerians of the possibility of resumption of 
talks and ultimately leading to peace, but at the same time terrorist activities were 
escalating in Paris, which was home to hundreds of thousands of Algerian emigrant 
workers. As a counter-measure to these terrorist attacks the Paris police imposed a
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restrictive curfew on the Algerian workers quarters of Paris. The curfew “recommended” 
that the Muslims were not to be found in the streets between 8.30 p.m. and 5.30 a.m. in 
the morning.30 On 17 October 1961, thousands of emigrant workers poured into the 
streets to demonstrate against the curfew and also proclaimed their support for Algerian 
independence. Violent clashes erupted in different points of the city between the 
Algerians, Police and Europeans. It is estimated that 200 Algerians were killed as a 
consequence of this mayhem and many others disappeared.31 This event and others 
elsewhere were pointers that the momentum for Algerian independence was irreversible 
and unstoppable. In mid-November 1961, de Gaulle now officially accepted the FLN as 
representing the wishes of the majority of the Algerian people, at the same time secrets 
talks between the FLN and the French began in Basle, Switzerland and ended on 19 
November 1961, though no conclusive breakthrough was reached, but the door was left 
open for the resumption of talks in the near future.
In January 1962, the GPRA leader Ben Khedda declared that his provisional government
was willing to enter into a new phase of negotiations on the basis of self-determination
for the Algerian people. Addressing the French people on 5 February 1962, de Gaulle
accepted this principle and also announced France’s diplomatic position on future
negotiations. France stated that she expected cooperation with Algeria in many fields,
even if this could be a burden for her. Instructions given to the French delegation as they
set out for talks with the FLN in February 1962 reveal how much importance France
attached to military interests in Algeria. French Prime Minister Michel Debre was said to
have told the departing team th a t:
You should pay special attention to Mers-el-Kebir and the Sahara. The
army would not accept the abandonment o f our best naval base and o f our
nuclear experimental sites [in the Sahara]...Also, our troops have to
remain in Algeria for a long period o f time as they represent a guarantee
12to Algeria’s Frenchmen.'
The emphasis and final message came from de Gaulle himself by saying that:
Do not insist upon the problems concerning citizenship....People who 
voted yesterday will vote now; later, the Algerian government will enact 
laws concerning citizenship within the new state. However, on the 
economic and the military issues, try to safeguard the essential.33
Intensive negotiations between the French and Algerians were held between 11 February 
to 19 February 1962 at Les Rousses in the Jura Mountains. After tough bargaining and 
horse-trading the two sides concurred that they had reached a general settlement and 
agreed to hold the next round of talks at Evian on 7 March 1962. In the build-up to these 
negotiations the OAS intensified its acts of terror such as bombings, attacks on 
government buildings, indiscriminate killings of Muslims. These attacks were 
spearheaded by Generals Raoul Salan and Edmond Jouhaud, both having gone 
underground after the failed April 1961 army revolt. On the other hand, as the final 
round of talks were about to begin the FLN stationed in Tunisia intensified their attacks 
at various points along the 100-mile French electrified barbed wire defence system. They 
fired mortars and recoilless guns, and the French had to send tanks, armoured cars and B- 
26 bombers to repel the attacks.34 These rebel attacks were possibly carried out to
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strengthen their hancl at the negotiation table.
The Evian accords were signed on 18 March 1962 amidst tight security around the place 
and well over 30 000 armed troops stood by in Paris to deal with any violence by the 
OAS.35 The agreement stipulated that there should be a cease-fire with immediate effect, 
amnesty and the release of all military and political prisoners within twenty days. There 
was to be a referendum in which the population of Algeria would be offered three choices 
namely maintenance of Algeria as a French department; independence by breaking all 
links with France; and thirdly independence in cooperation with France.36 The two 
countries agreed to have “mutual respect” for each other’s independence.
On individual rights the settlers were to hold dual citizenship for three years and then to 
decide whether to assume Algerian nationality or remain French. Ownership of property 
by both individuals and companies were to be respected, confiscation could only happen 
if the right compensation deal had been agreed upon. On the economic side, Algeria was 
to remain in the Franc Zone and receive full economic and technical aid at the level 
provided for at the time under the Constantine Plan. In the Sahara, existing rights were to 
be respected and mineral exploitation was to be carried out under the direction of a joint 
Franco-Algerian agency. French companies were to have a privileged position for six 
years in the granting of mining concessions. In other terms, this strengthened the French 
presence in the Sahara. Algeria had the right to distribute mining titles and had full 
sovereignty in enacting mining legislation. The two nations agreed to develop cultural 
relations and France was to assist Algeria with personnel such as teachers and 
technicians.
In relation to military installations, the French forces were to be allowed to remain in 
Algeria for three years after independence. The Force was to be reduced to 80,000 in the 
first twelve months, then progressively reduced, and the whole process to be completed 
after three years from the day of independence. The naval base of Mers-el-Kebir was to 
be leased to France for fifteen years.37 The use of other bases and installations including 
the nuclear testing centre in the Sahara were also to be granted to France for five years. 
The concessions of military testing ground were significant in France’s realisation of her 
nuclear force {force defm ppe  ). So, France was granted a significant number of military 
airfields, terrains, sites and installations. In case there were any disputes between the two 
countries they would be referred to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. On 
face value it does appear that the French had extracted much from the FLN negotiators, 
but in reality they had acceded to the fundamental demands of the FLN which were, their 
recognition as the sole negotiator, recognition of Algeria’s national sovereignty with the 
Sahara forming part of it and cease-fire after the settlement had been reached.
There were various reactions to the Evian accords across the political spectrum in France, 
United States and Algeria. The right in France saw the accords as surrender, 
abandonment of Algeria and even illegitimate. The left viewed them as neocolonialist. 
De Gaulle himself referred to them as a “common sense solution” and claimed that they 
contained everything France wanted them to contain.38 The United States was relieved 
that, at least, the two sides had reached an agreement acceptable to both of them. To the
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Algerians, these accords were to be at the centre of acrimony in future as will be shown 
in the next chapter.
c. Britain and Africa, January 1960 to March 1962
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Macmillan had at the close of 1959 taken the 
decision to visit Africa. This African tour began at the end of January 1960. One of 
Macmillan’s stops was South Africa. South Africa had always been a thorn in the flesh 
of the British government and the wider implications of her policies were unsettling to 
London. There was much fear in Whitehall that the settlers in East and Central Africa 
might choose to throw in their lot with the Union of South Africa, by rebelling against 
London and declaring their own independence, in which case all of Britain’s work in 
Africa would be undone. It was feared that the policies of apartheid that Britain 
professed to detest would be established in the heart of this part of the Colonial Empire. 
Macmillan flew on to South Africa on 27 January 1960 where according to Alistair 
Horne the country was seen by Macmillan as having many parallels with Algeria where a 
million French settlers were resisting any form of change.39 South Africa by then was 
almost in turmoil. For instance Nelson Mandela and many of his co-accused were on 
trial for treason. The black nationalist movement was in disarray having split into two, 
the moderate African National Congress (ANC) and the radical Pan-African Congress 
(PAC). At the same time the Nationalist Party government was vigorously pursuing 
some of its racist policies such as the banning of Africans in white universities and 
restricting nearly every aspect of their lives such as the compulsory carrying of passbooks 
for identification purposes. All across the Africa trip hints had been dropped by Tim 
Bligh (Macmillan’s Principal Private Secretary) to the accompanying press coips that 
“something was cooking which would astonish and satisfy us all.”40
On 3 February 1960 Harold Macmillan made what would later be regarded as his major 
speech in his political career one which brought a change to the political landscape of the 
world. In addressing both Houses of the South African Parliament at Cape Town, 
Macmillan began with elaborate compliments to South African progress, and courage in 
two World Wars. He then went to the crux of his speech by saying :
...Ever since the break-up o f the Roman Empire one o f the constant facts 
o f political life in Europe has been the emergence o f independent 
nations...In the twentieth century, and. especially since the end o f the war, 
the processes which gave birth to the nation states o f Europe have been 
repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening o f national 
consciousness in peoples who have fo r centuries lived in dependence on 
some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through 
Asia...Today the same thing is happening in Africa. The most striking o f 
all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is o f the 
strength o f this African national consciousness. In different places it may 
take different forms. But it is happening everywhere. The wind o f change 
is blowing through this Continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth o f 
national consciousness is a political fact. Our national policies must take 
account o f it.41
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The phrase “wind of change,” would later become most associated with Macmillan’s 
speech as there was a rapid movement towards political independence in most of the 
African colonial territories.
Addressing himself specifically to the Afrikaner regime in South Africa and possibly 
white settlers in the Central African Federation, Macmillan went on to say :
...It is a basic principle o f our modern Commonwealth that we respect 
each other’s sovereignty in matters o f internal policy. At the same time we 
must recognise that, in this shrinking world in which we live today, the 
internal policies o f one nation may have effects outside it...Our judgement 
o f right and wrong and o f justice is rooted in the same soil as yours-in 
Christianity and in the rule o f law as the basis o f a free society. This 
experience o f our own explains why it has been our aim, in the countries 
fo r  which we have borne responsibility, not only to raise the material 
standards o f life, but to create a society which respects the rights o f 
individuals-a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to 
their fu ll stature in political power and responsibility ; a society finally in 
which individual merit alone, is the criterion fo r a man’s advancement, 
whether political or economic.42 
Here Macmillan was attacking the heart of the apartheid policy in which there were vast 
inequalities between the minority whites and the majority blacks.
The British Prime Minister went further by attacking the policies of the apartheid regime 
but at the same time in order not to alienate the South Africans still he balanced the 
speech with a few conciliatory remarks. He stated th a t:
As a fellow member o f the Commonwealth we always try and I think, we 
have succeeded, in giving South Africa our fu ll support and 
encouragement, but I hope you won’t mind my saying frankly that, there 
are some aspects o f your policies which make it impossible fo r  us to do 
this without being false to our deep convictions about the political 
destinies o f free men to which in our own territories we are trying to give 
effect. I  think therefore that we ought as friends to face together, without 
seeking, I  trust, to apportion praise or blame, the fact that in the world o f 
today this difference o f outlook lies beWeen us 
In appeasing South African rulers he said :
I certainly do not believe in refusing to trade with people because you may 
happen to dislike the way they manage their internal affairs at home. 
Boycotts will never get you anywhere and may I say in parenthesis how I 
deprecate the attempts which are being made in Britain today to organize 
a consumer boycott o f South Afiican goods. It has never been the practice 
so far as I know of any Government in the United Kingdom, o f whatever 
complexion, to undertake or support campaigns o f this kind designed to 
influence the internal politics o f another Commonwealth country. I  and 
my colleagues in the UK Government deplore this proposed boycott and. 
regard it. as undesirable from every point o f view. It can only have serious 
effects on Commonwealth relations and trade and be to the ultimate
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detriment o f others than those whom it is aimed...44
More importantly was Macmillan’s emphasis on the Cold War for this new way forward 
when he said :
...As I  see it the great issue in this second half o f the twentieth century is 
whether the uncommitted peoples o f Asia and Africa will swing to the East 
or to the West. Will they be drawn into the Communist Camp ? Or will the 
great experiments o f self-government that are now being made in Asia and 
Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful and by 
their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour o f 
freedom and order and justice.45 
The South African response was immediate and prompt. Prime Minister Hendrik 
Verwoerd angrily responded by saying: “Mr Prime Minister, we have problems enough 
in South Africa without your coming to add to them...46 His Foreign Minister, E. H. 
Louw also in protest at the speech asked whether Macmillan would dare to criticise de 
Gaulle over Algerian policy or talk about races in the United States 47 But Macmillan had 
driven home the point that no part of Africa could for long remain an exclusive white 
preserve.
The general effect of the “wind of change” speech on Macmillan was that it gave him a 
favourable press coverage at home and abroad. The speech was soon seen as the 
harbinger of change in the British African empire, a change that would be implemented, 
or accelerated, resulting within a short time in the end of the African colonies and their 
replacement by new African-dominated states. The “wind of change” speech was 
delivered just before Britain conceded independence to the East and Central African 
territories, which this chapter will shortly discuss. The bulk of the territories in these 
regions gained their independence between 1961 and 1964. Macmillan’s speech came 
under criticism from some pro-empire right-wing members of his party who blamed the 
speech for unleashing the hurricane that would sweep across Africa in less than a decade. 
Lord Colyton (who as Henry Hopkinson had been a minister at the Colonial Office under 
Churchill and Eden) condemned it as coming “twenty-five years too early...it precipitated 
everything-Algeria, the Congo, etc.. 48 Even Lord Hailsham felt that “It may be that he 
went too far; if he had gone slower, the results in Africa might have been the same, but at 
least at lesser cost in human lives... but that’s purely my judgement.”49 To other critics of 
the government’s handling of colonial affairs, the speech was an act of capitulation, and 
was a direct inspiration in the formation of the Conservative Party’s right-wing Monday 
Club.50 The “Club” was to mark “Black Monday” the day Macmillan spoke in Cape 
Town.51 In summing up on the origins of the speech, Richie Ovendale has argued that the 
“wind of change” to some extent was initiated by the “profit and loss” account of 1957, 
and was possibly moved by the French moves in Algeria in 1958, but really began to gain 
momentum with the internal policy debates in Britain starting with the initial
CO
considerations of “Africa: the next ten years”
In the event, the “wind of change” speech probably had more influence in encouraging 
African nationalists elsewhere than in changing the South African situation. The 
situation there got worse because the following month witnessed the Sharpeville
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massacre. Sixty-two Africans were killed at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960. This marked 
the turning point in South Africa’s international isolation. Subsequent to this incident, 
over a thousand Africans were detained, an assassination attempt was made on Dr 
Hendrik Verwoerd and the value of South African shares dropped by £650 million.53 The 
ANC and PAC were banned, and the following year South Africa left the 
Commonwealth.
Since the overall policy of Macmillan’s government was to preserve Britain as a great 
power, international considerations had to be taken into account in formulating and 
shaping colonial policy. One of the factors that London policy makers had to take into 
account after 1959 in relation to colonial policy was the actions or the activities of other 
European colonial powers in Africa. France, Belgium and Portugal were also coming to 
grips with their colonial problems, which were at times an embarrassment to British 
colonial policy. Macmillan was thought to have feared the risk of a bloody, draining 
colonial war epitomised by the Algeria quagmire. For instance in Lawrence J. Butler’s 
words, Macmillan was personally haunted by France’s experiences of confronting anti­
colonial nationalism in Algeria, and was keen to avoid plunging Britain into similar, 
possibly unwinnable, conflicts.54 The Portuguese refusal to even consider relinquishing 
her hold on her African territories drew much criticism from the international 
community, and Macmillan held up British policy as progressive against this intransigent 
attitude. The immense Belgian colony of Congo became independent on 30 June 1960 
with very little preparation for the post-independence political dispensation. With the 
granting of independence to Congo, chaos immediately followed. In July 1960 
Congolese soldiers mutinied against their Belgian officers. In the ensuing turmoil 
hundreds of European women were raped and some Europeans were killed in Katanga, 
the south-eastern province which was rich in copper and was the backbone of the 
Congo’s economy. Katanga then declared its secession from the rest of Congo and 
appealed for Belgian help. The subsequent Belgian army’s intervention only served to 
worsen the situation. The new post-independence Congolese government based in 
Kinshasa appealed to the UN to act against the Belgian destabilisation. The UN 
subsequently sent an intervention force which also failed to salvage the situation. The 
breakdown of law and order continued. Put in perspective, the Congo debacle, it could 
be argued, was a dramatic confirmation of Macmillan’s “winds of change” speech. Of 
the fratricidal civil war that followed in the Congo, it has been argued that Macmillan 
feared that it would draw in the two superpowers, thus creating the risk of wider 
international conflict at a time of deep Cold War tensions.55
The hectic pace with which the French colonies had reached independence made a 
mockery of the various approaches by the Colonial Office to the question of 
independence in the various territories of British Africa. Britain was now in an awkward 
position of defending or claiming its colonial policy as being more liberal than that of 
other colonial systems. It was now difficult for Britain to justify the denial of 
independence to British colonies whose economic and political development already 
outstripped that of France’s former colonial territories.56 Moreover, the prospect of a 
large new contingent of African states at the United Nations was an advertisement for the 
magnanimity of France and an implicit condemnation of British gradualness. This was
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all the more unattractive as the competition for influence in the Third World seemed to be 
accelerating at the United Nations and Cold War politics were reaching their intensity. 
Especially significant was the United Nations General Assembly’s adoption in i960 of 
Resolution 1514, supporting speedy independence for colonial peoples, and its 
establishment in 1961 of a special Committee on Decolonisation.57 Britain, having 
previously set the pace of decolonisation in Africa, had now been left behind by all 
except the Portuguese.
In decolonising East and Central Africa Britain had to deal with the issue of settler 
politics, which as illustrated by the Algerian problem could have serious unpalatable 
consequences that reverberated in the metropolitan country and threatened the political 
establishment there. On the one hand settler resistance could lead to unilateral decisions, 
as later shown by Southern Rhodesia, while on the other settler weakness could result in 
acquiescence as was in the case of Kenya. According to Miles Kahler, settler resistance 
increased as the ratio of non-European to European population decreased.58 Throughout 
the history of decolonisation Europeans resident in the colonial empires were among the 
most vociferous and at times effective opponents of the transfer of power to African or 
Arab majorities.
John Darwin has argued that in East Africa the British had to deal with territories whose 
social and political character displayed important differences but their fates had to be 
settled together and along broadly similar lines.59 Tanganyika’s move towards 
independence was swift and did not pose too much of a hassle for the British. One of the 
factors attributed to this fairly easy transfer of power was the small number of European 
settlers which stood at 22,300 in I960.60 The process of decolonisation had been set in 
motion by the British attempt to reform local and central government in the late 1950s. 
Opposition to colonial rule centred around unity forged under the banner of the 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led by Julius Nyerere. TANU demanded 
full self-government and backed this demand by a threat of demonstrations, strikes and 
boycotts. Britain saw the futility of using force as this would have imposed enormous 
strains on the resources of the colonial administration. Instead she offered constitutional 
talks which resulted in elections in September 1960 and were convincingly won by 
TANU. A further constitutional conference was held in Dar-es-Salaam in March 1961 
and this paved the way for the territory’s independence in December of the same year. 
What made Tanganyika’s transition fairly smooth was the fact that Nyerere and TANU 
had comfortably established themselves as the country’s single nationalist party and were 
willing to negotiate with the British.
Uganda’s move towards independence was more complicated because of the ethnic 
question. The powerful Buganda Kingdom which had enjoyed autonomy for centuries 
saw any constitutional reforms towards self-government as a threat to its survival.61 The 
non-Baganda groups in the north and east of the country wanted a federal constitution to 
guard against the perceived Buganda hegemony. A compromise was agreed in September 
1961 in which the Buganda Kingdom was to enjoy federal status within Uganda. It was 
further agreed that Uganda would achieve internal self-government on 1 March 1962 and 
independence was to follow in October of the same year. Just like Tanganyika, Uganda’s
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speedy move towards independence could partly be attributed to the small European 
population in the country who were not a force to be reckoned with. Crucially important 
for Uganda was that antagonism was not mainly between the colonial rulers and the 
different ethnic groups, but with the Buganda and other groups who resented the former’s 
privileged status as likely to prove a step to total domination of other groups. On the 
other hand the British wanted to guard against the Buganda’s secessionist tendencies as 
this might have resulted in anarchy. So, in Uganda it was this “unholy alliance” of 
interests that brought about a peaceful settlement for the territory.
Kenya was by the end of the 1950s the most advanced of British possessions in East 
Africa. It was the wealthiest, having the most diversified economy ; it was strategic for 
military purposes especially after Britain had decided to end its military facilities in the 
Suez area; and it had a considerable number of settlers as compared to the two territories 
of Tanganyika and Uganda. The number of settlers stood at 67,700 in 1960. British 
officials were aware that the constitutional gains made by Tanganyika and Uganda would 
soon have to make their way in Kenya. By the end of the 1950s the colonial government 
was based on some form of multiracial power-sharing in which the Africans and 
Europeans had an equal number of elected representatives. British officials wanted to 
give Kenyan colonial policy a forward-looking appearance since otherwise, their policy 
might be likened to that of the French, that is protecting settler interests. The Mau Mau 
insurrection of the 1950s had shown to the British how difficult and costly it was to put 
down an uprising. Suppression of the Mau Mau meant the incarceration of its leader 
Jomo Kenyatta. But the British did introduce certain reforms that were agrarian, 
commercial and market-oriented, so as to appease the Kikuyu ethnic group which was the 
main backbone of the Mau Mau. So, African interests became more important at the end 
of the 1950s and the settlers began to lose the power and privileges that they had enjoyed. 
The Kenya settlers were unable to resist this change of turning Kenya from a “white 
man’s country” to a black man’s.
One of the reasons for the white settlers failure in Kenya to resist change was their 
character. Most of them were not settler farmers in the White Highlands but town- 
dwellers, engaged in commerce, the professions or administration.62 Their composition 
was even more diluted after 1945 because most of those who came to Kenya were public 
servants who at the end of their service could still return to Britain and enjoy a 
government pension. So, they did not have many interests to safeguard in the colony. 
Also the European weakness was exposed by the Mau Mau struggle as they had to rely 
on the mother country’s troops to quell the disturbance, so any resistance on the settlers 
part might encounter the full military might of London. Furthermore the whites in Kenya 
had displayed their weakness by failing to obtain internal self-government as the white 
settlers of Southern Rhodesia had done in 1923. So, when the path was launched for 
Kenya’s self-independence in the 1960s, the odds were stark against the European 
settlers. Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod began Kenya’s march to independence by 
terminating in Novemberl959 the emergency under which Kenya had been living since 
the Mau Mau outbreak in 1952, he released most of the detainees apart from Kenyatta and 
some of those closest to him.
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In January 1960 Macleod presided over a constitutional conference on Kenya at 
Lancaster House in London. At the same time two modern political parties had been 
formed in Kenya. These were KANU (Kenya African National Union) dominated by 
Kikuyu and Luo politicians who regarded Kenyatta as their leader. KADU (Kenya 
African Democratic Union) was a loose alliance of ethnic groups who feared and 
resented Kikuyu power and influence. These African dominated political parties attended 
the London conference and alongside them was the New Kenya Group (NKG) formed by 
the European settler Michael Blundell and a more conservative settler group opposed to 
them. Blundell’s aim was to break the mould of settler politics and break racial barriers 
through this party and to appeal to all races equally. In his opening speech to the 
conference, and to the dismay of the right-wing of the Conservative Party, Macleod 
announced that the time had come to recognise that majority rule must come to Kenya; 
the Africans were the majority race.63 The conference produced an agreed new 
constitution for Kenya. The plan envisaged a council of ministers composed of four 
officials and eight “unofficials” of whom four were to be Africans, three Europeans and 
one Asian.64 In addition there was to be a legislative council of sixty-five members 
elected by over a million Africans and the Europeans.
In March 1961 a general election, fought largely on the emotive issue of Kenyatta’s 
release was held. The two African parties KANU and KADU obtained the largest share 
of the votes. But, Tom Mboya, leader of KANU, the more popular party, refused to take 
office unless Kenyatta was released. After much wrangling within the Conservative 
Government and Party, the decision was finally taken on 27 July 1961 to release 
Kenyatta. In his diary at the end of 1961 Macmillan was said to have expressed his 
misgivings about the way forward in Kenya. He recorded that, “If we have to give 
independence to Kenya, it may well prove another Congo. If we hold on, it will mean a 
long and cruel campaign-Mau Mau and all that.”65
In February and March 1962 yet another constitutional conference on Kenya was held in 
London. Under the chairmanship of Reginald Maudling ( who had replaced Macleod as 
Colonial Secretary in October 1961), KANU and KADU were persuaded to form a 
coalition national government. Furthermore the two political parties were persuaded to 
accept a constitution which provided for a strong central government with regional 
governments enjoying wide autonomous powers of which the most important were 
control of land and the police.66 Before long, this constitution became a bone of 
contention between the Kenyan political parties, especially KANU, which wanted a 
unitary state since although it lacked an overall majority, it had emerged as the largest 
single party in previous elections. The task of unravelling this East African saga now fell 
to Duncan Sandys who had succeeded Maudling, the latter having been promoted to 
being Chancellor of the Exchequer in the summer of 1962. After negotiations that 
entailed “give and take” deals, elections by universal suffrage were held in Kenya in May 
1963 and KANU won by a landslide. In October 1963 the constitution was revised and 
tipped the scales in favour of central government as opposed to the regions. 
Independence came on 12 December 1963 with Kenyatta as the head of the post-colonial 
government. This completed the process of decolonisation in East Africa.
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The 1958 European population figures show that Central Africa had 287,300 white 
settlers. Of this figure 207,000 were in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 72,000 in 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) had 8,300.67 As alluded to in 
chapter two, the three territories had been amalgamated into a federation in 1953, which 
was to serve partly as a bulwark against South Africa’s discriminatory racial policies. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Macmillan’s administraion established the Monckton 
Commission in 1959 to review the future of the Federation. Its report was published in 
October 1959. The Commission stated that the “great majority” of Africans “expressed 
opposition to the Federation,” and their opposition was “widespread, sincere, and of long 
standing,” indeed in the two northern territories, “almost pathological.”68 The 
Commission recommended that African franchise be extended, that self-government in 
Northern Rhodesia should move forward and the question of secession be left open and 
possibly to be raised and discussed at the December 1960 Federal Constitutional review 
in London. While the Commission acknowledged the economic rationale behind the 
Federation, it still argued that it could not exist in its present form. Implicit in the 
Commission’s recommendation was that the Federation was doomed.
Macleod had set the East African territories on the road to independence with remarkable 
speed and ease, but his first real test came in Central Africa where he was always at 
loggerheads with the settlers leaders and the settler lobby in the Conservative Party. 
Macmillan had always viewed Central Africa as a potentially explosive area if not 
handled meticulously. He was said to have noted in his diary in February 1961 that “we 
may have a Boston Tea Party, Welensky declaring the Federation independent and 
seizing the colony of Northern Rhodesia, or an African Bloodbath, riots all over British 
Africa...69 According to Roger Louis what Macmillan feared most was an “Algeria” in 
Central Africa.70 Also talking to Welensky, in early 1962, Macmillan is said to have 
stated the following to him :
In Algeria the French have a million men under arms, and they have now
suffered a humiliating defeat It is too simple a reading o f history to think
71that you can exercise control simply by the use o f power.
In mid-1958 Hastings Banda returned to Nyasaland after a long stay abroad. He then 
assumed leadership of the Nyasaland African Congress. Its main objective was to secure 
the secession of Nyasaland from Southern Rhodesia white dominated Federation.72 As a 
consequence of British reluctance to bring about constitutional reforms, there were 
widespread riots and demonstrations which culminated in the Federation’s Prime 
Minister Roy Welensky bringing in Southern Rhodesia troops to Nyasaland to restore 
order. Banda and many of his supporters were arrested and were soon accused of 
plotting to massacre Nyasaland’s whites. In the ensuing disturbances more than fifty 
Africans were killed. Subsequent to the Devlin Report on Nyasaland disturbances, 
Macmillan and his colleagues decided to take a different route from Welensky’s. He 
later informed the latter that “I cannot guarantee, that British troops would undertake the 
kind of duties that would be necessary.”73 On 1 April 1960 Macleod released Banda from 
prison and invited him for talks in London. Subsequent to this, a Constitutional 
Conference on Nyasaland was held on 1 July 1960. The outcome was the framework of a 
new constitution. It provided for the direct election of Africans to the legislature with a
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qualitative franchise (meaning that only Africans with a certain amount of money or 
education could vote).74 But, despite protestations from Welensky, Macleod on 3 
January 1961 issued an Order in Council which established a new election procedure, that 
is, encompassing all Africans, resulting in African majority government. In August 1961 
the renamed Malawi Congress Party (MCP) won a land slide in the ensuing general 
election.
African opinion had been bitterly opposed to Federation in Northern Rhodesia even 
before its inception. But Northern Rhodesia nationalists were deeply divided and 
opposed to each other. Nevertheless by March 1959 there were widespread disturbances, 
and leading officials of the Northern Rhodesia’s Congress were arrested. They were 
however released in January 1960 and Kenneth ICaunda set about uniting them into a new 
movement called the United National Independence Party (UNIP). In December 1960 
Kaunda was invited to attend the federal review conference in London, pursuant upon the 
Monckton Commission’s report. He attended on the condition that the existing Northern
7SRhodesian constitution would at the same time be reconsidered. That precipitated the 
major encounter over Northern Rhodesia which spread through all of 1961 and beyond. 
Reconsideration of Northern Rhodesia constitution now became an issue of central 
importance. The Northern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference got down to business on 
8 February 1961. On 14 February 1961, Macleod circulated to his cabinet colleagues a 
draft White Paper which if implemented would have resulted in African majority rule in 
Northern Rhodesia. This paper formed the basis for subsequent friction within the 
Cabinet and the Tory Party pertaining to Northern Rhodesia. Philip Murphy has 
contended that during the entire process of decolonisation, it was over the question of 
Northern Rhodesian constitutional reform early in 1961 that the Conservative Party came 
closest to splitting apart.76 The federal review conference was aborted as the parties 
could not find a common ground on the issue at hand. Macleod’s successor at the 
Colonial Office, Reginald Maudling pushed ahead with the destruction of the Federation. 
In February 1962 Northern Rhodesia was given the right to secede, despite Lord Home’s 
warning that there was a danger that the Europeans “if driven too far” would take the law 
into their own hands and form a European-dominated association of Southern Rhodesia, 
the Copper Belt, Angola, Katanga and South Africa,” fatal to British hopes of multiracial 
cooperation in Africa.77
By the end of 1962, therefore, out of all the British colonies in Africa, only Southern 
Rhodesia was left as an exception to the rule of independence under black majority 
government. Now that South Africa had left the Commonwealth, it was the country that 
bore the strongest resemblance to Algeria, and for the same reason, the presence of a 
powerful white minority determined to preserve its privileged position. The difference, 
however, was that Southern Rhodesia was effectively self-governing under the 
constitution of 1962; the war of independence was still in the future; and when it came, it 
was fought by the settlers in defiance of the metropolitan country against the equivalent 
of the FLN, the guerrillas of ZANU and ZAPU.
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d. Britain and Algeria, January 1960 to Evian 1962
As the 1960s began, therefore, Britain took keen interest, not only in events in French 
Africa as a whole, but in Algeria in particular. British discussion of French African 
colonial policy at the beginning of 1960 up to the second half of the year was not focused 
specifically on Algeria per se, but on the entire French policy in the continent, and one 
assumes that this impacted indirectly on the Algerian question. Ambassador Jebb 
writing to his boss in the Foreign Office, Selwyn Lloyd, on 2 March 1960 stated his 
impressions of his recent tour of French Africa. He said that de Gaulle’s recent speech at 
Dakar on 13 December 1959 had transformed the whole situation. That, everywhere he 
(Jebb) travelled the relations between the French and the local politicians appeared to be 
excellent and chances of arriving at some satisfactory redefinition of the ties binding the 
States of the French community in Africa with the metropolis now appeared to be 
extremely good.78 Implicit in this Jebb’s thinking was that something significant was 
about to happen to the colonies.
Still in March 1960 de Gaulle discussed his intentions about Africa with Jebb at 
Rambouillet. De Gaulle stated that the various states of the French Community would
70gradually demand independence and he would not object, though he expressed doubts 
that some of them were not fully-fledged states to exist or face the challenges of 
independence on their own. He then expressed his worries about the position of Guinea 
and the help which Kwame Nkrumah was giving to Sekou Toure, who was speedily 
slipping into the Communist camp. All this made it very important for continued Anglo- 
French contact about Africa.80 The idea of such contact entered into the question of 
Algeria.
Contributing to the Queen’s speech on 1 November 1960 the leader of the Opposition 
Hugh Gaitskell referred to the Algerian subject as an international issue of some 
delicacy.81 He cautioned that the situation in Algeria might give rise to serious 
international dangers in the near future. This was made more possible by the fact that the 
Algerian rebel forces had made contact with and had been recognised by Russia and 
China.82 There was the likelihood that the Algerians would receive arms from these 
quarters. For these reasons Gaitskell contended that with all the respect Britain had for 
France, this was a matter that required United Nations intervention. From Gaitskell’s 
contribution one could see that he feared the exacerbation of the East-West rivalry in the 
Cold War.
On 4 November 1960, the day that de Gaulle repeated his offer of self-determination for 
Algeria, the Algerian issue made its way once again into the House of Commons in 
London. On that day opposition Labour Party’s Anthony Wedgwood Benn moved a 
motion of debate on the Algerian subject. He began by stating that the situation in 
Algeria was the most dangerous international situation confronting the Government or
oo
any Government throughout the whole world. That as members of NATO and UN 
there could be no question about the responsibility of Her Majesty’s Government in this 
matter. Benn went on to state a litany of misdeeds which he alleged were explicit 
confirmation of British collusion with France against the Algerians. Examples cited were
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the British consistent voting pattern at the United Nations against resolutions on Algeria, 
supply of equipment such as helicopters and British acquiescence to the French claim that 
the Algerian problem was an internal matter that could only be solved by France alone.84 
The maverick Parliamentarian did not spare the United States which he accused of abuse 
of its wealth and power by providing France with substantial military aid which it then 
used to fight the Algerian war.85 He blamed France for the failure of the Melun talks held 
in the mid-year. This he said was due to France’s pandering to persistent demands of the 
settlers and army. Benn concluded by stating that whether the House accepted his verdict 
or not, it was impossible to escape the fact that it had been Western support-British, 
American and NATO that had enabled the French to pursue their war in Algeria.
In response the Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, stated that Her Majesty’s Government 
had ties of interest and friendship in Europe and Africa, as such it could not be indifferent 
to the Algerian question.86 So, the matter was of concern to the Government, but more 
complex than Benn had put. Heath fell short of criticising France, but instead went on to 
detail how the long colonial links established between France and Algeria made it 
difficult to disentangle the problem and that Her Majesty’s Government fully understood 
the French dilemma. Heath referred to the settlers question which he said was one of the 
obstacles to finding a solution to this subject as most of them were fearful of their 
future.87 And from experience, Britain knew these problems in some of her African 
territories, though not as desperate as those of the French. Referring to the Melun talks 
the Lord Privy Seal stated that Her Majesty’s Government was disappointed with their 
failure, as they had hoped that they would lead to high level meeting between the French 
Government and the FLN leadership. According to Heath the disappointment was also 
felt in France because of the way the war was haemorrhaging France financially, morally 
and politically.88 As with all other previous British official responses, this could be said 
to have been a carefully crafted and measured answer, attempting the impossible, that is, 
satisfying both the French and Algerians, and Britain appearing to be sitting on the fence. 
In December 1960, the Pakistani Government proposed to the British to bring about 
something along the “good offices” to facilitate the resolution of the Algerian question, 
but the British refused this suggestion.89
As France gradually shifted towards Algerian independence the main British interest in 
the negotiations themselves was the fate or guarantees of the European colons or settlers 
in the final settlement. In January 1961 in a personal minute addressed to Foreign, 
Colonial and Commonwealth Secretaries, Macmillan stated that the great problem that 
Britain faced now in Africa, was how to guarantee the rights of European minorities once 
former colonial territories become independent.90 He said that this was of particular 
importance since the Europeans would be the dominant economic force in those 
countries. The Prime Minister further stated that Britain was beginning to consider how 
to deal with the situations as they might arise in the Rhodesias, Kenya and even 
Tanganyika.9' In this regard the Prime Minister said his office had discussed issues 
relating to “Bill of Rights,” “Supreme Courts” and “Council of State.”92 According to 
Macmillan the French were in the same boat in relation to Algeria. For that matter the 
French had asked for information about the 1959 British settlement of Cyprus. An 
agreement had been entered into in February of that year between the Greek Cypriot
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leader Archbishop Makarios and the governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey, under 
which Cyprus would become an independent republic in 1960, and Britain would retain 
its important bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.93 Since an arrangement had been made for 
Britain and France for discussions on African problems, Macmillan said that he felt that it 
might be useful if Britain could propose to the French an official study of this question of 
European guarantees in various forms.94 This according to him would strengthen Anglo- 
French cooperation in Africa. The Prime Minister hinted that he wanted to make the 
proposal to President de Gaulle when they meet at Rambouillet later in the month.
First to respond to the Prime Minister’s minute was his Foreign Secretary Lord Home, 
and was not impressed by what his master thought. He suggested that the way forward in 
dealing with the French was one of caution. The Foreign Secretary stated that the French
05were very unpopular in all British Commonwealth countries in West and East Africa. 
He expressed the fear that any leak that Britain was considering aspects of colonial policy 
with them would be very suspect; even if such talks were concerned with factors which 
would follow independence, the effect would still be bad. He suggested that the only 
cooperation with the French could be an exchange of information between the Embassies 
and also raising the matter privately with General de Gaulle, but nothing of their 
discussion should be leaked.96 The Foreign Secretary further expressed his scepticism 
about any special safeguards for the settlers, in his view such guarantees did not hold as 
was illustrated by Ghana once Britain had departed.
In response the Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod said that he would be glad if some of the 
information on British colonies such as the Cabinet Committee information on Land
07Tenure in Kenya could be shared with the French. Britain had in the early 1960s, hand 
in hand with constitutional reforms, bought thousands of acres of land in the lucrative 
White Highlands, for redistribution among African farmers. Possibly, the aim was to 
create a flourishing class that would engage in farming on a large scale. As his colleague 
in the Foreign Office, Macleod said he foresaw some danger in offering to join the 
French in an official study of this question of European minorities. In Macleod’s view if 
this was done and became public knowledge, it would be damaging to British interests in 
the colonies and the independent states in Africa as it would be interpreted as support for 
the colons.98 The Colonial Secretary further stated that already African nationalist leaders 
had the belief that Britain was sympathising with the French in their Algerian policy and 
this perception had done Britain some harm.99 The Commonwealth Secretary agreed with 
his two cabinet colleagues on the need for caution. He suggested that the transference of 
power should be gradual and undertaken by carefully calculated stages, possibly 
announced in advance.100 This correspondence within Whitehall shows that there was no 
clear policy on the way forward on colonial matters.
After these discussions in Whitehall, Philip de Zulueta prepared a position paper on the 
subject. The gist of this was that there was general advantage in carrying out discussions 
with the French about protecting European settlers in Africa as this would be to 
encourage a feeling of Anglo-French solidarity, at least in the minds of General de Gaulle 
and his closest collaborators.101 It was felt that the two colonial powers might be able to 
contribute useful ideas to each other though conditions in various territories differed
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widely. It was hoped by the British that if the French could be led in this way into 
discussing their policy in Algeria, Britain might be able to exercise some influence on its 
development. This shows that Britain had some concerns about the Algerian question, 
but did not want to go public as this might sour relations between the two colonial 
powers. It was finally decided by Whitehall that the Prime Minister was to raise the 
subject with de Gaulle when they meet at Rambouillet. The two political leaders met at 
Rambouillet on 28 January 1961. On the question of Africa they agreed that it might be 
useful for experts from the two countries to consider whether there were any possibilities 
of arranging effective guarantees for the rights of white minorities in former colonies.102 
This Project seems to have disappeared into the air as no joint study or result was 
produced.
At the beginning of March 1962, as there were signs that the French and Algerians were 
getting nearer to the settlement, discussions began within Whitehall as to what response 
Her Majesty’s Government was to make should such prospect come to fruition. Downing 
Street thinking revealed some disagreement on the way forward. The Paris Embassy had 
suggested to the Foreign Office that a Ministerial statement should be made to welcome 
any settlement. The Foreign Office seemed to have been warming towards the Paris 
Mission’s idea and even went further by suggesting that the Prime Minister should also 
send a personal message to de Gaulle.10-3 When this suggestion was put before the Prime 
Minister he was not impressed. In a minute to the Foreign Secretary he expressed his 
doubts about the idea and even seemed to be irritated by it. He stated the following:
Do you think it really wise fo r  Her Majesty’s Government to make any 
statement at all in either House? Is it not intolerably patronising? Did 
other countries make approving statements when we lost Ireland or 
India? Please consider. As fo r  a message from me to de Gaulle, I 
think he would resent it  Perhaps I might write him a letter on some 
occasion in which I would refer to Algeria.104 
After this Prime Ministerial intervention the idea of making a ministerial statement was 
abandoned.
As the GPRA and the French moved closer to negotiations and the OAS intensified its 
propaganda and terror campaigns, the British were not spared. On 5 March 1962, the 
OAS informed some British and American journalists that they would be told to leave 
Algeria if the Secret Army thought their reporting of its activities were “unfriendly.”105 
Earlier on, eleven Italian journalists had to flee Algiers after threats to their lives by 
Europeans claiming to be an “OAS Commando.”106 In its editorial on 9 March 1962 the 
Daily Telegraph, though it expressed cautious optimism that a solution to the Algerian 
question was in sight, argued that the OAS posed a serious threat to any agreement and 
had to be nipped in the bud.107 Britain noted with little concern the formation of the 
National Council of the French Resistance in Algeria (CNRFA) by the OAS on 13 
March 1962. This was the last ditch attempt by the organisation to derail the negotiation 
process. The CNRFA was under the presidency of ex-General Salan, its aim was the 
deposition of General de Gaulle and his replacement by General Salan with a mandate to 
restore the sovereignty of the French people under the 1958 constitution. Though this 
was an open call to rebellion and mutiny, London thought and believed that de Gaulle
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would prevail as the Army would remain loyal,108 a further endorsement of confidence in 
de Gaulle by Britain.
After the collapse of the Melun talks in June 1960, discussion between Whitehall and the 
Foreign Office over the possible prospects for an Algerian settlement hinged on an 
assessment of the French government’s capacity to impose it, de Gaulle’s ability to carry 
French public opinion with him to do so, and the likelihood of an Algerian partition 
establishing settler enclaves within the northern coastal cities.109
As far as the settlement of the war in Algeria was concerned, when the Evian accords 
were eventually signed in March 1962, the British authorities regarded it as a diplomatic 
triumph for General de Gaulle and his team.110 British government sources at this climax 
of the Algerian situation recapitulate the terms of the Agreements basically for the 
official British records. London was mainly interested in seeing what the French got out 
of this, compared with similar agreements by Britain. Macmillan immediately when 
hearing of the signing of the accords requested P.F. de Zulueta to prepare a note setting 
out briefly what the French had got out of the Algerian agreement.111 Whitehall’s 
feelings was that the French had done rather well out of all this.
In his note for the record, Philip de Zulueta stated the following:
It appeared that the French had got the Naval base fo r another fifteen
years and exploitation rights in the Sahara for a further six years. This
contrasted strongly with what we got out o f our Colonies when we
turned them into independent countries. I suggested to the Prime
Minister that this was not fo r  want o f trying on our part; fo r  example,
we had a defence agreement with Nigeria when they became
independent (1960), but we gave it up after about a year because they
wanted us to. The Prime Minister recognised that the French had a
stronger will to stay on fo r  example, in Bizerta, but he thought it would
be useful in, say, our discussions with Kenya, if we could quote the
112  'French settlement with the Algerians.
From these remarks of de Zulueta it does appear that the British officials were envious of 
the French gains. The mention of Kenya illustrates that developments in Algeria were 
having a wider indirect impact on British thinking in East Africa and possibly other areas.
From Paris, Sir Pierson Dixon ( British Ambassador to Paris 1960-64) commented on the 
accords by saying:
Many o f the agreement's provisions fo r  example, over military bases 
and guarantees fo r  European settlers-are much better than could at 
one time have been expected and have only been wrung from the 
Algerians after a great deal o f bargaining. Indeed, in agreeing to 
allow France to retain the use o f her nuclear testing ground, the GPRA 
did so in fu ll knowledge that they would be likely to incur the odium o f 
their fellow Afro-Asians.113 
Dixon went further and stated that:
It is possible that the GPRA were forced to make these concessions 
through fear o f partition and it may well be that extremer elements
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among the Algerian nationalists have agreed to this settlement with the 
mental reservation that they could go back on their word when they 
have achieved complete independence.114 
Dixon concluded his report on a more pessimistic and ominous note by stating that:
The main obstacle to the application o f the agreement was the OAS 
who would presumably continue to sabotage it with every means at 
their disposal. The French authorities, however, are cautiously 
optimistic that the favourable terms o f the agreement would cause 
European support fo r  the OAS to fall away. But fo r  the immediate 
future it is hard to foresee anything but a period o f continuing 
bloodshed..115
The military aspects of the Evian accords in a broader context are a reflection of the 
overall French defence policies in Africa during decolonisation, and these were in 
contrast with those of Great Britain, France maintained bases in Africa and used them 
from time to time, whereas Britain did not bother much about these military agreements. 
In addition, France wanted her former colonies to be in some kind of military 
dependence, which was in contrast to what Britain stood for, for instance, London was 
not prepared to go to war in Southern Rhodesia over the question of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI).
In a letter to General de Gaulle on 20 March 1962, Macmillan expressed feelings of 
gratitude to him on the successful conclusion of the Algerian settlement. He stated that 
since the end of the war, both Britain and France had had to face great changes in the 
structure of their influence in many parts of the world. And, lastly, the Prime Minister 
expressed the hope that the good work done by Britain and France in spreading 
civilisation might soon bore fruit.116
The Daily Telegraph editorial comment of 19 March 1962, welcomed the agreement and
i 1 n
referred to it as an incredible feat. But it qualified the praise by stating that there were 
still obstacles to genuine peace as the OAS and their supporters of i(Algerie francaise” 
were still a threat. This threat it argued could only be overcome by the loyalty of the 
French Army not being in doubt and its willingness to contain the violence of the OAS. 
The Telegraph concluded by appealing to the European settlers not to despair as a result 
of the agreement, but to draw comfort from safeguards provided for them, which the 
paper said were substantial. Also the settlers could have hope from the fact that both 
parties at Evian had agreed that “cooperation was the solution which best corresponded 
with the interests of Algeria and France.”
f. Conclusion
The 1960s were a watershed for both British and French colonial policies in Africa. In 
the case of France, most of her French Black Africa territories were decolonised in 1960. 
This marked the end of the “Community” in its original conception. France now entered 
into a new relationship with her former colonies. This relationship was cemented through 
a variety of treaties and agreements with the individual states. At the same time in the 
1960s there was a dramatic shift in the pace of constitutional reforms in most of British
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possessions in East and Central Africa. The territories in these regions were set on an 
irreversible path of self-government. But throughout this process the European 
population in these areas played a critical role in trying to delay, stall or even derail this 
process of change.
Civil-military relations determined the course of the resolution of the Algerian problem. 
The termination of the war not only was a relief for the direct belligerents, but for the 
Western world especially Britain and the United States, as their NATO ally (France) had 
now become an embarrassment to them in the United Nations, as it constantly faced a 
barrage of attacks from Third World countries and the Eastern bloc. After the 
referendum and army revolt in 1961, de Gaulle opened negotiations with the GPRA, that 
dragged on and off for over a year before the Evian accords were finally agreed. Because 
of the length of time involved, and the various proposals put forward by the French, de 
Gaulle has been accused of vacillation. Offering an American perspective on the war. 
Irwin Wall has gone so far so far as to suggest that the credit and praise often heaped on 
de Gaulle was misplaced, as he was part of the problem, by prolonging and perpetuating 
the war. The truth of the matter is probably that having accepted the principle of 
Algerian self-determination, and hence Algerian independence, he was presured on the 
one hand by the need to safeguard French interests, including those of the settler 
population, and on the other by OAS terrorism, which obliged him to fight a war on two 
fronts-against the FLN and the Europeans-and hence to reach a solution as quickly as 
possible. In the process, GPRA intransigence compelled him to abondon the attempt to 
construct a coalition in which the FLN would be only a partner, and concede the right of 
the FLN to form the government of an independent Algeria. Developments in Algeria 
and France were keenly watched by British officials, and what lessons could be learned 
from there for purposes of their (British) colonial questions. Britain and France took a 
leaf out of one another’s book in dealing with the decolonisation of their African 
possessions. Though the Evian accords officially ended the Algerian war, achieving 
peace was a different matter altogether, many problems were still to come to engulf this 
newly born and independent nation. It is to post-independence Algeria and the attendant 
problems that the next chapter focuses on.
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CHAPTER 8
ALGERIAN INDEPENDENCE, 1962 TO 1965
a. Introduction
With the achievement of Algerian independence in 1962, the problem changed from the 
need of the FLN to win the war, and the need of France, Britain and America to bring it 
to an end, to the need of the FLN to form a government of the newly-independent nation, 
and the need of France, Britain, and the rest of the world to relate to that government. 
The solution depended on the character of the new nation, which was defined by the 
Evian accords on the basis of residence in the country, as the European together with the 
Muslim population of Algeria, but which was immediately altered by the flight of the 
great majority of the European population, leaving the new nation almost entirely 
Muslim. On the one hand, that freed the FLN from the need to compromise; on the other, 
it limited the possibility of economic and therefore political independence. Between 
1962 and 1966, these factors governed the British attitude to Algeria. The fact that Her 
Majesty’s Government regarded the Algerian affair as effectively settled was also 
reflected in this period by the consular reports which took over from memoranda in terms 
of reporting on Algeria.
b. Ben Bella to Boumedienne
As mentioned earlier on, the Soummam Valley Congress of 1956 sought to clarify the 
objectives of the Algerian revolution. It affirmed the primacy of the political over the 
military, and the internal over the external. Contrary to this, in the course of the war, the 
external had taken priority over the internal, and within the external, the military in 
Tunisia and Morocco were the largest element, while the political was divided over 
policy and between personalities. In the contest for leadership in 1962, Ben Bella came 
to power with the support of the army under Houari Boumedienne, driving his opponents 
into exile, rebellion, or to death. This now meant that Ben Bella and his regime could do 
as they pleased in governing.
Following a national referendum on 8 September 1962, most of Ben Bella’s 
constitutional proposals became law. He was elected the first President with an 
overwhelming majority; this was a foregone conclusion as no other candidates were 
permitted to stand. This gave him unfettered freedom in establishing a presidential 
regime which he believed was the most effective way of ensuring his own authority. He 
increased his powers by assuming the offices of president, prime minister and 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.1 In the course of his presidency, his office 
assumed direct control over the Prefects, the police, media, finance and planning which 
were the main organs of the state. Ben Bella set up a one party state with the FLN
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formed into the sole permitted political body, and the principal policy-making body. 
Institutions of government were heavily weighted toward the executive branch while the 
National Assembly essentially became a rubber-stamp body.
Algeria under Ben Bella was declared a socialist state. Socialism was the guiding 
ideology, mainly in state management of abandoned European estates. For instance, the 
March 1963 Decrees created a legal definition of vacant property, established a detailed 
system of self-management to be applied to all such properties, and provided for a system 
of profit sharing within each enterprise.2 Algeria conceived of her revolution, whatever 
its Marxist overtones, as an indigenous product, African, Arab, Islamic and above all 
Algerian. Arabic was declared the language of the republic, though French was to be 
retained provisionally; Islam was defined as the religion of the state.3 Algeria saw herself 
as out in front of the avant-garde of the Third World, but not as leading it into the 
Communist camp. Ben Bella’s Algeria conducted her foreign policy with 
grandiloquence. She displayed unblushingly her wish to cut a dash internationally and 
waved the banner of “liberation.” Algeria became more than ever home from home for 
fellow-travelling conferences and exiles.4 Algeria had in 1964 agreed to host the 
expensive Afro-Asian conference the following year. During the Congo crisis of 1964 
she assumed a vocal and aggressive stance.
By 1965 only two people still wielded power apart from Ben Bella. They were 
Boumedienne, Vice-President and Minister of National Defence and the youthful 
Abdelaziz Boutefiika as Foreign Minister (now President). These two were also allies. 
In the build up to the Afro-Asian conference in June 1965, there were persistent rumours 
to the effect that Ben Bella wanted to sack the foreign minister and after the conference 
dismiss Boumedienne and create a government of national unity in which sidelined 
leaders of the revolution such as Ben Khedda, Mohamed Khider and Ait Ahmed would 
be co-opted. It does appear that Boumedienne was persuaded to act swiftly by his closest 
ally Boutefiika before Ben Bella could get at them.
The coup took place in the early hours of 19 June 1965 with the arrest of Ben Bella and 
his inner circle of allies. The Algerian nation was informed that the Revolutionary 
Council under colonel Houari Boumedienne had taken control of the reins of power. A 
proclamation from the Revolutionary Council lambasted Ben Bella’s rule on many fronts. 
He was denounced as a dictator, having a pathological love for power, at the heart of 
Algeria’s social, economic and political maladies such as mismanagement of national 
resources, political instability and rampant unemployment. The proclamation went 
further and stated how Boumedienne and the Revolutionary Council intended to run the 
country, that is, devoting itself to setting in order and improving the country’s economy. 
The removal of Ben Bella by Boumedienne meant the assertion of the primacy of the 
military over the political.
c. France and Algeria, 1962 to 1965
One of the provisions of the Evian agreement was that there should be a transitional
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period which would end with the holding of the referendum in not less than three months. 
As stated in the previous chapter that, the OAS intensified its terrorist attacks on the eve 
and immediately after the signing of the Evian Accords. These barbaric acts were in the 
form of indiscriminate killing of both European settlers and Muslims, robbing of banks, 
attacks on hospitals in which patients were killed, sabotage of oil-pipelines, massacre of 
Muslim dockers waiting for work, abduction of Europeans and the arson attacks on 
schools in Algiers.5 At the same time, the French security forces intensified the rounding 
up of OAS leaders. First was the arrest of ex-General Edmond Jouhaud in Oran on 25 
March 1962.6 He was tried and sentenced to death but was later reprieved. Then on 20 
April 1962 was the arrest of ex-General Raoul Salan, head of the OAS. He was 
convicted of treason and sentenced to life imprisonment as the high military tribunal said 
they had found “extenuating circumstances” in the case.7
As OAS subversive acts escalated, there was at the same time the mass departures of 
most European settlers to France. These were mainly entrepreneurs managers, engineers, 
teachers, professors, doctors, dentists, technicians, highly skilled workers and the most 
experienced administrators and clerks.8 As Algeria moved close to independence, these 
departures reached panic proportions. At the signing of the Evian accords, it was 
estimated that there were a million settlers or colons in Algeria and it was anticipated that 
two-thirds of these would remain in Algeria. But between March 1962 and independence 
in July that year well over 800,000 settlers had left and this exodus rendered the special 
status provided for the settlers under the Evian accords ineffective. This mass departure 
of the valuable European personnel would later have an adverse effect on the economic 
development of this newly bom nation as it endeavoured to chart its destiny. Too late to 
have any effect on the outcome, the sad chapter of FLN-OAS rivalry was brought to a 
close by the signing of a truce between the two on 17 June 1962.
The relationship between France and Algeria from 1962 to 1965 could be summed up as 
one of independence with interdependence. Continued economic dependence on France 
limited the regime’s freedom of action. Algeria’s leaders’ public utterances against 
France did not correspond with their dealings with France in practice. For France, the 
interdependence was primarily political as Algeria retained a crucial strategic importance, 
especially concerning Third World relations, complementing French foreign policy 
pursuits of greatness {grandeur) and independence,9 For Algeria, its inevitable reliance 
upon France for its social and economic needs, as exemplified by a series of cooperation 
programmes, restricted its assertion of its sovereignty and its revolutionary identity. By 
way of comparison and contrast, whereas the United States isolated Cuba after her 
revolution and this enabled her to go ahead in exporting her revolutionary ideas, Algeria 
remained closely tied to France and this limited whatever revolutionary rhetoric and 
aspirations that Algeria desired to spread throughout the third world . In other words, 
Algeria’s dependence on French aid had an effect on the course of the politics of the 
regime and meant that Algeria was kept in check within the orbit of the Western alliance. 
French-Algerian cooperation programmes covered the military, financial, commercial, 
cultural, technical and hydrocarbons aspects. Added to this, was a wave of Algerian 
economic immigration into France, making the relationship between the two countries 
even closer.
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As French troops began to withdraw in accordance with the time-table set by the Evian 
Agreement, they converged from the south of the country on three points : Oran, Algiers 
and Constantine; from these they were to disembark for France. Although they took their 
arms with them they left behind them many tons of varied equipment. They left vehicles 
and workshops in good order, and barracks fully equipped even down to the bedding.10 
The handing-over process was the beginning of Franco-Algerian co-operation in the 
military field. Furthermore, in order to improve relations, the French government 
accommodated Algeria’s most desired objective, a revision of the Evian Accords’ 
military clauses. By an agreement signed on 2 May 1963, the French promised to 
accelerate the evacuation of French troops. Troop withdrawals, other than those at leased 
bases, were implemented about eight months ahead of schedule. This pleased Ben Bella 
since it presented “a new dimension” promoting “a fruitful and stable cooperation.”11
Another field in which France continued to play the major role in Algeria was the 
provision of financial assistance. The Evian Accords had stipulated the continuation of 
massive French financial assistance toward Algerian development. An agreement was 
signed between the two countries on 26 June 1963 in which France provided an annual 
package of 800 million french francs, divided between free aid and tied aid.12 Free aid 
was transferred to the development fund of the Algerian treasury. This aid could be 
allocated as Algerians wished. Tied aid made, like free aid, in the form of grants was
1 "Xdirected towards realising the projects of the Constantine Plan. By the end of 1963 
public financial assistance by France to Algeria alone amounted to 1,368 million francs. 
This meant that Algeria alone accounted for 52 per cent of all French aid to 
underdeveloped countries.14 French loans provided to Algeria were long-term, more than 
ten years. France also permitted Algeria to have “treasury advances” which funnelled 
francs to Algeria in order to stabilise the deteriorating financial situation.15 In the process 
Algeria accumulated a debt of over a billion francs.16 This financial cooperation brought 
one stark fact into the open, that Algeria’s dependence upon France was inextricable. 
From the Algerian perspective, the Evian financial aid package protected French 
interests, inhibited Algeria’s exercise of its socialist option, and hampered its efforts of 
economic diversification.
The economy of Algeria was tied to France in various ways. After independence,
especially because of the exodus of the colons with much of their capital, Algeria was
less able to be independent economically than ever before. Now cooperation was
extended to the commercial field. This was achieved by several commercial accords
between end of 1963 to the end of 1964. For instance, on 18 January 1964 the two
countries concluded a commercial agreement that preset, for the period 1964 to 1968,
French importation at 33.8 million hectolitres of Algerian wine. 7 By 1964, France
received 73 per cent of Algeria’s exports while 70 per cent of Algeria’s total imports 
18arrived from France. Bearing in mind the disproportionate size of the two economies, it 
is clear that the exports-imports ratio was skewed in favour of France.
Even more important than the material aid that France gave Algeria, however, was her 
invaluable assistance in providing trained personnel. In 1964, there was a proportion of
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Frenchmen in the upper ranks of the Algerian civil service and they formed 43 per cent in 
the administrative grade (Grade A) and 77 per cent in the senior Executive grade (Grade 
B).19 France also sent over 15,000 teachers, and the Algerians would definitely have 
welcomed several thousand more.20 Towards the end of 1964, France and Algeria 
defined a new direction for cultural and technical cooperation. It was agreed that the 
Algerian cadres would be developed to ensure “Algerianization” of all sectors; education 
and technical training would become priorities.21 However, there were other areas in 
which French-Algerian technical cooperation was seriously wanting and did not bring the 
desired effect. For instance, in the sphere of medicine almost all the 1,800 trained 
European doctors had left and Algeria was forced to depend heavily on forty-six doctors 
from Bulgaria, who put a strain in the country’s finances as the Government had to pay 
their salaries.22
In addition, France and Algeria cooperated in the area of hydrocarbons production. One 
of the French gains at Evian was the concessions of the French petrolium companies 
whose discoveries and subsequent production freed France from an overdependence on 
Anglo-American hydrocarbon purchases.23 Once the French companies’ position was 
secured and entrenched in Algeria, they continued to expand production. France’s de 
facto control of the Saharan hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) fields improved France’s 
overall balance of payments, enhanced her competitive position, provided economic 
security, promoted modernisation, and above all projected greatness {grandeur) and 
independence. With France increasingly importing hydrocarbons and Algeria still 
dependent upon a wide array of French commodities and durable goods, trade in the short 
term remained interdependent and relatively balanced.
d. Britain and Africa, 1962 to 1965
The period from 1962 to 1965 was crucial for Britain in Africa, as she wound up most of 
her African colonial commitments in the potential trouble spots, with the exception of 
Southern Rhodesia. During the same period and beyond, British relations with her 
former colonies were transformed into those of “equal” partners under the umbrella of the 
Commonwealth. This section of the discussion looks at the aforementioned period and 
the international standing of Britain at the end of this period. In March 1962, Macmillan 
created a new department which was now responsible for all Central African Affairs. 
The responsibility of heading this new creation fell to R.A. Butler. Soon afterwards, 
Nyasaland’s right of secession was virtually accepted in May 1962. A further Lancaster 
House conference for Nyasaland was held in November 1962, which decided that 
Nyasaland should attain internal self-government. The following month Britain 
conceded that Nyasaland might secede from the Federation and this was officially 
confirmed to the House of Commons on 19 December 1962.
Acceleration to the break-up of the Federation reached its peak in March 1963, when in a 
meeting in London between Butler and Welensky, the former read to the latter a chilling 
draft statement to the effect that, “any Territory must be allowed to secede if it so 
wishes.”24 Welensky protested against this by refusing to go on to lunch with Macmillan 
at 10 Downing Street. To these moves of dissolving the Federation Welensky
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complained th a t:
The most hopeful and constructive experiment in racial partnership that 
Africa has seen in our time has been wantonly destroyed by the 
Government which only ten years earlier gave its impetus....Harold 
Macmillan’s mind was the most complicated I have encountered in my 
political life25
Anthony Sampson has argued that Macmillan’s operation in decolonising Central Africa 
or dissolving the Federation, resembled in miniature de Gaulle’s operation in Algiers; 
both leaders were put into power by their right wing, and then turned against it.26
Meanwhile, on 25 May 1963 representatives of thirty-two African governments signed an 
agreement in Addis Ababa to establish an Organisation of African Unity (OAU ), thus 
partly fulfilling the realisation of the Pan-African ideal championed by leaders such as 
Kwame Nkrumah. Article II of the OAU Charter proclaimed among the purposes of the 
OAU “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.”27 At the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and in the Special Committee on Decolonisation, which was 
established in 1961, it was hoped that the African group could exercise some influence by 
virtue of their numbers unrelated to the strength of individual countries. In July 1963 the 
OAU established a Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, which 
acknowledged that Britain, France and Spain had already recognised the right of colonial 
self-determination, even though diplomatic pressure might be required to expedite its 
implemention.28 At the same time, in the summer (June-July) of 1963 at a conference 
held at Victoria Falls, the Federation’s resources and assets were divided among its three 
components. This was a clear indication that the Federation’s days were numbered. 
Nyasaland (Malawi) finally became independent in July 1964 with Hastings Banda as 
president.
Though Welensky could let Nyasaland leave the Federation with no qualms, he made his 
last stand by fighting fiercely for the retention of Northern Rhodesia in the Federation. 
Not only was Northern Rhodesia important for its sizeable white population but more 
importantly because of its rich copper belt, which was vital for the Federation’s economic 
prosperity. Sometime in the course of 1962 some marginal changes were announced to 
the new constitution for Northern Rhodesia that did contain the possibility of African 
majority rule. In October 1962 elections were held in Northern Rhodesia and resulted in 
a coalition government of UNIP and ANC of Kenneth Kaunda and Hairy Nkambula 
respectively.29 On 28 March 1963, Britain acceded to the Kaunda-Nkambula coalition 
request for Northern Rhodesia to secede from the Federation. The Federation finally 
collapsed in December 1963. After further elections in 1964, Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia) became independent in October 1964 with Kaunda as president. Britain 
concluded the decolonisation of her African colonial territories by conceding 
independence to the Gambia (West Africa) in 1965, Bechuanaland (Botswana) and 
Basutoland (Lesotho) in 1966, Swaziland and Mauritius in 1968. By the end of 1968 the 
bulk of British possessions in South-Central Africa were independent. Apart from the 
Portuguese colonies that were left in the region, and the separate issue of South Africa, 
only Southern Rhodesia remained an issue.
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Developments north of the Zambezi worried Southern Rhodesia settlers and the white 
supremacist Rhodesia Front campaigned on a platform of separate independence for 
Southern Rhodesia. On i l  May 1962, the seventeen-nation United Nations Committee on 
Colonialism endorsed a report (with representatives of Britain, USA, Australia and Italy 
dissenting) that the position in Southern Rhodesia was grave and there was a danger of 
serious conflict if the existing constitution was maintained in the face of “total African 
opposition.”30 In the elections held in October 1962, the Rhodesia Front led by Winston 
Field won. At the time when Butler was in charge of Central African Affairs and his 
main focus was on disentangling the Northern Rhodesia problem, his efforts were 
complicated in the spring of 1963 by the Southern Rhodesia Prime Minister, Winston 
Field as he demanded independence for that territory. African leaders such as Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda are said to have told Macmillan that 
they would leave the Commonwealth if London allowed independence to Southern 
Rhodesia.31 This threat was made, no doubt, because of the flaws in the territory’s 
constitution, which did not contain enough safeguards for the African majority. In the 
meanwhile, in August 1963 the main nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia, ZAPU 
split. A group led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole founded the Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU). At issue was disagreement over ideology and strategy, 
compounded by personal and factional rivalry. Of significance was that ZANU came to 
be dominated mainly by people of Shona origin whereas ZAPU became identified with 
those of Ndebele stock.
At the end of 1963 when the Federation officially collapsed, Welensky retired from front 
line politics. In April 1964, Field, judged by many supporters to have lost a golden 
opportunity to secure independence at the dissolution of the Federation, was ousted from 
the leadership of the Rhodesia Front in favour of the hard-liner, Ian Douglas Smith who 
regarded Southern Rhodesia as his birthright. Under Smith’s leadership the Rhodesia 
Front demanded independence along the same lines accorded Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia. He also embarked upon draconian measures that were aimed at stifling the 
African nationalist movements opposition to his regime. These included the banning of 
ZANU and ZAPU, and a crackdown on the media. Smith further strengthened his grip 
on power by appointing a loyal commander as head of the army and called a general 
election at which most of the white voters overwhelmingly endorsed his uncompromising 
stance on independence.' A succession of British Prime Ministers refused to accede to 
Smith’s demand unless tangible concessions were made to African demands.
When the Labour Party came back into office under Harold Wilson in October 1964, he 
attempted a negotiated settlement but to no avail. On 11 November 1965 Ian Smith 
proclaimed Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) which in 
effect was rebellion against London. This set the stage for a fifteen year long armed 
struggle between Smith’s minority government and the African nationalists. The 
customary Lancaster House Conference held at the end of 1979 reached a compromise 
settlement. The final resolution of the problem was in April 1980 when Smith agreed to 
black majority rule after a general election which was won by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU. 
The country was renamed Zimbabwe.
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Once Britain had concluded the decolonisation process of her African dependencies in 
the 1960s, she now established a “special” relationship through the Commonwealth with 
former members of her vast empire. The Commonwealth since its foundation in the late 
1920s has undergone tremendous changes and transformations in terms of meaning and 
composition. Until 1965 the Commonwealth constituted a special “club” within the 
empire. Becoming a “member of the Commonwealth” was a badge of independence.33 
After 1965, with the creation of the Secretariat, the Commonwealth was transformed into 
a multilateral association, which soon achieved a momentum of its own. The year 1965 
has been characterised as the watershed in the evolution of the modern Commonwealth.34 
The issue of Southern Rhodesia which failed to be resolved in the 1960s became one of 
the most contentious problems that the post-1965 Commonwealth had to deal with. 
African governments, and their supporters inside the Commonwealth, demanded that 
Britain should exercise her sovereignty in bringing the Southern Rhodesia rebellion to an 
end, but without success. Despite the ups and downs in the life of the Commonwealth, it 
has been resilient, and up to this day it still remains the forum in which Britain and her 
former colonies gather together to discuss a variety of issues of mutual interest.
e. Britain and Algeria, 1962 to 1965
The Salan verdict referred to earlier on, angered President de Gaulle and his government. 
He saw the judgement as a condemnation of his Algerian policy and an attempt to 
understand the attitude of Army elements who still clung to the out-dated notion of 
Algerie-francciise. Commenting on the Salan verdict the British broadsheet newspaper 
the Daily Telegragh said the result was one of simple incredulity.35 The paper wondered 
how the same military tribunal that sentenced Jouhaud to death on the same charges to 
Salan could arrive at a different verdict in the latter’s case. Once again double-standards 
had been displayed by the French judiciary and its impartiality questioned. (De Gaulle’s 
anger finally led to the dissolution of the High Military Tribunal and replaced it with an 
all-special court which was to carry out swift and summary justice on captured Secret 
Army killers).30
From the birth of Algeria as an independent State, Britain watched the political and 
economic developments in the huge North African territory with much interest. When 
General de Gaulle proclaimed the independence of Algeria in July 1962, it was also 
immediately recognised by Her Majesty’s Government. On 1 October 1962, Britain 
formally established diplomatic relations with Algeria through the appointment of Her 
Majesty’s Charge d’ Affaires.37 November 1, 1954 the outbreak of the revolution was 
commemorated as a National Day from 1 November 1962. Foreign delegations including 
Sir Roger Stevens of the Foreign Office representing Her Majesty’s Government attended 
the celebrations. Notes for the brief for Sir Roger Stevens at the celebrations give a hint 
at what British officials thought of the newly independent Algerian government.38 British 
thinking was that the first principle of Algerian foreign policy was to take a lead in the 
emancipation of dependent peoples, particularly in Africa.j9 Britain was worried by the 
Algerian leaders tendency to speak of Southern Rhodesia in the same breath as South 
Africa and Angola.40 This, the British viewed as ignorance on the part of Algerians,
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arguing that there was a basic difference between the aims of Her Majesty’s Government 
and those of the South African and Portuguese governments. London added that the 
Algerians had to be reminded that South Africa had an independent government outside 
the Commonwealth 41 In other words South Africa was not a colony in which Britain had 
responsibilities.
The brief also stated another worrisome factor, which was the close relationship that 
Algeria was developing with communist or revolutionary Cuba, while at the same time 
the Algerian attitude towards the Americans was becoming negative as shown by recent 
press coverage. But in the case of Britain the coverage was favourable. The brief 
cautioned that Britain must not express any kind of support for the Americans as this 
would only result in the souring of relations between London and Algiers. This fact is 
interesting, since during the war there had been an Anglo-American front intended to 
ensure that an independent Algerian did not go Communist or make trouble in Africa. It 
now appears that Britain was willing to wink at poor relations with America over Cuba, if 
this could help Great Britain in Africa. Furthermore, the brief stated that although there 
was a qualified respect for the Evian Agreements by Algerian government policy, there 
were by and large Algerian government servants who as a result of their “war” 
experiences and of the OAS terror still bore bitterness and suspicion towards the French, 
and were thus not keen to carry out the agreements. Also Stevens was advised not to 
mention anything relating to NATO as the word was dirty in the Algerian vocabulary; 
the Algerians were distrustful of the organisation. Algerians had during the war believed 
that NATO was supplying France with the ammunition to prosecute the war. Finally, Sir 
Roger Stevens was to convey to the Algerians that Her Majesty’s Government wished to 
develop normal relationship that friendly adult nations enjoy, on a footing of sovereign 
equality and respect for each other’s legitimate interests.42 It can be deduced from the 
above that, Britain was walking a tightrope, that is trying to draw a fine line in her 
relations with the newly independent Algeria.
The background to this diplomatic approach was filled in in the annual review of the 
situation in Algeria for 1962, which gave on the whole an encouraging assessment of the 
economic and political situation in the country. The British annual report on Algeria 
stated that though the Ben Bella regime had a shaky start it was now beginning to assert 
its authority. On Ben Bella himself the report stated that he had increased in stature, had 
many qualities, one of which was his popular appeal, and another his pragmatic approach 
to most problems, which served him well. He had also created some stability in the 
whole country. In British views, they hoped that Ben Bella and his team would be able in 
the coming months to maintain the progress already made.43 According to British 
officials one of the darker sides of Algeria was the one party system she had adopted, 
since it was likely to lead to dictatorship. The report went further to state that the FLN 
had proved its worth as a fighting machine during the war, but with the return of peace 
had revealed its deficiencies and was virtually non-existent inside Algeria. The 
consequence of this was that from the beginning Ben Bella had to rely on the Army. The 
political foundation for democracy was lacking.
On the mass exodus of some 800,000 Europeans, the 1962 annual review stated that this
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meant that the Algeria of the Evian agreement was no longer feasible. The French 
departures had left unattended some 800,000 hectares of land, and 850 factories closed 
out of a total of 2,500. It was also estimated that only some 12,000 European managers 
and factory owners were now left out of 45,000. Unoccupied farms were declared “biens 
vacants” and were handed over to Management Committees. Ploughing was undertaken 
as a crash operation by the Ministry of Agriculture. At the same time the management of 
these properties which had been intended as a first step in agrarian reform at the time of 
the Evian Accords was proving impossible owing to the departure of the Europeans 
farmers, which had forced the hand of the authorities. In the industrial sector, according 
to the annual review, results had proved even more difficult to achieve, lack of credit 
facilities, shortage of managerial and technical staff and shrinking markets had all been 
largely responsible for the negative results. A gloomy economic picture of Algeria was 
thus presented by British officials in relation to economic matters.
In the field of foreign affairs, the British assessment of Algeria was that her foreign 
policy was one of non-alignment in the East/West relations, which included the following 
elements: continuation of the struggle against colonialism, strengthening of Algeria’s 
links with the non-committed nations, the development of its relations with the socialist 
countries and the widening of its relationships with the Western countries, particularly 
France. Measured in terms of aid received, the results of this policy had been 
satisfactory. Algeria had since independence been kept going by budgetary aid from 
France, emergency relief in the form of food and clothing from the United States and a 
variety of aid, technical, material and financial from many sources. In the Arab world, 
according to the review, Algeria had as expected built some sort of special relationship 
with Nasser’s Egypt, although they appeared to have resisted the temptation of taking 
sides in Arab squabbles. Her relations with her immediate neighbours had been bad or 
indifferent. In Africa, support for anti-colonialist movements had by the end of 1962 not 
had time to get fully under way. What was more encouraging for British mandarins was 
the fact that the Algerians were not antagonistic or unfriendly towards Britain or Her 
Majesty’s Government, though they said they (Algerian) had not forgotten what they 
regarded as Britain’s blind support for the French Government over the Algerian issue. 
So, 1962 was not only the year of independence, but was also the year of truth in the 
evolution of Algeria. In other terms, the British annual report was giving a mixed picture 
of the situation in Algeria albeit encouraging.
According to a report on the political and economic conditions in Algeria prepared for the 
Federation of British Industries by the The Economist Intelligence Unit in June 1963, Ben 
Bella’s closest Algerian political associate was colonel Houari Boumedienne, the 
Minister of Defence and leader of the ALN ; the latter was a shy man, without personal 
ambition ( how ironic?) and the regime’s loyal supporter rather than its “eminence 
grise.”44 The year (1963) saw the signing of a number of satisfactory international 
agreements, mostly involving aid in some form or other with Yugoslavia, Egypt, Kuwait, 
United States, Soviet Union, China and on a more modest scale with the United 
Kingdom. Official and political relations with France were still governed by the Evian 
agreements, which wound up the Franco-AIgerian war and accorded Algeria 
independence. According to The Economist report the Algerian government’ attitude to
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the accords was to say the least eclectic.45 The confiscation of French-owned land 
without prior compensation arrangement was quite contrary to the text of the agreement, 
but Ben Bella had explained that he had chosen to ignore the textual provisions on the 
grounds that it was not the text which counted, but the spirit in which it was applied. 
Parallels could be made with Zimbabwe when in 2000 the Mugabe regime began to 
confiscate white owned farms without compensation contrary to the text of the Lancaster 
House Agreement of 1979.
The Economist Intelligence Unit report in its assessment of opportunities for British firms 
in trade in Algeria concluded that there were no opportunities for British firms in the 
supply of consumer durables and other non-essential consumer items, owing to the 
collapse of the domestic market.46 Though the market for cheap goods, such as textiles 
and processed foods had not been disrupted, it was very slack, in spite of Algerian efforts 
to diversify suppliers. Any sales effort made in this direction would not pay off in the 
long run, because of the Algerian plans to create tariff and quota protected domestic 
industries in this general field. The Economist went further to state that the prospects as 
regards equipment were better. Opportunities in this area mostly lay in the supply of 
equipment to the government and public corporations, especially textile and steel mills, 
shoemaking plants and some types of agricultural machinery 47 The British firm Mather 
and Platt was already negotiating an agreement with the government, with regard to the 
setting up of a textile mill. As regards opportunities in Algerian public works, The 
Economist report concluded that these were little or non-existent because Algerian 
contractors were working below capacity and tenders were now only offered to local 
firms.48
The annual British review of 1963 contained in the report by Evans from Algiers stated 
that the year proved to be one of “leap forward” in Algerian socialism and ended with a 
pause for consolidation.49 Algerians had had socialism thrust upon them. This was as a 
consequence of the exodus of French farmers in 1962 which left the Government with no 
alternative but to acquiesce in the peasants taking over the farms. In 1963 the half­
hearted management of many enterprises by French and also Algerian industrialists 
compelled the Government to take them over. In both cases it was the absence of a long 
established Algerian middle class and the suspect character of the emergent bourgeoisie 
(many of whom had made their fortunes during the revolution) that made some form of 
socialism virtually inevitable; while in the absence of qualified cadres there was no 
alternative to autogestion.50
The pause, however, was necessitated by the fact that it had become apparent for some 
time that the Algerian socialists had bitten off more than they could chew. The need for 
consolidation was explained by Bachir Boumaza, the Minister of National Economy, in a 
remarkable speech which he had delivered before the Chamber when presenting the 1964 
Budget.51 He emphasised that during this period not only would the socialist sector be 
overhauled. The credit machinery, which had been devised to meet the needs of other 
times, would receive particular attention, although private and semi-private including 
foreign enterprises would be permitted to exist and even encouraged, provided they 
collaborated loyally in making possible the ultimate triumph of socialism. At the end of
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the period of consolidation, which would, however, be a long one, private enterprise 
would wither away. Boumaza at the same time threw a good deal of light on the regime’s 
ultimate aims and intentions. Their ambition was to set up a strong modern Socialist 
State, independent economically as well as politically. Full advantage was to be taken of 
the country’s material and human potential, the oil and gas of the Sahara and the energy 
and skills of the people, many thousands of whom had worked in France. Algeria could 
not, he said, continue to be the classic colonialist market exporting raw materials.52 The 
new Algeria was to develop economic relations with Arab, African, Socialist as well as 
European countries, although geographically, proximity would favour the latter.
Boumaza stated further that during the consolidation period, France would continue to 
enjoy a special position, based on customs, preference for French goods and special 
currency arrangements, in return for which he clearly expected that Algeria would 
continue to enjoy French financial and technical aid. Similarly, he cautioned that 
preferential commercial arrangements with France would have to be replaced gradually 
by agreements with Arab, African, Socialist and European countries. The specific 
mention of the latter led the 1963 British annual review of Algeria to say that it was 
encouraging and that the United Kingdom should not miss any opportunity in ensuring 
the presence of her interests. This was in no way to oust French interests, but in order to 
prevent undue Communist participation in the Algerian market, whether in Algeria 
proper or in the Sahara. Britain had earlier on in the year offered Algeria a loan of half-a- 
million pounds sterling and promised credit facilities for the construction of a new oil- 
pipeline, which the Algerians wished to build and run themselves.53 All these were 
indications to Britain that the Algerian leaders were in no doubt of the benevolent interest 
of the United Kingdom in Algeria’s vital industrial sector.
In foreign policy by 1963 according to the British annual review, Algeria still adhered to 
her non-alignment policy. Algerian-American relations were now generally good. In 
case of her neighbours, Algerian-Moroccan relations had deteriorated, and culminated in 
October 1963 with the Algerian-Moroccan frontier war in which the former lost heavily. 
At the same time there was growing antipathy between Ben Bella and King Hassan II of 
Morocco. This was both personal as well as ideological. There was no doubt that the 
Algerian revolution was for export, and that Ben Bella preferred a Socialist republic to a 
Moroccan monarchy. And he was convinced that time was working for him, and seemed 
to be ready to help in the process through subversion rather than by military means.54
This was not encouraging. In fact, although the political situation seemed stable, with no 
sign of a rift between Ben Bella and Boumedienne, the overall picture was gloomy. In 
British eyes inasmuch as the last months of 1962 saw growing disillusionment with 
independence, 1963 ended with the masses disillusionment with socialism.
This gloom was confirmed in 1964. The British annual review of the Algerian situation 
of 1964 did not make good reading. It portrayed a depressing picture of political 
dictatorship and the crushing of internal dissidence. The Algeria regime according to the 
review, during the course of the year strengthened its position and its mandate without 
resolving its own interior problems, it became more totalitarian in its technique and
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contained the internal resistance to it.55 The British official conclusion of an analysis of 
the situation in Algeria in 1964 was that the Government was under the strain of serious 
material problems and was intrinsically fissible.56 And if things were to get really bad, 
British thinking was that Boumedienne’s moment might arrive, though at the same time 
there was no sign of this yet. British officials further concluded that though by the end of 
the year the situation appeared to have stabilised, the future was still bleak. Though they 
admitted that it was difficult to make any extrapolation with confidence on the situation 
in Algeria, they thought that it was probable that the revolution would bluff its way on, 
but with nothing of credit to it. To these observers, Algeria was a country on the wrong 
path, whose economic, political and social fabric was collapsing.
Against this background, however, British-Algerian relations continued to improve. 
Relations with France were delicate, and those with the US were once again bad, despite 
the latter’s aid. This was partly due to the fact that the United States was deeply involved 
at the points where Algerian emotions were mostly engaged, such as Cuba and the 
Congo.57 Britain by contrast, had managed to evolve an acceptable image of willingness 
to do business and keep off politics. Two major events in the economic development of 
Algeria happened in 1964. One was the gas Iiquefication project which was completed 
and the third oil pipeline was started. Britain was the principal client for one and was 
constructing the other. The pipeline being built was between Hassi-Messaoud and 
Arzew.58 A contract for the building of this pipeline was placed with Constructors John 
Brown of London. This was a consortium of British merchant banks, led by Kleinwort, 
Benson Limited, and they made a loan of £18.6 million repayable in eleven years at 5.5 
per cent interest over the first seven years.59 British participation in this venture led to 
the first overseas purchase of Algerian gas, to supply London. A fifteen-year contract 
was signed with the British Gas Council for the delivery of about one billion cubic metres 
annually; two methane tankers of 12,000 tons each were specifically built to transport 
it.60 The pipeline, in particular, touched the point at which Algeria wished to diversify 
her economic dependence on France, while retaining Western markets and methods. 
Britain felt that she was fairly well placed to carry this relationship forward.
Military takeovers are generally regarded as anathemas or taboos in the vocabulary of the 
international community. What is surprising and even arousing curiosity was the 
lukewarm response or indifference that the Algerian coup of 19 June 1965 generated. 
Not only were the Algerians suiprised by the sudden turn of events; so was the 
international community. Commenting on the coup the Spectator said it had no motive 
other than the personal rivalry between Ben Bella and Boumedienne,61 that had always 
been marked. The New Statesman referred to it as the quiet revolution because even the 
early riser of Algiers did not realise that it was happening.62 Even the resistance to it was 
sporadic and showed no enthusiasm for the former president. According to The Times, 
Colonel Houari Boumedienne was always the power behind the throne in the new 
Algeria. And he had not had the look of a man content with the role of kingmaker.63 The 
paper stated that it was Boumedienne who put Ben Bella in the Algerian presidency and 
kept him there as long as it suited his purpose. The Guardian for its part referred to 
Boumedienne as the quiet man who carried out the coup.64 It argued that the colonel 
feared that he was gradually to be divested of his power and it appeared essential to him
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to organise a military coup while he was in a position of authority. For the putsch to be 
successful, it had to be organised before the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers, however 
inconvenient this might be to many of the delegations attending it because Ben Bella’s 
prestige as host to so many important Heads of State would have greatly increased his 
stature both at home and abroad.
British government authorities were kept abreast of the developments in Algeria 
immediately after the coup by their diplomatic missions in North Africa, France and 
Washington. The British embassy in Algiers reported that from many of its sources it 
had come to the conclusion that the coup was motivated by personal rivalry between Ben 
Bella and his colleagues.65 The former was alleged to be consciously or unconsciously 
driving the country towards Communism and away from Islam, trampling on his 
colleagues, humiliating them and ignoring their advice.66 In taking his decisions, Ben 
Bella was motivated primarily by desire to enhance his own position, and acted without 
consulting his colleagues. For example, his decision to sign a cease-fire with the 
Socialist Forces Front (FFS) might or might not have been justified, but no one else was 
consulted. His policy towards leading dissidents was considered generally confused and 
again motivated by considerations of personal prestige 67 It was further reported that Ben 
Bella had been trying to demote Boumedienne and Bouteflika in the hierarchy and lessen 
their influence. Even his attitude towards the party he had created had not done him good 
because he had antagonised the party ideologues by maintaining that the party was only 
the means to an end.
From Paris, the British Ambassador Sir P. Reilly reported that the French seemed to have 
been taken by surprise by the Algerian coup d'etat.68 Though they had noted tension 
between Ben Bella and Bouteflika they had seen no concrete evidence of recent 
fundamental disagreement between Ben Bella and the Army. Even French politicians 
such as Mendes-France who had recently been to Algiers reported that he had noticed no 
sign of unrest and that Ben Bella had seemed to be at ease and full of confidence 69 But 
the Quai d’Orsay admitted that early in June they had heard reports to the effect that 
United States sources had evidence that the army coup was being prepared.70 The Paris 
briefing further states that reaction among left-wing Algerians in France were strongly 
anti-Boumedienne: they called him a fascist adventurer. The French had taken note of 
the fact that the new Algerian regime wished to continue to cooperate with France, 
although they had also taken note of the fact that Boumedienne had criticised the Evian 
agreements for giving too much to France. The French Council of Ministers on 23 June 
1965 agreed that the events which had taken place inside Algeria in no way modified the 
relations between France and Algeria,71 and that there should be a continuation of the 
previous cooperation. This was symbolised that morning by the departure of oil experts 
who were going to put finishing touches to the agreement on hydrocarbons.72 What was 
important was the interdependence between the two countries no matter who governed.
From Washington, the Ambassador there Sir P.Dean briefed the Foreign Office on the 
United States preliminary assessment of the new regime. The United States thought that 
the new regime might be marginally less ill-disposed towards the White House than the 
previous one.7j The State Department’s North African section was instructed to call on
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Bouteflika and inform him of the United States Government’s desire to conduct normal 
business with the new regime.74 The Americans did not think that a formal act of 
recognition should be necessary unless the Algerians asked for it. A Foreign Office 
telegram to Washington stated that there seemed no doubt that the new Government was 
in effective control of the territory and there was unlikely to be any mass disobedience on 
the part of the Algerian population, despite the few demonstrations that still continued.75 
The letter stated that instructions were about to be issued authorising Her Majesty’s 
Ambassador in Algiers to deal with the new Government in the normal way, in the 
knowledge that to do so would afford recognition of it.
A British summary of the consequences for Algeria of the recent downfall of Ben Bella 
prepared by Sir Thomas Bromley in Algiers concluded that there was a possible change 
of emphasis in relations with the Arab world and Black Africa by the new administration. 
Algeria was likely to remain a supporter of Arab unity, but Egypt could not expect to 
have the same influence it had in Algeria under Ben Bella. The new Algerian 
government, Bromley’s report stated was also likely to reduce its interest in Black Africa. 
Algeria would remain committed to African unity and to the support of liberation 
movements, but representatives of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) 
were now worried about their future under the new regime.76 The ANC and other 
liberation movements in Africa had been extravagantly receiving aid from Ben Bella’s 
government. The ANC’s fears however, were soon allayed. Arslan Humbaraci has 
contended that the foreign policy of Boumedienne’s government over the post-coup 
period was consistent on the whole with Bouteflika’s statement on 20 June 1965: “the era 
of noisy speeches, vulgar catchwords and of impulsive frenzy was over.”77 A 
manifestation of a more sober foreign policy was discernable in Algeria’s contacts with 
the “liberation movements,” many of which had been indiscriminatingly encouraged by 
the Ben Bella regime. Boumedienne confined his attention to the more serious and stable 
among them such as : the ANC of South Africa and FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique) in Mozambique.78 These continued to receive aid from Algeria, but such 
aid was now given with much less ostentation than under Ben Bella. Apart from Africa, 
the British summary on Ben Bella’s downfall further stated that relations with the West in 
general and France in particular were unlikely to be affected. As for Anglo-Algerian 
relations there was no danger to it and to the former’s commercial and other interests.79 
So, Her Majesty’s Government had now decided to carry on business as usual, as this 
was perceived as the right policy to pursue.
f. Conclusion
Although the Evian accords concluded the Algerian war and resulted in her 
independence, the Algeria envisaged under the accords was not realised. This was due to 
the OAS terrorism and many Europeans left the country because they were not certain of 
their future under the Algerians whom they had fought so bitterly against. Algeria, thus 
lost the qualified French personnel who could have imparted their various expertise to 
Algeria’s development. But the Algeria that the French left was not at peace with itself. 
The personal rivalries and animosities that had been concealed throughout the struggle 
now came to the fore. France had not left an Algeria with any democratic structures in
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which the new Algerian leaders could build on; this was one of the main contrasting 
features of French decolonisation to the British one. Failure on the part of the Algerian 
leaders themselves to realise their differences and acknowledge that everyone of them 
had made a contribution to the liberation in whatever form exacerbated and entrenched 
this lack of a democratic culture. The consequence of this was the emergence of leaders 
who wanted to arrogate power to themselves and became myopic ideologues bent on 
settling old scores at the expense of the nation. The outcome was the coup of 1965.
France developed a new relationship with Algeria along the same lines that she 
developed ties with Black Africa. Since Algeria was a special case during the colonial 
period, even the relationship entered into or maintained after decolonisation was unique 
in the sense that France signed multiple agreements of cooperation with Algeria because 
she had a variety of interests. Some of these treaties led to incidents of friction as they 
seemed to infringe upon Algeria’s integral sovereignty. Britain on the other hand, after 
her successful decolonisation of most of British Africa in the relatively peaceful 
atmosphere of the 1960s, strove hard to keep away from politics in her dealings with the 
new Algerian government. London established diplomatic relations, as would normally 
be the case between two equal sovereign independent states. Furthermore, despite the 
deteriorating social, economic and political situation in Algeria, worsening relations with 
the United States, over-dependence on France, Britain on the other hand was making 
good out of the situation, as Algeria became a relatively important trading partner. In the 
wider picture of international relations in the era of decolonisation and the Cold War, this 
relatively quiet end to the Algerian affair was in keeping with the general outcome of 
empire, in which the case for decolonisation as a means of keeping the Third World 
either in the Western camp or out of the Soviet camp had prevailed over the maintenance 
of colonial rule as a means to the same end. Only South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 
were left to maintain the position that Algeria had proved to be impossible, and to find 
out for themselves that it was so. It was ironic that 1965, which effectively concluded the 
Algerian war with an end to the power struggle it had left behind, saw the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia and the beginning of “Britain’s 
Algeria”: except that, in this case the metropolitan power was not only excluded by the 
settlers, but refused to intervene by other than diplomatic means and economic sanctions.
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Epilogue -Literature Review
What follows now is a brief survey of some of the secondary literature around the subject 
published during or after the war in English, that gives an idea of the way that Algeria 
was viewed at the time in the Anglo-American world, views that became the starting- 
point of the controversy over the war that has continued to the present day.
The wartime literature began with the publication of A Survey o f North West Africa (the 
Maghrib) by Nevill Barbour who used to work for the Eastern Services of the BBC. He 
tackled the question of “statehood” or “nationhood” which some writers had concluded 
was lacking in Algeria. He concurred with the Algerian nationalist writer, Mustefa 
Lacheraf, who argued that Algeria had always been a living entity, not an object as some 
claimed.1 Barbour stated that no one could deny that an Algerian fatherland existed 
before, which was why most Algerians took up arms and laid down their lives to save it 
from the French. The struggle signified a revival of a society that had gone into a period 
of convalescence from 1871 to the 1920s. After the Philippeville massacres as a result of 
which he said “a moat of blood was dug between the two communities,” he expressed 
some pessimism about the whole conflict being solved through peaceful means.2
Michael Clark a former correspondent of the New York Times, in his book, Algeria in 
Turmoil: A History o f the rebellion, supported Algerie francai.se. For him, the European 
Algerians wanted to defend their freedoms which were threatened by the Muslims.-3 He 
believed the American public was being misled by the press about European Algerians. 
Clark argued that the French and Muslims could co-exist only under the French Republic. 
French methods of dealing with the rebellion to him were justified because France was 
fighting heartless terrorists who killed even innocent civilians, encouraged to do this from 
outside under the name of Arab nationalism. Henry Alleg’s The Question, detailed the 
systematic use of torture by the French security police as a form of interrogation.4 The 
author argued that even the terrorism that the FLN was notoriously known for was the 
consequence of France’s own doing, since the French had everything: soldiers, money 
and arms, as opposed to the rebels who had only the support of their people.5 With this 
imbalance the rebels had to resort to terrorism as the only means of defence.
Lorna Hahn’s North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood, had the blessing of an 
introduction penned by the famous John F. Kennedy who said the book was scholarly and 
of great public service.6 Kennedy stated that the Algerian war had a great influence 
because its repercussions could be felt in the West. This resulted in the souring of 
relations between the West and the rest of Africa, while Algeria and North Africa would
n
be of strategic importance in the Cold War. Hahn argued that the war was started by 
young people who were impatient with change, as they also felt their leadership was slow 
in taking drastic action.8 Those young people who started the Algerian war were partly 
inspired in the spring of 1947 by the speech by President Harry Truman, promising 
assistance to peoples fighting for freedom. Hahn further argued that the Algerian 
“nation” had long existed, evidenced by the way the majority of the Muslim people 
rallied to the FLN’s call. However, the propaganda campaign perhaps encouraged more 
than a necessary amount of intimidation and terrorism.9
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Joan Gillespie’s Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution, continued along the lines of Barbour 
and Hahn that Algerian nationalism had long existed. For her, the Muslims had a strong 
historical and cultural tradition which went far beyond the limits of Algeria.10 She 
criticised the American government for being silent for so long about the dreadful 
Algerian conflict, with the result that the American public was led to think that no United 
States interests were at stake.11 She contended that concrete United States interests of a 
long term nature were in the balance. North Africa was a strategic NATO complex of 
Mediterranean bases vital to US security.12 She condemned American military and 
economic support for France an that American bombs and guns were used to kill 
defenceless Algerians.
In Ordeal in Algeria, Richard and Joan Brace argued that the 1958 Gaullist coup d ’etat in 
France opened the world to the Algerian question.13 The book tried to present the 
Algerian rebellion from the European, American and Arab perspectives. The authors 
contend that the failure of France and West generally to solve the Algerian question 
increased the chances of Algeria slipping from the Western-oriented Maghrib, away from 
the benevolent influence of Morocco and Tunisia towards the East.14 The relationship 
between NATO and France was shown to have been complicated by this war with the 
alliance being held at ransom by France which used the conflict to get help in return for 
agreeing to NATO programmes. Both authors are American and are very critical of their 
country’s economic and military support for France, despite preaching self-determination 
of the oppressed peoples of the world. The book further showed the division in American 
political life in the sense that not all Americans were aware of the gravity of the conflict 
and even those who were, differed in their opinions on the way forward in dealing with 
the Algerian issue. For instance, by 1957, the Democratic Party Senator for 
Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy (later President) became a leading figure advocating 
Algerian independence, but not all his Democratic Party colleagues supported his views 
on this issue.15 On the other hand, the Republican Eisenhower administration, whose 
vice-president Richard Nixon had visited North Africa in March 1957, was indifferent to 
or merely paid lip service to the Algerian question.
The Anglo-American Predicament: The British Commonwealth and European Unity, by
H.C. Allen, Commonwealth Fund Professor of American History in the University of 
London, addressed both the British and American peoples.16 The book is divided into 
three parts. Part One is especially addressed to Great Britain; Part Two to the United 
States; and Part Three to both nations, as well as to the free world in general. The thesis 
of the book was the imperative necessity of a federal Atlantic Union, both to strengthen 
the West in its struggle with Communism, and to fortify the democracy, and develop 
fully the prosperity of the free world. It pronounced that only a united Anglo-American 
determination could actually bring this into existence. In the case of France, she was for 
a long time characterised by internal political instability, which resulted in her failure to 
defend her people when World War II broke out. But France was redeemed during the 
course of the War by the proud inspiration of General de Gaulle, who led her to a sense 
of “nationhood,” only to be rejected when the war was over by politicians of his country, 
who re-established, under the guise of the Fourth Republic, the spirit and many of the
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institutions of the Third Republic. Thus, in the 1950s, France was faced with a problem 
so grave and so charged with emotion in Algeria that only the most vigorous action could 
hope to solve it. France, once again, turned to the greatest of contemporary Frenchmen, 
de Gaulle, whose policies almost all observers abroad most ardently prayed could solve 
the Algerian problem.17 As a result of France’s political history which was dominated by 
both domestic and foreign violence, Britain was urged to be cautious in entering a 
European political union, with France as a member, since stability could not be 
guaranteed.
Tanya Matthews was correspondent of The Birmingham Post based in Tunis, and her
book The Algerian A.B.C., had the foreword written by M ’hammed Yazid, Minister of
Information, Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, who stated that the
18independence of Algeria did not rule out future co-operation with France. Co-operation 
would be fruitful, particularly in the economic and cultural field and it would also be in 
the interests of the two peoples. Tanya Matthews was Russian-bom, but married in 
Britain. She compared French Algeria to the Russia of Joseph Stalin. For instance, in 
Stalin’s Russia, one could hardly find a family without a relation or a friend who had 
been arrested or questioned on a political charge or sent to a concentration camp.19 In 
Algeria, likewise, one could find very few Muslim families without members or friends 
who had either been arrested, imprisoned or regrouped, or otherwise killed or tortured in 
search of information.20 Generally, the book attempts to examine the origins and history 
of the Algerian war. It covered the nature and origins of Algeria, French conquest in 
1830, the subsequent European colonisation ; with the growing demands by Algerian 
Muslims for a greater part in running the country and the rejection or deformation of 
these demands under pressure from the European settlers. Finally, it dealt with the 
outbreak and development of the rebellion and various attempts to solve it.
David Schoenbrun wrote an introduction to Jules Roy’s, The War in Algeria, in which he 
contended that France’s problems were America’s too. The failure of France to bring an
9 1honourable peace to Algeria was also America’s failure. The United States was in a 
dilemma because while France was a vital NATO ally, at the same time, the US 
championed the freedom of the oppressed people of the Third World and was supplying 
the French with helicopters and bombs to hunt the rebels. He argued that if the United 
States dissociated itself from France, it risked the break-up of the Atlantic alliance. 
Surely, he argued, it would have been absurd to save North Africa and lose the North 
Atlantic.22 On the whole, the book dealt with the fighting in Algeria and was critical of 
the settlers and the army in Algeria. Benoist Rey The Throat Cutters, whose translation 
was by G. Lobbenberg, told mainly of the atrocities committed by the French in Algeria, 
but it should be pointed out that it also details atrocities committed by Algerians 
themselves often against their own people, and even against children.23 The events in 
France and Algeria are said to be terrifying and reminiscent of Germany in the early 
1930s, of the conditions that gave Hitler his chance.24 The author viewed the situation in 
Algeria and France as having posed a greater peril to the world than the possession of 
nuclear weapons.
The Algerian Problem, by the British journalist, Edward Behr, Paris and North African
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correspondent of Reuters and Time Magazine, argued that the idea of a true “Algerian 
nation” began after 1945, but that does not mean the inhabitants had been docile objects 
of their more advanced and organised previous colonisers such as the Phoenicians, 
Romans, Spanish, Turkish or French.25 They were often on the brink of rebellion, but the 
segmented nature of the society and inter-clan rivalry always made them easy victims. 
The outbreak of the rebellion was blamed on the divided post-World War II governments 
in France. The irresponsible National Assembly was consequently no longer able to 
initiate and execute a given policy overseas.26 The result was that the Fourth Republic 
was characterised by a lack of discipline at all levels of administration, and everything 
was left to the army and hardline colons. The Fourth Republic failed to accept the 
realities of the Algerian problem. The only window of opportunity was provided by the 
coming into power of General de Gaulle in May 1958. Behr argued that for many years, 
French public opinion was blinded in its attitude to the Algerian problem by French 
politicians. It was the coming to power of the father figure, de Gaulle, that started to 
open up the Algerian problem to the French public. Although de Gaulle’s tactics might 
have prolonged the war and given false impression to the French settlers in Algeria, he 
nevertheless succeeded in “demystifying” the Algerian problem such that all sane French 
people came to realise they must be prepared to recognise and even talk to the rebels.27 
Despite pessimism over the outcome of the negotiations, at least the first steps had been 
put in motion.
In France and Algeria : Complementary Enemies, by Germaine Tillion, the Algerian 
problem is defined as complex, with economic and political aspects affecting both 
Europeans and Muslims.28 In relation to the economic aspect, the author argued that 
France alone could find solutions to it. Politically, however, the solution was out of 
France’s hands. Both Algeria and France were part of the solution, and were mutually 
dependent. Neither of the two societies could have its own way without taking into 
account the wishes of the other. By the end of 1956, the FLN had mobilised the majority 
of the Muslim masses to its side and under almost every Muslim society there was a 
structure set up to support the revolution.29 Of course, one could argue about the 
existence or non-existence of the Algerian nationality during this or that period of history, 
but after six years of war, the Algerian nation was a reality and the French were the ones 
who forged it and helped it to grow/
A Scattering o f Dust, by Herb Greer, an American photographer/ journalist, was based
upon his experience of two winter clandestine visits to the FLN reporting the war from
the rebel side. The author made clear his admiration for the rebels and sympathised with
them. The FLN admitted that at times they murdered women and children but their main
targets were French soldiers and traitors. The rebels criticised the Americans for helping
3 1France with money and arms.' They were also suspicious of American interest in their 
cause, suspecting they were interested mainly in oil. The rebels refuted the charge that
39they were communists, viewing theirs as a struggle for political independence. They 
further refuted the claim that they were fighting a holy war. To them that was another 
French invention to win American support.3j It was during these visits to, and travels 
with the rebels that Greer saw that they were not in agreement as to what to do with the 
country once victory was achieved, in terms of political development. He saw that this
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would be one contentious issue and indeed it brought the country to the brink of civil war 
in the summer of 1962 and the post-independence uncertainty that followed and threw the 
country into the morass that afflicted it for the better part of the twentieth century.
Arslan Humbaraci’s, Algeria: A Revolution That Failed: A Political History Since 1954, 
expressed disillusionment with independent Algeria, The work of a Turkish journalist 
who had followed the Algerian war in every aspect and was sympathetic to the FLN’s 
cause. He considered the FLN as a band of brothers (ikhwan), a race apart, outstanding 
in Africa and the Middle East: a race formed in the toughest of all schools.34 They 
deserved respect and support, and were enthusiastic for their cause and their conduct in 
fighting for it was very impressive. His disillusionment set in, when at independence he 
saw the lack of unity among the Algerian revolutionaries, and their thirst for power 
allowed the political and military groups to overcome all other considerations.35 Algeria 
had by 1966 become a police state no better than before. Humbaraci’s book is evidence 
of the disappointment felt abroad at the outcome of the war.
The attitude of Her Majesty’s Government, that the Algerian affair was effectively closed 
in 1962, is nevertheless reflected in Alistair Horne’s major history, A Savage War of 
Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 of 1977, which regards the outcome as definitive and on the 
whole satisfactory, and thus relegates the war to history. It was the first complete 
account of the war in English and aroused a lot of controversy. Home's book was a 
comprehensive narrative, well-balanced, and well written as an episode of French rather 
than Algerian history. It is a centre piece whose judgements are in terms of cause and 
effect rather than right or wrong. He argued that it was a “war of peace” in that no 
declaration of hostilities was ever made, and during most of the eight years the vast 
majority of Frenchmen lived unaffected by it.36 Equally, it was undeniably and horribly 
savage, bringing death to an estimated one million Muslim Algerians and the expulsion 
from their homes of approximately the same number of European settlers.37 Though at 
the time of its first publication, the book was regarded as the last word on the Algerian 
war, in effect, it turned out to open a new debate over the war in the subsequent years. 
Only Elie Kedourie violently objected in his review of Horne in the Times Literary 
Supplement (TLS); today, he may not have been proved right, but the disappointment of 
the 1960s has been justified. Forty years on, Algeria is still pretty much in a bad shape.
Martin Thomas, (Reader in International History, University of West of England, 
Bristol), in his book, The French North African Crisis : Colonial Breakdown and Anglo- 
French Relations, 1945-62, has touched on the subject that this study discusses. The 
book was about France’s North African crisis within the fabric of the western alliance 
and within France’s partnership with Britain in particular. Following closely behind 
Thomas’s book was Irwin M. Wall’s France, the United States and the Algerian War. 
The gist of the book was an American perspective of the Algerian war of independence. 
The book attempts to put the Algerian war in an international context, to deal with it as a 
world crisis and not simply a French one.’9 Wall contended that France was severely 
constrained in the prosecution of the war by international realities: the Cold War, Soviet 
ambitions in the Middle East and North Africa, and the attitudes of its European allies. 
But first and above all stood the problem of French relations with the United States 40 His
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argument revolved around the fact that contrary to what most historians have believed, de 
Gaulle instead intended to keep Algeria French, that he never meant to disappoint the 
hopes of the constituencies which had brought him to power, and that the Algerian War 
underlay practically all his diplomatic initiatives from 1958 to 1962, which were 
designed to achieve that end. He argued further that the major reason for the failure of de 
Gaulle’s diplomatic initiatives from 1958 to 1962 was his inability to convince the 
Americans to cooperate with him; only then did he begin to think about diplomatic 
“independence.”41
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